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Executive Summary
S.1 General
COTS* was defined in this study as commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) prod,rts, ruggedized and militarized compo-
nents, and COTS technology. This study cites the benefits
of integrating COTS + in space, postulates a COTS + inte-
gration methodology, and develops requirements and an
architecture to achieve integration. Developmental needs
and concerns were identified throughout the study; these
needs, concerns, and recommendations relative to their
abatement are subsequently presented for further action
and study.
The study described a total COTS + system concept consist-
ing of COTS + hardware, software, systems, architecture,
and their requirements. The Airfines Eleclronic Engineer-
ing Committee (AEEC) draft of Project Paper 651,
"Design Guidance for IntegratedModular Avionics," and
the Boeing 777 airplane avionics architecturewere used
extensively to establish the concept.
The concept was implanted fi'om the bottom up into con-
ceptual space avionic architectures represeating different
future manned mission vehicles. The bouom-up integra-
tions met with furore manned mission top-down require-
ments that were also developed in the study. The melding
of integrations with requirements disclosed compatible
unions or, in most cases, compatibility differences. These
differences were resolved by changes to mission/vehicle
requirements, architecture, and/or COTS + product/testing
requirements. Differences requiring further development
were identified as needs. Difficult differences were consid-
ered concerns.Differences requiring significant involve-
ment, time lapse, or risk were ia._.ntitied as technology
gaps.
The COTS + concept appears atwactive. The study base-
lined a feasible space vehicle architectural approach sup-
ported by unique requirements for COTS + missions,
operations, vehicles, and components. The subject of
COTS + in space should not be accepted, de-emphasized, or
dismissed by this study; there is much work to be done to
further its cause, test its utility, and/or disprove its merits.
Detailed work is required to accommodate needs and
resolve concerns. In particular, system tradeoff studies
must examine the impact of incorporating COTS + as pre-
sented herein. That is, we have taken the approachofmini-
mizing nonrecurring development by using COTS + in
operational environments compatible with COTS + compo-
nent design.Our studyconcludesthatfuturemanned space
avionic systems may be implemented with such an
approach. Nevertheless, a system-level assessment is
needed to validate the approach.
S.2 COTS* Benefits
S.2.1 Reducing Technology Gaps
This study was initiated with a desire to assess integrating
COTS + technology within space avionics to the advantage
of the space program. Of the many COTS* benefits
described in the study (cost, capability, dependability, pro-
curement lead times), the effect of shortening procurement
lead times with COTS + technology is significant.
Because COTS + technology represents present- or near-
term technology, its use minimizes space avionics technol-
ogy gaps. This fact is substantiated by comparing COTS +
product maturities to identified technology gaps. The
recent General Dynamics Space Avionics Requirements
Study [SPACg0] identifies future manned mission technol-
ogy gaps that currently exist. The study identified and
evaluated 143 critical technologies applicable to space
avionic architectures. Technologies were classified into
three categories:
• Green--ixesent or near term technology that can be
used in a production system within five years.
• Yellow---developmental technology that does not
require a major breakthrough.
* Red---a technology gap area that requires a major
breakthrough.
By comparing the list of categorized technologies within
the Space Avionics Requirements Study to a conservative
assessment incorporating COTS + technology, technology-
gap reduction is realized (see Table S-l). Therefore, a ben-
efit of COTS + technology insertion is the compression of
future manned mission timelines providing an economical
solution to "'space race" scenarios.
Table S-l. Tcelmology Gap Comparisoa
Class GDSS Study With COTS*
Green 29 95
Yellow 101 41
Red 13 7
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S.2.2 COTS + ProductAdvantages
Several COTS + products and technologies were described
within this study. Their benefits: state-of-the-art perfor-
mance, maturity, dependability, and low acquisition cost,
made them appropriate candidates for inclusion within
COTS + space avionic architectures. Aeronautical Radio,
Inc. (AR]NC), Boeing 777 aircraft, and Honeywell avionic
technologies were found to enhance future manned mission
architectures, were described in detail, and were incorpo-
rated within strawman architectural configurations.The
technologiesdescribedinthisstudyarerepresentativeof
COTS + technologiesavailablefrom othervendors;they
are"
• Boeing 777Airplane Information Management Sys-
tem (AIMS),
• Boeing 777 AIMS central maintenance computer,
• Honeywell's Boeing 777 fiat-panel display system,
• Boeing 777 ARINC 629 bus,
• Boeing 777 ARINC 429 bus,
• Boeing 777 ARINC Fiber Distributed Data Interface
(FDDI) network,
• Honeywell's Boeing 777 SAFEbus _'M*backplane
bus,
• Honeywell optical disk storage system,
• Honeywell integrated Inertial Navigation
System/Global Positioning System (INS/GPS).
S.3 Requirements
A baseline COTS + system architecture incorporating corn-
macial aircraft avionic Integrated Modular Avionics
(IMA) concepts (a system apprmch to avionic engineering
which takesintoaccountmodern thoughton system
decomposition,modularity,functionavailability,and fault
tolerance)was established.Stravananm-chitecturesincor-
poratingtheCOTS + conceptswithCOTS + productswere
definedforlaunch,transfer,orbital/surface,and excursion
vehicles.The architectureu_ ARINC 629,429,and
FDDI networkstoconnectIMA cabinetextclosures,remote
data int_aces, and sensor.qefl'ectms/displays. COTS +
avionic requirements were generatedfrom thepoint-of-
departurestrawmanconfiguratiom.
Top-down COTS + avionic requisements fi'om COTS + ref-
erence vehicles and missions were used to modify the
*SAFEIms_* isaregisteredtr&lemarkofHoneywellInc.
avionic requirements. The following statements relate to
unique COTS + requirements generated within this study.
COTS + avimics shall be distributed,physically par-
titionod, and located in environments within their
environmental envelopes.
• COTS + avionics shall be qualified to new accelera-
tion, humidity, and salt spray tests.
Requirements shall ensure single-event upset (SEU)
recovery with aror detection and correction (F.DAC)
mechanisms as well as protection against latchup
caused by radiation environments.
The COTS + program shall provide for assessment of
COTS + radiation tolerance and possible substitution
of more radiation-tolerant pans at the vendor's facil-
ity without significant additional recurring cost.
Acoustic qualification should be required for COTS +
equipment installed in high-acoustic environments
such as near engines.
extended duration missions, a storm cell, or
equivalent will be provided to protect critical avion-
ics fnxn major upsets. A safe will be used for storing
COTS + aviot_ics cold spares.
COTS + avionics will be qualified by analysis to
ensure that there are no detr_ental outgassing
effects.
Any COTS + equipment that may be operating during
the ascent phase in a partial vacuum shall be proved
by being operatod during the evacmaion phaseof
vacuum chamber testing.
Configuration ux_rol procedures shall be capable of
identifying hardware and sohware configurations
that are compatible and constitute a validated config-
uration. It may be necessary for the equipment
design to incorporate safeguards to enforce compati-
bility.
The COTS + parts list applicable to a particular series
of vehicles" fists shah identify acceptable alternative
parts. This list may include interchangeable compo-
mats specified by an ARINC characteristic suRplied
by differmtmanufacmrea_
Remote Data Interface 0tDI) avionics without ade-
quate environmental protection shall require environ-
mentally hardened COTS + components.
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S.4Needsand Concerns
NumerousCOTS+ needs were noted in the study; most,
however, correspond to needs that are also necessary to
integrate space qualified parts and technologies. Needs
unique to COTS + integration are cited above in Subsection
S.3, Requirements.
One concern was identified: assessment of COTS + radia-
tion tolerance for wander, excursion, orbital/surface mis-
sions (missions other than earth to orbit). Further study of
vehicle sheltering concepts and COTS + part replacement
or other strategies (i.e., spot shielding) is recommended.
S.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
The Future Manned Systems Advanced Avionics Study
provided an exploratory investigation of integrating
COTS + products and technologies in space avionic archi-
lectures. A comprehensive COTS + avionic architecture
(software, hardware, and system engineering) for space
applications was established. The architecture employed
COTS + technology, quad-redundant channels, deferred
maintenance (including fly-without-repair), and cold
spares concepts. Physically distributed architecture is used
to provide avionic environment within COTS + product
environmental envelopes.
The COTS + concept appears workable in part or in totality.
No COTS + technology gaps were identified: however,
radiation tolerance was cited as a concern, and the deferred
maintenance issue resurfaced. Further study is recom-
mended to explore COTS+ cost-effectiveness, maintenance
philosophy, needs, concerns, and utility melrics. The gen-
eration of a development plan to further investigate and
integrate COTS + technology is recommended. A COTS +
transitional integration program is recommended. Sponsor-
ing and establishing technology maturation programs and
COTS + engineering and standards committees are deemed
necessary and are recommended for fta'thering COTS +
integration in space.
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Section 1
Introduction
l.lS_
This report documents the study we conducted to incorpo-
rate commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), ruggedized, and
militarized equipment into space vehicles used for futare
manned mission applications. The study includedevelop-
ing a design philosophy, general requirements, system con-
figurations, recommended procedures and wactices, and
new maintenance operations. It also identified technologies
and furtherdevelopment necessarytouseCOTS + products
(COTS, ruggedizedand militarizedcomponents,and
COTS technology)forspacelaunch,transfer,orbital,and
excursion mission segments.
This study identifies top-level issues, concerns, and prob-
lems associated with COTS + insertions in space applica-
tions. To facilitate this identification, a strawman archi-
tecture incorporatingCOTS + technologyand components
was developedforfuturemanned missions.Because
COTS + isnot readily adaptable to space applications, the
differences between the COTS + components and space-
qualified components are noted to identify what changes
must be made to incorporate COTS + technology with mini-
mum impacL
To _ the use of COTS+ in space, changes in pro -
gram philosophy and vehicle/system requirements, including
architectural perfitioning, are assessed, as well as easily made
modifications to COTS + components, l_liminary vehicle
system requirements, COTS + subsystem requirements, and
architectural definitions necessary to implement the COTS +
philosophy are subsequently gencwated.
This report identifies technology shortfalls and needs, pro-
vides development direction, and recommends plans lead-
ing toward timely use of COTS + technology in space.
1.2 Purpose
This report is presented as a top-level application design
guide for COTS + avionics. It provides guidance for the
design and implementation of COTS + avionics for space,
which may replace or be used with existing equipment in
old designs (backward integration) or for new designs in
vehicles designed after 1991. It represents concepts pro-
vided by airline representatives,airframe manufacutrers,
and avionics equipment designers for commercial aircraft
avionics as well as the views of the authors.
This report is conceptual in nautre and covers broad sub-
jects ofoperationalobjectives,faulttolerance,hardware
components,softwaredesign,and certificationissues.In
covering all these issues, the document attempts to be as
inclusive as possible while being general enough to be
applicable to new and developing technologies. It includes
design philosophy and recommended practices concerning
the use of COTS + and,as such, is expected to establisha
starting point for the actual implementation of COTS +.
1.3 COTS + Definition
Included within the definition of COTS + products herein
are nondevelopmental items (NDI) covered under Civil
MarketCOTS, Commercial Type, Olive Drab Commercial,
Best Commercial Practice, and MIL-SPEC products
[USAF22] (see Table 1-1 and Figure 1-1). These NDI clas-
sifications pertain to non-space-qualified components that
require similar requirements, architecture, and component
modifications to be qualified for use in space. Because of
the general similarity in their qualification for use in space,
all are considered within the scope of this COTS + study.
Of the above NDI classifications, only Civil Market COTS
items fit the formal definition of commercial off-the-shelf.
In the strictest sense, all other NDIs cannot be considered
commercial off-the-shelf. Civil Market COTS items repre-
sent a limited category of commercial products for com-
me_ial use. They are bought exactly as found in the
civilian market and are allowed to flow with the changes
and updates the vendor provides to customers.
The COTS + product defmition also includes government-
sponsored Best Commercial Practice hardware designs
that, when compared with MIL-SPEC designs, are less
rugged and/or are less standardized developments. The
contractor is allowed to build a new or modified design
that will not stand up to military or space environments but
is solid enough to withstand civilian uses. Because they
represent a government-sponsored new design,theeco-
nomics of the high-volume civilian market, lead-time
advantages,and up-front development cost savings do not
providesignificant advantagescompared withCivil Max-
ket COTS items. Best Commercial Practice hardware is
included within this COTS + study because it covers Civil
Market COTS items that must be functionally modified to
meet COTS + architecture requirements. An example of
such a modification would he the addition of on-line moni-
toring or serf-test capabilities to an avionic module.
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Table 1-1. The C_iJl Specmos
Design Features
MIL-SPEC
Government:
Militarized
Bern
Commen:_l
Practice
Government:
Not militarized
Olive Drab
Commercial
Commercial:
Just for
government
Commercial-
Type
(*spad-r)
COTS:
Modified for
govemment
COTS
For civil market
Examples Fighter simraft Rxed ground Tactical radio Embedded Television
radio computer monitor
Percent of Sales to 100% 100% Probably 100% Small Small
Govemrnent (of basic item)
Design Disclosure Full Ful Meetly F3" Probably 13. F3"
(piece part) (piece part) Maybe Full Full needed
Configuration Government Government Vendor or foreign Domesec or Domestic or
Authodty govemment O/S vendor O/S vendor
Design Stability Risk Low Low Moderate to low Moderate High
to high
Long-Term Support/ Low Low Moderate High Moderate
Co= Risk to high
"Form, fit and function celu
Reference [USAF 22]
I Il--J- I---I
• ML-SPEC Govemnlent- ]
FwnishedEquipment I I
_'GFE TypeItms OntheShelf
I ""°d_ I • Oom._COn
I I
D..m I ,.mn__'mmmm'mI conv,w=_,_lot Im
Govmmnwntt,Nm I N_U_ I Commm:4MU_
mlmm.a
Fifwr I-l. Commercial Speemam Fbw Ckart
Olive Drab Commercial products come fDroma segment of
industry orient! to selling equipment m the government
and willing to undertake development of militarized, semi-
militarized (and similarly, space-qea]ified and semi-space
qualified) designs at their own expense. The government
obtains qualified or semi-qualified hardwa_ without hav-
ing to sponsor Ihe development or wait for its design.
These originate as nongovenanent designs for noncivilian
use. Because they axe used only by the govenunent, the
designs ale stable over lime. The government, howev_.
does not have conuol over the items' documentation.
MIL-SPEC hardware includedwithin_ COTS + d=_,d-
lion follows the classicmilitaryapproach to design and
construction and is usually designed for the govemmcnL
The design philosophy and the selection of MIL-SPEC
are suicfly acconJingtoslandards and specificalions,
and typically the cost and part lead dine axe high. Never-
thckss,_ and use ofmature,M]I_-SPEC ha_l-
ware may provick a cost-effective altctaafive to using
Sl:mce-qualified or commercial-grade avionics for particular
missions/applicadons.
1.4 The COTS + Approach
This study develops a COTS + design philosophy using dif-
few.nt atcidtcctures, new system concepts, promising new
t_chnologi_,and innovative uses of new lechnology. The
design philosophy ¢stabEshcsan open architecture, allow-
ing (li_rcntnetwork and subsystemstandardsto COCXiSL
It allows a mix of COTS + with space-qualified equipment
and a mix of modular cabinets with standard, chassis-
mounted equipmcnL From the design philosophy baseline,
a slrawm_, point-of-depannre, futmre manned mission
arc_ is presented. This architectu¢, its pertidoning,
its components and their characledstics are used to estab-
lish requirements for using COTS + inspace.
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Thear_hitecum_usesamixofcommercialintegrmedmod-
ularavionics(IMA)components and techaologies with
commer_nilitary-qualified line replace_c unit (LRU)
components. Comme:_ini aircraft IMA principles are used
within this study and ARINC IMA gttidelines ate incorpo-
rated throughout this report. A most recent implementation
of the DdA concept, the Boeing 777'sAirplaneInforma-
tionManagement System (AIMS), is used within the archi-
tecun_ to assess fitting commercial off-the-sheff pmdmts
in space systems.
COTS + IMA is formed around the concept of powerful
computers with an operating system that allows indepen-
dent processing of application software, while maintaining
robust partitioning betweensoftwaremodules foreven the
most critical functions. The computers are housed in a cab-
inet of hardware modules, forming a subsystem with a
common cabinetdesign, shared fault-tolerant processing,
centralized power supplies, and flex£vic vehicle interfaces.
Several of these cabinets interconnected by ARINC 629
and Fiber Disuibuted Dam Interface (FDDI) global data
buses connect avionics hardware outside the cabinet, form-
ing an intewated system for performing all avionics func-
tions on the vehicle. The hardware acts as an electrical
interface, while the aircraft functions are mostly, and
sometimes entirely, implemented in software modules.
Software partitioning and structuring are important to this
concept. A rigorousprocessisnecessaryfor defining soft-
ware modules and m_ning their integrity.
High-thronghput microprocessors,theAda programming
language,theFDDI network, the ARINC 629 data bus and
efficient power distribution me the key components and
technologies necessary to design, develop and integrate
this type of advanced avionicsarchitecture.
The interfme to the outside world (e.g., transduce_'s, sen-
sors, actuators, displays, controls and radio frequency
transmitters/receivers) is handled by components external
to the cabinets but is controlled by and embraced by the
total COTS + integrated modular avionics design. Cost-
effective ARINC 449 dam buses and serial Taxi buses are
used for these interfaces.
1.5 History
Since the mid 1980s, the commercial air transport industry
has been investigating ways to exploit new technologies
for the purpose of developing smaller, lighter and more
cost-effective avionics systems. Advancements in teclmol-
ogy, specifically in the areas of microed_tmni_, fault
tolerance, and software, have enabled the aircraft avionics
indusuy to develop new design concepts that result in
higldy integrated digital avionics under so/tware controL
This approach, collectively referred to as integrated modu-
lar avionics, introduces methods that result in substantial
cost savings compared with earlier avionics implementa-
tions°
The emerging dominance of software added yet another
reason to redefine the aircraft avionics suite. Beginning in
1986, the Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee
(AEEC) and the AEEC Systems Architecture and Inter-
faces (SAD Subcommittee held meetings at which rewe-
sentafives from academia, govenunent, avionics
manufacmre_, airframe manufacturers, and airlines dis-
cussed how new technologies could benefit future genera-
tions of aircraft avionics.
In 1988, rewe_ntatives of the NASA Langley Research
Center briefed the SAI Subcommittee concerning the
application of fanh-tolerant avionics to commercial air-
craft. Later in 1988, AEEC adjusted the work program of
the SAI Subcommittee to focus specifically on future sys-
tems. AEEC recommended the development of a top-level
IMA design guide fJom which ARINC Report 65 I,
"Design Guidelines for Integrated Modular Avionics," was
generated.
ARINC Report 651 on Design Guidelinesfor Integrated
Modular Avionics contains the underlyingprinciplesand
concepts necessary to design and implement integrated
modular avionics. A significant amount of the study docu-
ment herein is derivedfrom the draft ofReport 651. The
authors of this study acknowledge and appreciate the use
of ARINC Report 651 information and the permission to
incotlmmte IMA guidelines by the AEEC.
Boeing Company officially launched the 777 airplane pro-
gram on 29 October 1990, and first delivery is expected in
1995. The 777 avionics were designed to incorporate IMA
concepts and include several new features.
Some of the new featmes provided by the 777 include a
fly-by-wit_ system, flat-panel displays, ARINC 629 net-
work buses, SAFEbusm beckplane buses, and the AIMS.
The 777 avionic architecture provides greater flexibility for
future growth by taking advantage of new technology
without architectural changes and accommodates system
upgrades without hardware changes. Boeing 777 architec-
tree and the above listed features are assessed in this r_pon
fortheirsuitability for futuremanned missionapplications.
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1.6 Study Methodology
This study is initiated recognizing recendy stated executive
branch, legislative commiuee, and space community
desires to explore innovative concepts, gready improve
nmional bunch capability, reduce space ope_on costs,
and improve space system reliability, reslmnsiveaess, and
mission perfonuance. Guided by these national space pro-
gram objectives, this study seeks to apply commercial
avionic products from Airbus, MDll, and Boeing 777 and
military aixcraft, etc., to lm_nt mad future space avionics
systems. The study lira]st is to ansv,_ two key questions:
• W-dlcommegial avionics do tbe job in sPaCe?
• What improvements ..re needed?
The study oulfine shown graphically in Fqlure 1-2 identi-
ties six major tasks to be perfmme(L These are:
* Identify COTS Avionira---Commexcial off-the-shelf
products (com_nents, equipment, and _hneiog_s)
applk_e for space avionic applications will be
identifi_ "lee product characteristics and auribmes
win be caudoged in a dam base. Emphads wm be
placed on identifying each product's e_vironmental
qualification&
. Requixe.ments Definition---Tbe space mission will be
defined to detemdne avionic performance, quality,
and a_hitecunl requirements.
. Architeclnre De_A COTS+ mchitecmra]
framework will be developed to mustra_ tbe COTS+
concept and save as a mawman architectural con-
figuration for assessment and comparison with other
co.Stations, includingsystcms cmpioying 100%
slmce-quali/'v-,dcompo_n_ The snwnum m-chiu_c-
Uwewill relmsent a botmm'up apprmch to incorpo-
commacial paxlucts in space applications.
• Review _ Leamed---A review of past lXO-
grams and studies will be conducted to ensure that
requirements ale compau'ole with lessons learned
and cmxent colr.e_
• Identify Technology Needs--Space mission require-
_ andCOTS+ characteristics are compared m
determine modifications to space requirements.
COTS+ alchitecmrc,and/orCOTS+ products(see
Figure 1-3).
. Development Recommendations--Devel°pment
directions and recommendations are presented based
on identified technology needs.
RequlrementsDeflnltion
.Functionalreqtarm l/-
.O_,raeo," I_,f _
requirements
.Environmental
requirements
•perto_nanoe COTS
requkemenm
•Costrequirement*
Architm:tureand
Implementation Strmmn
ot10m14)48
Tedmolo_ ShOI'UMIW_
Development Dlr, ctlon,
and R, commmndatiorm
. D,v,,op tradmm* [
• _ rest vmmmm-
F/t'_ 1-,1.Stt Mo_brTasksm be pe_erm_
1.7 Report Organization
This document is organized into eight sections and two
appendices, which discuss economic, technical, and admin-
isumive iss,es associated with the design of IMA.
• The Executive Summary presents a summary of
conclusions and recommendations for the implemen-
mtim of COTS+ in space.
• Sectioe I introduces tbe d(x:umentaai lgovides
background information leading to its developmenL
• Sectioa 2 presents the key economic and operational
objectives for COTS +•
• Sectioa 3 establishes the requirements applicable to
furore manned missions.
- Subsectkm 3A describes the future manned mis-
sionand vehicles.
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Point-of-Departure
Architecture
Significant Difference
Between Space and
Cornrnerc_al Requimmentz
Usable COTS
Advanced
Avionics
Products
Modify COTS
Materials. Parts
and/o¢ Design
Develop Space Architecture
to Accommodam Commercial
Practices and Procedures
Components and Experience
Needs
Syther_zecl System
Figure 1-3. Tecknology Nteds Comparison
Subsection 3.2 generates avionic requirements.
Subsection 3.3 addresses cert_cation considera-
tions and provides guidance to designers and reg-
ulatory authorities. It also reviews accepted
industry philosophy and general recommenda-
tions intended to minimize the complexity of cer-
tification.
Subsection 3A recommends testability and main-
tainability concepts that should be applied to the
design of IMA components and their implementa-
tion.
Section 4 cl_q::fibes COTS + architccUlre. This sub-
section addresses mveral architectural components
and issues:
Subsection 4.1 defines the don_n of commercial
components evaluated in this study.
Subsection 4.2 identifies supporting technologies
and standards forming the fcmndafion of the COTS +
concept and_ _ ARINC repom and
specfficatiom _ to the IMA co_
Subsection 4.3 addresses system architecture.
This subsection describes an arcluteclme promot-
ing a high level of hardware integration while
ensuring integrity. All space vehicle functions are
included.
Subsection 4A describes the data communica-
tions network for handling large amounts of data
on the vehicles.
Subsection 4.5 providesguidance for theapplication
of fault-tolerantprinciples for the ptn'poscof meeting
COTS+ in=gntyandmaintenanceobjec_ve_
Subsection 4.6 describes goals for software
designand programming.
Subsection 4.7 provides guidance on the deglgn
of functional sotnce and output devices such as
RF equipment, air data probes, actuator, nondigi-
tal sources and data concentrators.
• Section $ discusses COTS + technology shortfalls
and needs.
• Section 6 suggests development direction and rec-
ommendations.
• Section 7 includes note, definitions, and acronyms/
abbreviations.
• Section 8 contains the references used in preparing
this report.
• Appendix A describes COTS + components and
technology.
• Appendix B contains supporting viewgraphs and
annotations.
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1.8 Relationship to Other Documents
The material in this report is intended to complement all
ARINC and AIMS characteristics and specifications refer-
enced in Subsection 4A. To avoid inconsistencies and dis-
crepancies, some subjects have been omiaed since ARINC
documents cr other specifr.ations on those subjects are
known to exist.
It is also the intent of this report to encourage the use of
any standards of good practice developed by the Govern-
meat, the military, and other industry groups that are
applicable to COTS + electronic equipment.
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Section 2
Objectives
2.1 Introduction
This section describes the key goals and objectives for the
design, implementation, and service of Space Candidate
COTS + products. These include program objectives,
design objectives, cost objectives, and the desire for inte-
gration, interchangeability, reliability, and maintainability
of avionics.
COTS + objectives include new program-level ideas, meth-
ods, processes, architectures, and requirements describing
how commercial products such as discrete sensors and
probes, computers, displays, connections and wiring, soft-
ware, support equipment, and technology can best be
applied in a manageable way.
COTS + emphasizes a program-level systems approach to
engineering, recognizing that future manned missions pre-
sent a new set of challenges in systems design. High levels
of autonomy are required of the initiative, and systems
must provide high levels of reliability and operability
[JOHN90].
To achieve these goals in the face of great complexity, var-
ious organizational techniques, new technologies, creative
concepts, and prudent use of cost-effective COTS + compo-
nents must be explored. It is the intent of this study to
investigate and disclose measures that can be incorporated
to attain these goals.
The motivations and expected goals of COTS+ in the con-
text of total life-cycle costs, i.e., vehicle first-cost, opera-
tional costs, costs of changes and additions, maintenance
and training costs are described. Attempts are made to cat-
egorize the benefits as they pertain to integration, fault tol-
erance, and modularity. Both direct and indirect benefits of
applying COTS+ and commercial IMA standards/precepts
to future aircraft systems are described.
2.2 COTS + Benefits
The goal of using COTS + in space is to satisfy the objec-
fives of users and operators of the technology; the vehicle
manufacturers that design, build, and support spacecraft;
and equipment manufacturers that contribute to the innova-
tive design, efficient production, and support of the corn-
ponents and subsystems. User benefits include reduced
life-cycle cost through:
• Increased operational performance, reduced empty
weight, increased payload volume;
• Increased performance by using the most recent
technology;
• Reduced unscheduled maintenance and spares
requirements;
• Simplified service life changes and additions to the
avionics;
• Dependability from designs flown for thousands of
hours in commercial aircraft;
• Increased mission opportunity and availability of
avionics.
Benefits to the vehicle manufacturer include reduced first-
cost and cost of service life support of the vehicle through:
• Reduced development, certification, and production
costs;
• Flexibility to efficiently meet customer requirements
and to implement improvements.
Benefits to equipment manufacturers include increased
marketing opportunities of specialty components and sub-
systems through:
• Increased market volume,
• Iamger production runs,
• Flexibility to efficiently meet customer requirements.
2.3 Operational Objectives
COTS + integrated modular avionics is expected to allow
the avionics equipment to take full advantage of technol-
ogy changes and to expand efficiently. It is an objective to
design in a capability to upgrade systems and to add new
functions through on-board software loading of revised
application programs or new ones.
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2.4 Design Goals
Once the desiredfunctional performance,operational
objectives, and safety are achieved, then the cost of owner-
ship over the life of space vehicles is the primary criterion
against which a system is judged.
Cost of ownership should be used to trade off all other fac-
tors. The designer should provide avionics in which the
sum of all contributing cost factors--development, amorti-
zation, materials, spares, weight, volume, operauon, mmn-
tenance, test equipment, growth, etc.--is minimized over
the life of the aircraft. It is not acceptable to reduce one
cost factor and neglect others. In particular, it is not accept-
able to favor lust-cost effects over continued life-cycle
costs. Cost of ownership models should be developed and
be kept current for use in avionics upgrade programs and
new development programs.
2.4.1 Goals of integration
The system design should make maximum use of shared
resources to keep resource duplication to a minimum. Such
integration lowers the cost of ownership by reducing the
acquisition cost, spares requirements, weight, and volume
of the avionics equipment.
While hardware integration is desired, software functional
independence is essential, and a certifiable method for par-
titioning these independent software elements from each
other is necessary. Hardware integration is often limited by
the desire to minimize complexity and prevent unreason-
ably high spare unit costs.
System-level integration of COTS + products/technology
with space-qualified products/technology is desired.
COTS + architectures should allow a mix of avionics
designed for space with COTS + pmducts/tedmology. This
backward integration would provide for the coexistence of
COTS + with contemporary space vehicle architectures.
to the sink for the data, whether an indicator, actuator or
other function• Although functional redundancy uses dupli-
cation of component swings, emphasis is placed on the use
of fault containment techniques to allow other components
in the system to continue functioning in the presence of
failures.
2.5.1.2 Component Redundancy--Component redun-
dancy can play a major role in assuring mission probability
of success for extended duration missions (e.g., the Mars
transfer/excursion missions). In the COTS + integrated
modular avionics approach, component redundancy is
implemented at the lowest line replaceable module (LR1VD
level. Ultra-high system reliabilities can be achieved if a
pool of cold-spare LRMs is used for replacement of failed
redundant components. Without this cold-spare capability,
ultra-high reliability (i.e., fail-operative, 10-failure proba-
bility) wouldbe impractical usingwaditional redundant-
string architectures. This study presents COTS +
architecture and maintenance procedures acceptable, as a
goal, to the space community.
2,5.2 Transparency
The level and the physical method of redundancy used in
each of the components is to be totally u-ansparent to the
application software. Hardware shall be designed indepen-
dently of the application software so that changes in either
do not affect the other.
A detailed interface definition makes this approach possi-
ble. Standardinterfaces are specified to allow competing or
dissimilar designs to be used in different cabinets without
affecting the design of the application software. This mini-
mizes the validation effort required and allows equipment
manufacturers to have flexibility in the design of their
equipment. Only the integrity of the integration has to be
verifw.d each time either the hardware or software changes.
Separation of the physical and application design allows
the hardware and software to develop and mature at their
own rates.
2.5 Dependability Goals
2.5.1 Fault Tolerance and Redundancy
The approach to redundancyina commercial IMA system
is viewed on two levels: functional r,.dundancy and com-
ponent redundancy.
2.5.1.1 Functional Rc.dundant_--In a COTS+ system,
functional availability is ensured by providing multiple
paths for the data bom its source to the processing required
2.6 Maintenance Operations
The commercial IMA maintenance philosophy is built
upon the desire for scheduled maintenance intervals,
whereas spacecraft maintenance must be coordinated with
oppcmunities to access the vehicle/avionics. Although
maintenanceoperations forcommercial aircraftandspace
vehicles seeandifferent, IMA maintenance requirements
conveniently fit within the COTS + maintenance philoso-
phy.
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2.6.1 IMA Maintenance Philosophy
Scheduledmaintenanceispossibleifthesystemmaintains
operationalcapabilityinthepresenceoffaults,which
implies deferred maintenance. Therefore, to achieve sched-
uled maintenance for commercial aircraft, it is necessary to
(1) identify and contain faults, and (2) provide resource
redundancyuntilmaintenanceactionsareperformed.
2.6.1.1 Fault Containment--To achieve scheduled main-
tenance for commercial aircraft, fault-containment areas
must be established throughout the architecture. With this
approach, it is possible to quickly detect any failure and
isolate it to a given fault-containment area. A very high
percentage of faults must be detected. Each of these fault-
containment areas detect and annunciate the validity of its
data to all users of that data. This way the system accu-
rately reports the status of its own health and enables users
to achieve the maintenance goals that were previously
unattainable. It is a goal to make all commercial fast fail-
ures transparent to the flight crew, annunciate first failures
to the maintenance crew, and allow maintenance to be
scheduled at a convenient time.
2.6.1.2 Resource Redundancy--Some level of resource
redundancy must be provided to extend the mean time
between maintenance alert/action (MTBMA). The resource
redundancy required to extend the MTBMA is dependent
upon the length of the extended maintenance interval and
the statistical probability of successfully completing that
interval before total equipment failure. Resource redun-
dancy may be made available through secondary redun-
dancy at the component level, or it may be made available
at a system level, as part of the aircraft architecture, by
automatic reconfiguration.
As guidance, IMA has established that, for a fully fault-tol-
erant avionics suite, the mean-time-to-maintenance-alert
goal for an individual avionic function is at least 15,000
hours. Furthermore, it is desired that the full avionic func-
tion continue to be available for 200 hours after the first
fault with a 99% probability of success. The overall system
architecture design will contribute to the reliability goals
for each avionics function. It is a design objective of IMA
to apply this maintenance philosophy to all aircraft sys-
tems, including sensors and aircraft wiring.
2.6.2 COTS + Maintenance Philosophy
It is a COTS +objective tousecommercial IMA scheduled
maintenanceconceptsand requirements to incorporate
deferred maintenance (i.e., fly without repair) concepts
during extended flight. Furthermore, COTS + attempts to
incorporate deferred maintenance for expendable hunch
vehicles using COTS + technology (this is recommended
for furore study). Although no deferred maintenance
requirement specified by Multi-path Redundant Avionic
Suite (MPRAS) or by the commercial ARINC 651 IMA
guidelines, deferred maintenance philosophy will be pre-
sented within this COTS + study.
MPRAS Technical Memo TM-1 did not recommend
deferred maintenance for launch vehicles since projected
savings did not justify the cost of implementing an added
level of high-confidence avionics redundancy for deferred
maintenance. However, TM-1 did not consider the cost
savings of implementing vehicle avionics with COTS +
technology. Further studies are recommended to assess
deferred maintenance using COTS + technology in expend-
able launch vehicles.
The ability to employ fault tolerance to defer maintenance
actions is not required, detailed, or stipulated within the
IMA guidelines. It is mentioned only as an attraction con-
cept. IMA ojectives, however, imply the use of deferrred
maintenance.
Deferred maintenance using component redundancy will
be required to support extended-duration and/or deep-
space manned missions. During these extended missions,
replacement of failed components is expected within the
COTS + philosophy. Crew workloads will not always allow
immediate repair or replacement of equipment after fail-
ures. It is a goal to make all COTS + first failures transpar-
ent to the flight crew, annunciate first failures to the
maintenance personnel, and allow maintenance to be
scheduled at a convenient time within approximately four
days.
Essential deferred maintenance building blocks will be
established within this study.
2.6.3 Goals of Modularity
The primary goal of using commercial modular avionics is
to reduce the cost of ownership through lower acquisition
cost and to increase flexibility to accommodate variations.
Modular avionics are designed to reduce the total cost of
spares inventory by making the replacement elements as
small a part of the system as practical. Acquisition costs
are reduced by allowing high-volume elements to be sepa-
rately produced, thus achieving economies of scale. Avion-
ics development costs will also be reduced since standard
interchangeable modules can be used in a variety of com-
mercial aircraft and space vehicle types without modifica-
tion.
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2.7EquipmentPackagingandLocation
2.7.1 Weight and Volume Considerations
Generally, users agree that equipment should be as
lightweight and compact as possible, and integration tech-
niques should be used to minimize equipment size and
weight. However, the desire for compact lightweight
equipment should not result in packaging designs that
result in high-cost spares (e.g., custom I/O modules) and
compromise overall system integrity or life-cycle costs. It
is within this objective that COTS + avionics is superior to
equipment designed specifically for space.
The desire for compacmess should not cause thermal rise
problems that can be solved only by exotic cooling meth-
ods or require otherwise unnecessary radiation shielding
within avionic chassis or comparlments. The packaging
designer should work closely with the system designers to
evaluate the Wadeoffs of small, lightweight designs.
2.7.2 Location and Accessibility of Components
The trends toward small, lightweight equipment with high
mean time between failures (MTBFs) and toward the use
of the ARINC 629 data bus provide the fie,edom to dis-
tribute equipment on space vehicles in a variety of loca-
tions. Equipment location should be determined based on a
number of factors listed below. It is the system integrator's
responsibility to analyze these factors before distributing
equipment on the aircrafl.
• Functionand operational performance;
• Environment concerns;
• Access for maintenance;
• Maintenance philosophy;
• Integrationwithother systems;
• Growth potential and access for modifications;
• Lengths, number of wire runs, and number of inter-
connects with source systems.
Equipment with expected low MTBF with respect to other
equipment should be mounted in a location that affmds
easy access. For manned vehicles, the designer should con-
siderlocatingmajor COTS + equipment in the cockpit,
cabin wall, cabin overhead, or other areas that are easily
accessible.
In all cases, a time-to-replace analysis should be completed
for each LRU or LRM in its respective location. Equip-
ment with expected high MTBF can be located in areas
where the access is limited as long as an analysis of failure
rate in relation to time-to-replace is within acceptable lim-
its. High-MTBF equipment can be mounted in a manner
that involves an acceptable level of difficuhy to remove the
equipment.
Special tooling to remove equipment or locking mecha-
nisms should be used for equipment with a moderate to
high level-of-removal/replacement difficulty. Considera-
tion should be also be given to automated mechanisms
designed to remove both low- and high-MTBF equipment
with controlled sequences, forces, and handling.
2.8 Interchangeability
One of the continuing goals of both airline users and air-
craft manufacturers is interchangeability of avionics equip-
merit manifested with interoperability and open architec-
ture specifications. Interchange, ability is necessary to
achieve economies of scale, to distribute design and devel-
opment costs and to reduce the spares inventory. Ideally,
interchangeability can be applied to any manufacturers'
components and between any two aircraft types and mod-
els. This has been achieved often enough in the past to
prove that interchangeability is a feasible goal.
A COTS + goal is to provide interchangeability of COTS +
equipment with equipment similar to COTS + equipment or
space-qualified equipment with the same function.
2.9 Spares Provisioning
Spares provisioning is based on maintenance plans devel-
oped for a particular vehicle and the extent that it is
adaptedtomeet the needsofa particularmission.The
COTS + objective is to require the fewest number of spares
without jeopardizing flight safety.
2.10 COTS + in Flight Simulators
Flight simulators and maintenance trainers are now recog-
nized as an essential part of the aerospace industry. We
have become increasingly dependent on such simulators
for flight crew and maintenance crew training. Users typi-
cally require these simulators to be available as early as
possible to allowforcrew training beforeequipment inn'o-
duction into service.
As part of the design and construction of these devices,
simulator manufacturers simulatemany avionics
LRU/LRMs. However, such equipment simulation is not
practical nor desirable in many cases; therefore, the use of
an actual avionics unit within the flight simulator is
required. The flight and operational environment for stimu-
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lating the avionics equipment is programmed in the simu-
lator host computer. The currency of spa_t avionics
software is maintained through updates and procedures
similar to those adopted for the aircraft.
The need for ever-increasing levels of fidelity and credibil-
ity has forced the use of unmodified avionics in flight sim-
ulators. These avionics, when subjected to the environment
of flight simulators, have exhibited a tendency to behave
abnormally as a result of the execution of simulator func-
tions such as freezes, repositions, resets, and slews.
The disruptions caused by the unwanted side effects of the
simulator functions on the avionics slow down the training
process. Special work-around procedures must be estab-
lished to bypass the problems; alternatively, additional
explanations have to be provided to describe the differ-
ences between the simulator behavior and the spacecraft
behavior, which greatly increases training costs to the air-
lines. As a general rule, within reason, designers should
avoid defining hardware and/or software architectures or
algorithms that are incompatible with the simulator func-
tions.
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Section 3
Requirements
To integrate COTS* within space, it is necessary to know
COTS* avionic environments, functional needs, and per-
formance requirements. Of the three, COTS + avionic envi-
ronments plays the most significant role in the assessment
of COTS* in space. To succeed in the space integration of
COTS +, it is critical that there be a match of COTS + envi-
ronmental capabilities and space avionic environments.
This section emphasizes the generation and definition of
the COTS + environmental requirements.
Subsection 3.1 defines the COTS* missions and vehicles.
This definition is essential to the determination of the
avionic environmental requirements. Environmental and
performance requirements are subsequently generated and
provided in Subsection 3.2, Avionic Requirements. Subsec-
tion 3.2 also summarizes program-level and mission-related
requirements and presents a matrix chart that compares pro-
gram-level, mission-related, and environmental require-
merits to future manned missions and their vehicles.
COTS* functional and performance requirements are pro-
vided in the remainder of this document. These require-
ments, which relate to verification and validation,
maintenance and test, standard modules, architecture, data
networking, data sources, fault tolerance, and software, are
derived from bottom-up COTS* requirements. They define
functions, performances, interfaces, and configurations
representative of COTS + technology. They are derived
from ARINC Report 651 on Design Guidelines for Inte-
grated Modular Avionics and the characteristics and capa-
bilities of the Space Candidate COTS* products and
technology identified within this study. These requirements
are referred to as bottom-up derived requirements because
they are initially implemented without regard to top-down
program/mission-level derived requirements. Eventual
blending of top-down and bottom-up requirements is
achieved by this study.
Credit and appreciation is given to the University of Min-
nesota Aerospace and Mechanics class for information on
the Mars Integrated Transportation System (MITS) derived
from two final reports for USRA/NASA at Marshall Space
Flight Center. The class developed two different mission
prof'fles to Mars, each with a different vehicle. This study
greatly benefitted from the comprehensive presentations
within their final reports [UM-A91 & UM-B91].
3.1 Missions and Vehicles
3.1.1 Introduction
To establish the requirements, it is necessary to know
avionic requirements for COTS + reference vehicles: the fact
that COTS+ is applicable to many space missions and a mul-
titude of vehicles complicates the task. Because of the many
COTS + benefits, it is a goal to apply COTS* in as many
space architectures as possible. Consideration is therefore
given to integrating COTS* within all future manned mis-
sion avionic architectures, including launch boosters, trans-
fer and excursion vehicles, modules, and stations/platforms.
COTS* reference vehicle definitions are required for each
mission. Point design referear,.e vehicles, representative of
what typical COTS* application vehicles may be or look
like, will be used as platforms to integrate COTS+ technol-
ogy. They are defined for various future manned missions
herein. The reference vehicles, their missions, and some of
their operations are described within this section.
3.1-2 C07S + Missions
3.1.2.1 Earth to Orbit (ETO)--The Space Transportation
Architecture Study (STAS) defines a complete launch sys-
tem architecture. The COTS* Earth to Low-Earth Orbit
(LEO) baseline mission includes the STAS model goals:
• A highly autonomous vehicle,
• Automated checkout,
* A high level of health monitoring integration,
• Near 100% availability,
• Increased system reliability,
• Reduction of life-cycle cost by an order of magnitude,
• Provision of 100% assured access to space,
• Significantly reduced turnaround time,
• Maintenance of world leadership in space,
• Fault tolerance,
• Standardized interfaces,
• Minimal environmental constraints.
Although there is reason to change STAS mission models,
the total delivered payload mass for the option we consid-
ered was approximately 9.85 million pounds, the total
returned payload mass was approximately 6.76 million
pounds, and the payload value was approximately 197 bil-
lion 1986 dollars.
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Launch Vehicle$--The COTS + launch booster refer-
ence vehicles shall represent vehicles of various ¢o_gura-
fion and different payload capabilities. The COTS + booster
reference vehicles represent expendable launch vehicles
(E_V/AI._-E), reusable core with expendable booster(s)
(ALS-FBB), flyback boosters, and Space Transportation
System (Shuttle) configurations. The ref_ vehicles
also provide variable payload lift capabilities required of
STAS, lur_, and/or Mars missions.
The STAS vehicles included "Iimn IV and several new vehicle
classes from 25,(X)0- through 300,000-1b payload lift capabili-
ties. The Mars excursion may requin: heavy lift launch vehi-
cles (HLLVs) or two additional launch vehicle classes to place
mission componmts in LEO [UM-Agl & UM-B91]:
• 150,000-200,000-1b Class--External tank (ET)
derived in-line launch vehicle family. It will be used
to place smaller components in orbit in University of
Minnesota Study A.
• 200,000-300,000-Ib Class---Equivalent to the the
HLLV. This will be used to place most other lunar
and Mars components (e.g., propulsion system, and
fuel tanks) in LEO in U of M Study A. The HLLV is
used to place all Mats transfer vehicle and excursion
vehicle components and fuel in LEO in University of
Minnesota Study B
• 300,000-400,000-1b Class---Defined by the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, _ and Mechanics, Mars
Integrated Tmnsixa'tafion System Operations group
to place the Mars transfer vehicle aeroshell in orbit
in University of Minnesota Study A.
Several reference launch vehicles are illustrated in Figures
3-1 through 3-4. They represent new and old designs, are
used for different missions, provide various payload capa-
bilities, and exhibit a mix of expendable, reusable, and fly-
back booster configurations.
3J.2.2 Orbit Paridng---Stations and plaffmms such as
Space Station Freedom (SSF) perked in low earth or_t shall
be COTS + intesmable. SSFs mis_on, opmdms, and sroc-
na'e can be found in a mnnber of refe_'ences(r,.8, [SPACS4]).
33.2.3 Orbit Transfer, Transit, and Excunion---COTS +
architecture shall be used for the following future manned
navigational missions:
• Orbit transfer missi *ons--LF.J3 to high earth at-bits
{..seos-/nc.hm,'_oes,geostationary, Molnia, etc.);
• Lunar andMars transfervesiclemissions(solarnav-
igation);
• Lunar/Mars excursion missions.
These vehicles will be for crew and cargo wansfer.
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OTVs, LTVs, MTVs, and Excursion Vehicles--
Orbital transfer vehicles (OTVs), lun_ transfer vehicles
(LTVs), and Mars transfervehicles (MTVs) are illustrated
in Figures 3-5 through 3-9. They represent the COTS* ref-
erence vehicles of this study.
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3.1.2.4 HabitationEndronment---TheCOTS +concept
shallbe integratablewithin lunarand/orMarssurfacemis-
sions.The avionicsforthemodulesshallprovidepower
generation and conu_l, communications, environmental
control, etc., typical of avionic requirements for orbiting
platforms. A diagram of a typical Mars habitation module
is shown in Figure 3-10.
3.2 Avionic Requirements
3.2.1 ImroductLoa
COTS* avior_c requirements based on top.down program-
level, mission-level, and vehicle-level requirements are
presentedherein.Avionicrequirementsfor COTS+ refer-
ence vehicles ere lust determined using published charac-
teristics of past, present, and envisioned space vehicles to
establish upper and Iowa"requirement limits. Requirement
resu'icfions imposed by COTS + productsand integration
are then used to modify the avionic architecture and
requirement specifications of this section.
3.2.1.1 Bact4_roumI--The space program continues to use
old and modified/upgraded vehicles and plans to build
families of new vehicles for various missions .To be cost-
effective, COTS + must be valid for vehicle upgrades
(backward integration) as well as for new applications.
A literature search was therefore performed to obtain data
on past, present, and envisioned space vehicles. From the
descriptions of these vehicles, their anticipated missions,
and their specified environmental requirements, a databasc
of avionic requirements was generated.
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Fifure 3-9. Mars Excursion Vehicle
This subsection presents a COTS + requirements summary
table and supporting information. Discussion is limited to
requirements pertinent to particular missions, vehicles, and
COTS + applications.
3.2.1.2 Requirements Summary--Table 3-1 summarizes
the COTS + mission, vehicle, and avionic requirements.
Requirements are presented for each of the four primary
missions: eurth-to-orbit, wansfcr, excursion, and
orbital/surface systems. The requirements for representa-
tive vehicles are presented in the table. Tic missions and
their vehicles are as follows:
• Earth-to-orbit missions:
- Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle,
- Space Transportation System - Cargo (STS-C),
- Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV);
• Orbital and/or surface missions:
- Space Station Freedom (SSF),
- Man Tended Ttanspcx_on Node (MTI_,
- Personal Maneuvering Unit (PMU);
• Transfer missions:
- Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV),
- Mars TransferVehicle(MTV);
• Excursion missions:
- Lunar Excursion Vehicle (LEV),
- Mars Excursion Vehicle (MEV).
3.2.2 Earth-to-Orbit Mission
The earth-to-tobit mission shall primarily be to deliver
payloads to low-altitude parking orbits. The low-earth
orbits will be used for staging to higher orbits, transitions
to inter-solar-system Iravel, and construction of interplane-
tary vehicles.
3.2.2.1 ETO Durations--The mission duration for
expendable components, ASRBs, liquid boosters, and liq-
uid enginecorestageis0.5 hr. Although the boost phaseis
less than 20 min, 0.5 hr is selected to includeprelaunch
pad opetafio_afterfinalavionics chockouL
STS-C missions are two days on orbit, and the orbiters are
to be reused over a 20-year period.
3.2.2.2 ETO Environments--Launch vehicle user hand-
books specify pertinent parameters such as acoustic, vibra-
tion, and shock levels. Transporting the spacecraft from
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pointto point on the earth may subject it to more damaging
vibration and shock than the launch [GRIFgl].
ETO Vibration Environmentm
Space ShuttlemSpace Shuttle vibration environ-
ments are illustrated in Figures 3-11 through 3-13. The first
two figures are predicted environments for (1) an unloaded
main longeron trunion fitting and (2) an unloaded keel fit-
ring, and the third presents flight data for longeron vibra-
tion based on shuttle flights STS 1-4. Flight data yielded
higher frequency contents and higher Y-axis levels than
predicted. The Z-axis spectral density was 0.60 g2/I-Iz and
extrapolates to 0.001 g2/Hz at 10,000 Hz.
The shuttle avionics aft bay overall acceleration is 4.88 g
rms from 20 to 2000 Hz.
SSMECmThe Space Shuttle Main Engine envi-
ronment [CONT73] is as follows:
Decaying sinusoidal vibration: 5-44 Hz at 0.12 in.
double amplitude displacement, 44--1140 Hz at 12 g
peak, 1140-1620 Hz at 0.00018 in. double amplitude
displacement, 1620-2003 Hz at 24 g peak.
Random _ 20-1300 Hz at 0.15 g2/Hz, 1300--1650
Hz +18 dB/ectave, 1650-2000 Hz at 0.6 g2/Hz.
Other Vehicles--Ariane, Atlas-Centar, Delta, and
Titan vehicle vibrationenvironments are shown in Figures
3-14 through 3-20. These profiles give an indication of
general launch vehicle vibration environments.
CompositemThe ETO vibration environment is
considered "High." From the above, rough order of magni-
tude (ROM), worst-case composite avionics vibration
requirements (excluding engine environments) would be:
Sinusoidai longitudinal (thrust axis) vibration: +6
riB/octave to 2 Hz, 1.5 g peak to 15 Hz, 3.8 g peak 15
Hz to 25 Hz, 1.5 g peak to 200 Hz, assume-6
riB/octave beyond 200 Hz.
• Sinusoidal lateral vibration: First stage or near
engines, +6 dBIoctave to 2 Hz, 1.5 g peak to 18 Hz,
assume 1.0 g peak to 100 Hz, -6 riB/octave beyond
100 Hz. Second-stage flight 1.0 g peak from 4 Hz to
18 Hz and 0.6 g peak from 18 Hz to 200 Hz.
• Random vibration: +12 riB/octave to 30 Hz, 0.20
g2/Hz to I000 Hz, -6 dB/octave beyond I000 Hz.
The effective acceleration for the composite is rather
high (24 g rms).
COTS + Capab///ty--From samples of commercial
aircraft vibration test envelopes, the following specifica-
tions represent Civil Market COTS avionic vibration
requirements for equipment mounted rigidly on airplane
structures in forward fuselage, electronic bays:
• Sinusoidal vibration: 0.9 g peak to 15 Hz, --6
dB/octave beyond 15 Hz.
• _ vitration: 0.02 g2/I-Iz to 20 Hz,-6 dS/ectave to
45 Hz, 0.004 g2/Hz to 1000 Hz, --6 dB/cclave beyond
1000 Hz. Tbe ¢mmlll aceeleratioe is 2.5 grms.
It is obvious that Civil Market COTS products (commer-
cial products purchased exactly as found) will not meet
space vibration requuements unless the products are
ruggedizedoraremounted on secondary electronic racks.
Tertiary structures may be necessary to provide the vibra-
tion attenuation factor necessary to match Civil Market
COTS or COTS + product capabilities to launch vehicle
vibration environments. Distributed ai_raft architectures
are used to considerably reduce acceleration spectral den-
sity and overall acceleration requirements. Typical modem
aircraft acceleration spectral density at 130 Hz varies from
0.002 to 1.2 g2/Hz, and overall acceleration varies from 2.0
to 13.5 grms for different locations on the airplane.
However, some militarized Olive Drab Commercial and
MIL-SPEC products are able to meet the composite launch
vehicle vibration requirements.
COTS + Vibra6on Requirement--It will be a
COTS + baseline requirement to provide vibration attenuation
using physical slructm_s, physical partitioning, and the distri-
bution of Civil Market COTS products to locations where
vibration environn_nts are within their operating envelopes.
LTO Acceleration Environment--HI_V accelerations
levels age consideagd "High." Linear acccleration require-
ments are _0 g,and themaximum angularacceleration
requirement is +100 deg/s. Shuttle vehicle applied aceelera-
tim loads, however, are considered 'q._w," with 2.0 g steady
and_+.2.0 g dynamic in landing, and 1.7 g steady and +4.0 g
dynamic at launeh rekase (within 2 sec of release).
COTS + Capab///ty--Civil Market COTS product
requirementsderived from aimraft avionic requirements
are as follows:
• Angular rates of +100 deg/s,
• Angular accelerations of :l:10,0n0 deg/s 2,
• Linear accelerations of +6 g.
The disparity in linear acceleration is to be accommodated
by requiring COTS +productsto meet additional testing
requirements.
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ETO Shock Environment--Spacecraft shock envi-
ronments are associated with stage separations, pyrotech-
nics, docking, landing, and recovery. Figures 3-21
through 3-24 illusla'ate Delta and Titan launch vehicle
shock data. Launch vehicle shock requirements are con-
sidered "High." Avionic shock environments can be as
high as 10 g at landing to 1000 g at separation (location
dependent). The _huttl_ avionics aft bay overall shock
requirement i_:20 g.
I0,000
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c
E
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Figure 3-21. Delta Marman Clamp Shock Test Data
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Figure 3-24. Titaa 3C Shock Environment: Payload Fair-
ing Shock at Spacecraft Interface, Normal.
ized at 2000 Hz
COTS + Capability--Commercial aircraft shock
requirements are associated with handling (shipping con-
tainer and bench handling drop tests) and crash safety.
Although the equipment is not required to operate during
the tests, the test articles will be inspected and operated at
the conclusion of the tests and must show no failure, mal-
function, or out-of-tolerance performance. Free-fall heights
are up to 30 in., depending on the weight of the article.
COTS + Shock RequirementmDefmition of tmw
ETO shock environment tests for COTS + pnxlucts is recom-
mended and will be used in the COTS+ requirements base-
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line.Shocktests at w-be-specified g levels will conform to
shock requirements for aerospace equipment per MIL-E-
5400T (i.e., 18 impact shocks consisting of three shocks in
opposite directions along three mutually perpendicular
axes). It will be a COTS + baseline requirement to provide
shock atlennalion using physical slluctures, physical parti-
tioning, and the distribution of Civil Market COTS products
to locations where shock environments are within their oper-
ating envelopes.
ETO Temperature EnvironmentmVarious avionic
space temperature environments were idenufied for the
ETO mission:
• _186oC (_302oF) to 150°C (30201=) avionics [SPACg0];
• .-46°C (-50°1) to 32°C (90°F) SSMEC operating
[CONT73];
• _128oc (_200OF) to 94oC (200OF) SSMEC nonoper-
ating [CONT73];
• -62°(: (-80°1:) to 65°C (149°F) STS avionics bay;
• _25o(:: (__13o1=)to 65oc (149°1=) avionics;
• _157oc (_250°1=) to 121°C (250°F) STS cargo bay
with doors open.
COTS + Capability--Commercial aircraft avionics
are designed to withstand operating temperature ranges
from -15/-25°C to 65°C, depending on aircraft manufac-
turer specifications. The temperature may be either con-
trolled or unconu_)lled. Uncontrolled, passively heated, and
cooled equipment will rely on radiation and natural con-
vection from all sides of the equipment. No credit can be
taken from heat conduction to equipment ways.
COTS+ Requirement--Since portions of the ETO
mission are within a partial vacuum environment, uncon-
U'olled COTS + equipment will use radiative exchange from
all six sides of the equipment and heat conduction to
equipment trays, and will be accommodated by COTS +
requirements. If necessary, it will be a COTS + baseline
requirement to provide controlled thermal environments
through physical partitioning and the disoibution of Civil
Market COTS products m locations where temperature
environments are within their operating envelopes.
At launch, conductive thermal cooling will be provided
from air convection, and thermal lag will be used to sup-
port heat wansfer throughout the initial mission phase. An
active thermal control system (ATCS) providing avionics
bay heat rejection will be used for avionics required to be
operational over longer durations. During checkout and
prelaunch ground operations, heat rejection will be ener-
gized with ground power. From liftoff to approximately
T+125 sec, thermal lag will be used. Flash evaporator
operation subsequently commerces and continues until
vehicle radiators are deployed, as in the Shuttle mission.
COTS + equipment operating temperatm'e ranges will be
from -15°C to 65°C. A cost assessment tradcoff study is
recommended to assess the ufifity of this requirement for
Olive Drab Commercial components, which are commer-
cial products modified to withstand space requirements.
ETO Radiation Environment--The Van Allen inner
and outer belts lie between approximately 0-1 and 2-3 earth
radii, or between 0--4,000 and 8,000-12,000 miles above the
surface of the earth, respectively. The ETO mission ends in
LEO, which extends to approximately 621 miles (I000 kin)
above earth. The radiation belts protect the launch vehicle
against solar flares by providing a highly effective shield.
Protection from total dose and dose rate transient effects
can essentially be guaranteed with known and usually rea-
sonable amounts of shielding in combination with careful
use of radiation-luudened pans.
The radiation environments for LEO, gcostationaty, and an
elliptical high-earth orbit (180 x 10,000 nmi) are shown in
Figure 3-25, and Figure 3-26 shows the radiation environ-
ment for circular orbits. More high-energy protons are
trapped in the inner Van Alien belt, and the effect of
shielding attenuates the effects of low-energy elecn'ons
trapped in the outer Van Allen belL
_ - NASA mo(:l_ A[I-7 Hi
Proton _ - NASA model APE
1013 _ EnigxicaJoct)itmlkkctod tor hioh
mdiebon expo4ure. IlK) x IO.OGO
nmi. O-deo indiw,_n
10 _2 _\ _ Geos,-mnety od=it--equaoriM
\'-,, --- - _r_ orbit up to 40O nmi.
• ' _ _\. eny indin*eon
.,o,oi
lOg
I 10 8|
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Prow_ O
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Figure 3.25. Namrai Radiatioa Environment
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• Electron and proton/spherical shielding
• 10-year mission
• Circular orbits/0-deg inclination
AAMostly
Pr_°_ _. /
10 1/2 g/cm2
Shielding (AI)
lo /I t _ _stly
= !! H
o • 3g/cm2(AI)
10 ]
I I II I1[
2 4 8R E
1031 = , =
102 103 104 105
I
lO6
Altitude (nmi) c_10677._
Figure 3-26. Radiation Environment for Circular Equato-
rial Orbits
COTS + RequirementmThe ETO radiation envi-
ronment is considered "Medium." As a minimum, COTS +
equipment will be protected with shielding normally used
against lighting su'ikes. In addition, the requirements will:
Minimize susceptibility of electronic parts to single-
event upsets (SEUs) by locating COTS + electronics
within radiation-shielded compartments.
• Assure SEU recovery and protection against latchup.
Provide for the assessment of COTS + radiation toler-
ance and possible substitution of more radiation-toler-
ant parts at the vendor's facility without significant
additional recurring cost, e.g.. pin-for-pin replacement
of in.grail circuits with epi-layer CMOS technology
parts. Table 3-2 illustrates the radiation hardness lev-
els for various semiconductor technologies.
ETO Partial Vacuum Environment [GRIF91]mThe
design of electronic equipment intended for use in launch
vehicles is affected by gas ionization, as are spacecraft
intended for operations in low-earth orbits. In a partial vac-
uum environment, low-density gases are easily ionized,
providing excellent but unintended conductive paths
between points in elecmmic hardware that are at moderate
to high potential differences. This tendency is aggravated
by the fact that at high altitude, the residual molecular and
atomic species are already partly ionized by solar ullravio-
let light and various collision processes.
Table 3-2. Radiation Hardness Le_ls for Semiconductor
Devices
Technology Total Dose, rods (Sl)
CMOS (soft) 103-1 04
CMOS (hardened) 5 x 104-10 6
CMOS/SOS (soft) 103-1 04
CMOS/SOS (hardened) >10 s
ECL 107
12L 10s-4 x 10e
Linear IC2s 5 x 103-107
MNOS 10a-1 0s
MNOS (hardened) 5 x 10s-1 06
NMOS 7x 102-7x 102
PMOS 4 x 103-1 0s
TI'IJSTTL > 104
C@10677,,4o
A key point is that if any equipment is to be energized dur-
ing the launch ascent, care must be taken to prevent electri-
cal arcing during certain phases of flighL
COTS + Requirement--COTS + equipment that
may be powered on during the ascent phase will be oper-
ated during the evacuation phase of thermal vacuum cham-
ber testing.
ETO Acoustic Environment--T=tan IIS and MLV
IRD acoustic environmental conditions are illustrated in
Figures 3-27 through 3-29 and Table 3-3 provides maxi-
mum estimated noise levels for the Titan 34D/RJS.
SSMEC--The Space Shuttle main engine near-
field acoustic environment is 174 dB.
COTS + Capability--Commercial aircraft nor-
mally do not specify acoustic requirements.
COTS + Acoustic Requirement--Per MIL-STD.
810, equipment located in areas where noise levels are 130
dB or less do not require testing to noise environments.
Acoustic qualification will be required for COTS + equip
merit installed in high acoustic environments such as near
engines.
3.2.3 Transfer Missions
The transfer mission will be to deliver vehicles, structures,
components, fuel, supplies, and crew to high-altitude orbits
or lunar/planetary orbits. Additional operations during
inma-solar-system travel will be astronomical observations,
training, and landing simulations.
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32.3.1 Transfer Durations_Mars mission durations up
to 1000 days have been projected. The mission would
include 400 days for the round trip and a 600-day stay on
Mars. However, the f'u-st trip would be shorter for several
reasons.
Table3-3.En_lope ofMaximum EstimatedNoiseLevels
InternaltoPayloadFairinglorTitan.;4D/IUS
Launch and Flight
Third.Octave-Band
Center Frequency (Hz)
Third-Octave-Band
Vibration (dB)
25 145
31.5 121
4O 122.5
50 124
63 125.5
80 127
1O0 129
125 130.5
160 131.5
200 132.5
250 133.5
315 134
400 134.5
500 134.5
630 134
800 133.5
1000 133
1250 131
1250 131
1600 129.5
2000 128.5
2500 126.5
3150 125
4000 123
5000 121.5
6300 120
8000 118
Reference[GRIF91,p. 50]
Because psychological and physiological problems
increase with trip time, the fLrSttrip may be limited to
uncle: 500 days. It also may not be feasible for a first mis-
sion to stay longer than 50 days on the surface because of
launch windows, crew safety, and the lack of meaningful
tasks to accomplish [UM-Agl]. The University of Min-
nesota Task Team I Mars Integrated Transponatio_ System
(MrI3) mission profile is as follows:
• Outbound, approximately 175 days using Venus
flyby;
• Inbound, 249 days;
• Subtotal, 424 days;
• Stay dine on Martian surface, 30 days;
• Total mission, 474 days.
The University of Minnesota Task Team II concept sends
an unmanned Mars Habitation Module (MHM) to Mars
autonomously wior to the manned missio_ with a Mars
Excursion Vehicle (MEV) onboard the Mars Transfer Vehi-
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tie (MTV). The MHM transfer time (using cryogenic
boosters with low ISP) is approximately 500--600 days.
This requires that the MHM be launched several years
ahead of the manned mission ['UM-B91].
3.2.3.2 Transfer Environments--Since all vehicles must
endure the launch environment powered or unpowered,
avionics for missions other than launch should meet envi-
ronmental requirements unless more extreme environments
(radiation, temperature, vibration) or effects (e.g., more
heat generated by operating electronics) are evidenced.
Transfer Vibration Environment--Transfer vehicle
vibration environments are considered "Medium" and not
as harsh as the launch environment. However, the u'ansfer
vehicle avionics must endure launch vibration environ-
ments. Transfer vehicle avionics will be qualified to launch
Vibration requirements.
Transfer Acceleration Environment--Transfer vehi-
cle acceleration environments are considered "Medium"
and not as harsh as the launch environment. However,
transfer vehicle avionics must endure launch accelerations.
Transfer vehicle avionics will be qualified to launch accel-
eration requirements.
Transfer Shock Environment--Transfer vehicle
shock environments are considered "Medium" and not as
harsh as the launch environment. However, transfer vehicle
avionics must endure launch shock environments; there-
fore transfer vehicle avionics will be qualified to the same
levels as the launch shock requirements.
Transfer Temperature Environment--The transfer
vehicles are exposed to direct sunlight (77"C) and darkness
(-74"12). The vehicle will provide internal conduction paths
and thermal control to accommodate +150°C temperature
differences between sunlit and dark sides. Heating rates for
aerodynamic capture will be kept low. The maximum edge
temperature of an aerobrake on earth aerocapmre is approx-
imately 600°C. Qualification of transfer vehicle avionics to
launch vehicle temperature requirements with thermal con-
m_l is sufficient for the transfer vehicle.
Transfer Radiation Environment--Spacecraft in Wan.
sit above the Van Allen belts or in interplanetary space are
exposed to solar-generated radiation and galactic cosmic
rays. Although the dose levels from these sources have
been said to be negligible, the total radiation environment
enroute to Mars is more than 100 times greater than that
encountered in a lunar mission.
The greatest radiation exposure threats are solar proton
events and galactic cosmic radiation [NACH85]. Solar
flares can produce severe single-event upset problems,
since they consist of a large proportion of high-speed
heavy nuclei particles against which it is impossible to
shield [CUNN84 & CUNN85].
Major solar flare,s occurring in 11-year cycles, such as the
August 1972 event, will require the equivalent of over 40
g/cm 2 aluminum shielding. A storm cellar wall or enclo-
sure with the equivalent of 5.8 in. of aluminum must be
provided to protect the crew for physiological purposes.
The problem with aluminum is that as its thickness
increases, secondary nuclear reactions produce more radia-
tion than primary particles. However, Mars missions are
planned for solar minimums and decrease the chance of
solar flares.
A nuclear thermal reactor propulsive engine is used in the
baseline vehicle design to provide higher ISPs, more accel-
eration for less propellant, lower cost, and a reduction in
trip time. Shielding will be used to provide avionic and
crew protection.
Transfer vehicle radiation environments are considered
"High."
COTS + Radiation Requirement--COTS + avion-
ics will require a protected environment, radiation-tolerant
components, and recovery mechanisms from single-eveat
upsets. Protection from total dose effects can essentially be
guaranteed with known and usually reasonable amounts of
shielding in combination with careful use of radiation-
hardened parts. Figure 3-30 illuswates total doses for a
deep-space mission and the effect of aluminum shielding
for protecting avionics.
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A storm cell or equivalent will be wovided to protect crew
and critical avionics from major upsets. With a proper
design, it may be possible to incorporate shielding for solar
events with nuclear reactor shielding for the whole vehicle
avionic suite, regardless of location.
TransferPartialVacuum Environment--
MaterialOutgassing[GRIFgl]--Mostmaterials
will outgas to some extent in a vacuum environment. Met-
als will usually have an outer layer into which gases have
been absorbed during their tenure on earth and which is
easily released once in orbit. Polymers and other materials
composed of volatile compounds may outgas extensively
in a vacuum, losing a substantial fraction of their initial
mass. Some basically nonvolatile materials, such as
graphite-epoxy and its composites, are hygroscopic and
absorb considerable water from the air. This water will be
released over a period of time once the spacecraft is in
orbit. In a vacuum, some plating materials, when warm,
will migrate to cooler areas of the spacecraft, where they
recondense; cadmium is notorious in this regard.
Outgussing materials can be a problem for several rea._us.
In polymeric or other volatile materials, the nature and
extent of the outgassing can lead to serious changes in the
basic material properties. Even where this does not occur,
as in water outgassing material fzom graphite-epoxy, struc-
ruraldistortionwill result. Suchcompositesare often
selectedfor appficafionswheresu-ucturalalignmentis criti-
cal becauseof their highstiffness-to-weightratio andlow
coefficient of thermal expansion.
Outgassing is a problem in that the vapor can recondense
on optical or other surfaces and degrade device perfor-
mance. Even if the vapor does not condense, it can inter-
fete with certain delicate insmaments. For example,
ultraviolet asu'onomy is effectively impossible in the pres-
ence of even u'ace amounts of water vapor.
The COTS + Requireme nt--COTS+ avionics will
be qualified by analysis to ensure no detrimental out-
gassing effects.
3.2.4ExcursionMissions
The primary purposeof excursionmissions will be to
u,ansponpersonnel andcargo betweenpaddngorbitsand
lunaror Mars surfaces.
3,2.4.1Excunion Durations--Projected lun_ and Mars
excursiondurafiousare:
• Lunar---On orbit four days per mission, one to two
missions per year, and five missions per lifetime.
• Mars-Six days for a nominal mission and 30 days
for contingency planning; 800 days possible lifetime
(200-day u-ansit,600 days on surface and return to
Mars orbit to rendezvous with the MTV, and aban-
doned).
3.2.4.2 Excursion Environments--Excursion vehicle
environmental requirements are cited in the following
paragraphs.No excursion environments or operations
requiring additional concern are noted when compared to
launch and transfer vehicle environments. Launch or wans-
fer vehicle environmental requirements are specified where
applicable.
Excursion Vibration Environment--Excursion vehi-
clevibration environments are considered "Medium" and
not as harsh as the launch environment. However, excur-
sion vehicles must endure launch vibration environments;
therefore, excursion vehicle avionics will be qualified to
launch vibration reqtdrements.
Excursion Acceleration Environment--Excursion
vehicle acceleration environments are considered
"Medium" and not as harsh as the launch environment.
However, excursion vehicles must endure launch accelera-
tion environments; therefore, excursion vehicle avionics
will be qualified to launch acceleration requirenw.nts.
Excursion Shock Env/ronment---Excursion vehicle
shock environments are considered "Medium" and not as
harsh as the launch environment. However, excursion vehi-
cles must endure launch shock environments; therefore,
excursion vehicle avionics will be qualified to launch
shock requirements.
ExcursionTemperatureEnvironment [SPA CgOI--
The Martian surface temperature varies from -125°C to
25°C and the vehicle must accommodate +150°C.
The lunarexcursion vehicle must accommodate -180°C to
150°(2. Shadowed lunar craters at the poles have surface
temperatures of-233°C. At the Apollo 17 site, day to night
temperatures ranged from -117°C to ll0°C.
Qualification of excursion vehicle avionics to launch vehi-
cle temperaturerequirements with thermal control is suffi-
cient for the transfer vehicle.
ExcursionRadiation Environment--Excursion vehi-
cle radiation environments are considered "Medium" for
lunar and "High" for Mars excursion vehicles. The crew
and avionics will be provided adequate shielding onboard
the vehicle. Protection from solar flare radiation levels will
be provided for avionics required for rendezvous. This pro-
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tection will be a storm cell or equivalent to protect operat-
ing and/or nonoperating critical avionics from permanent
damage. Crew protection during anticipated solar flares
will be entry into the transfer vehicle and/or surface mod-
ules after solar flare warnings.
3.2.5 Orbital and Surface Missions
Orbital and surface system operations include space exper-
iments, astronomy, exploration, geologic sampling, and
construction.
3.2.5.1 Orbital and Surface Durations--The SSF mission
is 30 years on orbit. A lunar spaceport lifetime may be
beyond 20 years. The Mars habitat module may be occu-
pied for up to two years and have a lifetime up to 20 years.
3.2.5.20rbitalandSurfaceEnvironments---Sinceallvehi.
cles must endure the launch environment powered or
unpowered, avionics for missions other than launch should
meet environmental requirements unless more extreme envi-
ronments (radiation, temperature, vibration) or effects (e.g.,
more heat generated by operating elecu_nics) are evidenced.
Orbital and Surface Temperature Environment--The
lunar spaceport must operate within a lunar temperature
range from -180°(2 to 120oC.
Orbital and Surface Radiation Environment--A per-
manent platform may encounter radiation doses up to 3000
Mrad, and lunar and Martian surface stations/modules may
accumulate comparable amounts. NASA has set a 50 tad
requirement for SSE
Protection from solar winds, galactic cosmic radiation
(GCR) sources, and solar panicle events (SPEs) from solar
flares will be provided for operating and nonoperating crib
ical avionics. This protection will be a storm cell, safe, or
equivalent sU'ucture to protect critical avionics from per-
manent damage.
COTS + Requirements--Orbital and surface vibration,
acceleration, shock, acoustic, and temperature requirements
will be as specified for launch vehicles, and radiation protec-
tion will be provided by incorporating sheltered avionic
bays, safes for avionic cold spares, and/or storm shelters.
3.3 Verification and Validation Issues
33.1 Introduction
This subsection provides guidelines for the verification and
validation (V&V) of COTS + integrated modular avionics
and is based on the principles presented in ARINC Project
Paper 651 for certifying IMA in commercial air transport
category aircraft. It provides background information and
airline philosophy on the certification process, which may
be incorporated within COTS* applications. It contains
recommendations that are expected to minimize the effort
necessary to certify new avionic systems and modified
avionics equipment subject to certification.
Comme_ial certification provides guidelines for the imple-
mentation of V&V lm3cedures for COTS + avionics. Com-
mercial certification regulations and procedures are
analogous to Depmm_t of Defense (DoD) validation speci-
fications and tests; both ensure safety of operations. Included
within the certification definition are the prcr_ures used to
verify that designs meet specified requirements.
33.2 Airline Philosophy
Philosophically, airplane certification demonstrates that a
specific aircraft function is within acceptable safety limits.
It demonstrates a degree of confidence in the performance
and operation of a system. It is not meant to be a set of
activities designed solely to meet the Jegulations. Rather, it
sets the level of acceptable safety for a new system or, in
the case of modifications, demonstrates that existing over-
all safety is not degraded.
To aid in this process, national regulatory authorities have
established sets of regulations and other advisory docu-
ments that build on past experience. Therefore, certifica-
tion is to be a living, flexible process capable of absorbing
the developments in aviation and associated technology
while still maintaining its purpose---the safe aircraft.
Documents supporting the certification plan ideally contain
only texL drawings, and data that are relevant to the certifi-
cation. More documentation is not necessary to ensure suc-
cessful certification and may overcomplicate and delay the
process. The end result of certification is approval of a
function in the aircraft (and ultimately the total aircraft),
buL as part of the certification process, certain steps of cer-
tification are defined and may be accomplished indepen-
dently.
33.3 ResponsibUity for Cert_cation
Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the users to ensure
that their vehicles are safe. Although a regulatory agency
has ultimate responsibility for aircraft certification, it may
delegate that responsibility to an applicant who has demon-
strated competence in the certification process. The regula-
tory agency should assess the experience and resources of
each applicant to determine if the applicant's certification
plan is sound.
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Man_acturers are responsible for type certification of the
vehicle. They ensure that vehicles supplied to the users
meet all of the pertinent reguladons. Users often contract
with the manufactme_ to perform supplemental type cerd-
fication (STC) after the vehicle is in service.
3,3.4VerOr'wationand Validationof COTS +IMA
In the COTS* IMA concept, general-purpose computers
execute a variety of application programs within a stan-
dardized software environmenL With this approach, indi-
vidaal avionics functions shed theft LRU identity common
with previous generations of equipment. Resources are
shared, and communication is performed in a more highly
integrated manner than was possible with independent
LRUs. This level of integration results in the potential for
undesirable interrelationships between separate avionic
functions. The validation task to demonstrate scceptable
aircraftsafety is different for IMA and LRU equipment.
Verification and validation tasks are composed of three dis-
tinct efforts:
• Confirmation of the general environment provided
by the cabinet,
• Confirmation of the operational behavior of each
function intended to reside in a cabinet,
• Confirmation of the resultant composite of functions
within a specific cabinet.
All of these concepts are present in LRU validation but not
as separate idenfifmble tasks. The COTS + IMA validation
process shall optimize eachof these areas separately.
3.3.4.1 Cabinet Environment V& V--A COTS + cabinet
provides all of the physical and computational resomr, es
necessary for the various avionic functions to be reduced to
just a software program. This is essentially aU the hard-
ware, e.g., the mechanical racking and enclosure, power
conversion and distribution, backplane bus, and computer.
The computer consists of the CPU, program store memory,
scratchpad memory, timing and control circuity, internal
data paths, port to backplane bus, and executive (operating
system) software.
Cabinet Hardware Resources---Each facet of the cab-
inet hardware is implemented with a strategy for fault tol-
erance. These strategies include both redundancy and
design margin. Redundancy provides the ability for contin-
ued operation in the event of a random component failure,
and design margin provides the abifity for continued opera-
tion at extreme suess levels.
V&V of the hardwme aspects of the cabinet environment
ensures that the cabinet components provide their respec-
tive functions with the Intended fault tolerance ov_ the
entire anticipated environmental spectrum. The environ-
mental spectrum includes temperature, vibration, and EMI
primary power transients. Verification at this level concen-
trates on electrical characteristics: waveforms, voltage and
ctment levels, monitor detection thresholds, resource allo-
cation circuits,and theLike.
Executive Software Program Resources--The execu-
tive software program provides task scheduling, resource
management, and supervision of the operational applica-
tion software programs and is implemented with a strategy
for fault tolerance. This strategy includes memory manage-
ment' computational timing budgets, and monitoring the
execution of the application programs for possible viola-
dons. Reconfiguration and recovery ntethods are to be pro-
vided for each potential violation.
Verification of the software aspects of the cabinet environ-
merit ensures that the cabinet executive provides its
intended function. The operation of the executive shall be
verified to conform to the requirements and the structure of
the implementation.
3.3.4.2 Avionic Function Operational Verifwation--
Each avionic function may consist of several software
application programs executed by one or more computes.
The various functions are independent and isolated from
one another. Any intended interaction between functions
occurs as an overt use of system resources. A particular
function most likely will be composed of several con-
stituent pieces, convenient to its particular needs.
The constituent pieces or tasks contain the implementation
of the operation of the specificavionic function. This
includes interfacestootherfunctions, data conditioning,
sensor source selection, crew interface, computational
algorithms, fault monitoring, and so on.
Function operational verification ensm-es that each specific
application program performs as intended by confirming
the accuracy and adequacy of performance over the range
of input data conditions, mode transitions, and flight sce-
narios. This process includes module testing, integration
testing, functional testing, and other tests. Verification at
this level concentrates on confirming the presence of
intended function, requirements mapping, operational per-
formance, and test coverage.
Each integrated function should be individually verified as
pan of the IMA cabinet. Robust partitioning concepts are nec-
essary to ensme that once a function is vegified, it csn remain
3-20
hostedinacabinetcontaining any combination of uncenified
functions without jeoImrdizing the stares ofany verified func-
tions. Composite cabinet verification (simulmmous verifica-
tion ofallIMA functions)isnotnecessarynorrequired.
3.3.4.3 Validation of Degraded Modes of Operation--
One of the main drivers for COTS + IMA is avionic func-
tion availability. Fault detection, isolation, and the use of
redundant components are necessary to fulfdl these needs.
A principal benefit of COTS + IMA is the ability to exploit
the inherent fault tolerance of the system to allow users to
defer maintenance actions. This can be accomplished by
designing equipment to perform with degraded modes of
operation. Although airlines use a scheduled maintenance
concept, the extent to which it is used and the criticality of
functions involved renders this concept different in the
COTS + IMA deferred maintenance concept.
With COTS + IMA and the availability of shared resources,
it is possible to achieve higher levels of fault tolerance for
a greater number of systems and for systems of lower criti-
cality. This allows a large number of systems to be certi-
fied for fail-operative or degraded modes of operation.
In the most forward-looking approach to IMA, the COTS +
IMA system has the responsibility to detect and isolate all
failure conditions, enable redundant components, inhibit
actions by failed components, and determine whether flight
or ground crew need to be notified. It will also determine if
operating restrictions apply.
Some of the validation issues include the following:
The failuremodes and effectsoftheavionicsneed to
be rigorouslyexamined ina fullyoperationalstate
and indegradedmodes ofoperation.
The effectiveness of built-in-test algorithms to correctly
identify failures and reconfignre the system around
those failures will be as critical as the system itself.
Issuesofcrew awarenessand relianceon thesystem
toenforceoperationalrestrictionsshiftfrom vehicle
operationalprocedurevalidationtovalidationofthe
degraded modes of operation.
It is expected that the transition to the defened mainte-
nance, degraded mode of operation concepts will be evolu-
tionary and will progress as confidenceisgainedinIMA.
3.3.5 Configuration Control
The assurance of continuous dependability throughout the
life of the vehicle is essential. To accomplish this, an accept-
able system should be in place to ensure that the validated
configuration is maintained. Configuration control is the
means whereby it is determined that replacement items
installed on the vehicle are acceptable in form, fit, and func-
tion and meet the legal and technical definition of being vali-
dated for their intended use. Each vehicle incorporates
electronic documentation describing equipment installed
thereon, including manufacturers' part and serial number.
3.3.5.1 Configuration Status--Throughout the production
run of a vehicle design, changes and improvements will be
made constantly. Improvements to engines, additional sys-
tems, and extended performance of existing systems can be
expected. For example, extending the autoland perfor-
mance of the flyback booster's guidance system into ILS
CAT 111 conditions may require more attention and con-
trol than the installation of a radio altimeter. Retrofit of a
performance management system on a fleet of vehicles
may require certain features of a distance measuring equip-
ment (DME) interrogator that not all of the previously
interchangeable DMEs have.
Of great value to the users is the ability to use the same
component across several fleets of vehicles. The configura-
tion control system will be able to identify clearly any
unique features of the fleet that might be affected by modi-
fication status or manufacturers' variables between similar
equipment. Sometimes a new version of existing equip-
ment is backward integratable on earlier vehicles, but the
users' inventory of spares cannot be used on the later ver-
sion airplanes. This type of one-way interchangeability is
rarely of any use other than the potential it offers for modi-
fication of all existing inventory to the latest version.
3.3.5.2 Use of Manufacturer Parts List The parts list
applicable to a particular series of vehicle will include
alternate parts that have been determined to be acceptable.
This list may include interchangeable components speci-
fied by an ARINC characteristic supplied by different
manufacturers. While this type of documentation has
proved to be of significant economic benefit to the airlines,
it introduces to the COTS + concept the problems of identi-
fication, change control, and modification status account-
ability necessary in a configuration control system.
3.3.6 Software Changes
In the COTS + IMA concept, support personnel use an
onboard data loader to update software in equipment resi-
dent on the vehicle. The data-loading process will be
described in modification documentation and/or LRU
installation procedures, depending on the reason for the
change. The transfer medium will provide the data in a
standardized form.
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The integrator and the onboard software loading system are
responsible for ensuring the integrity of each software mod-
ification. An update might make minor changes to a single
function without affecting the memory map or timing struc-
line of the cabinet. An update might also make large reas-
signments of both resources. Both extremes should satisfy
the consistency checks described earlier. To ensure correct-
hess, these checks should be compared with known,
required states of the system following the modification.
Users with the proper level of technical expertise may
assume complete responsibifity for one or more avionics
cabinets. Functions may be reassigned, changes may be
incorporated or initiated, and new applications that are spe-
cific to the user may be developed. In such instances, the
user would accept the responsibility for verification and
validation.
3.4 Maintainability and Testability
3.4.1 General
The benefits of dependability and cost are two key motiva-
tots toward incorporating a COTS + maintainability and
testability philosophy. The following paragraphs summa-
rize these benefit.
3.4.1.1 Dependability--Deep-space extended-duration
missions have been said to require avionic dependability
better than fail-operative (FO) 10-failure probability,
meaning that the avionics are fully operational after I0 like
failures. The ramifications of this requirement are signifi-
cant. Assuming that channel redundancy is implemented,
12 avionic channels would be required. Considerable effort
would be required to implement suchan ultra-high-reliable
avionic system in a cost-effective (low-cost. high-utility)
manner. The electronic design, redundancy management,
and V&V for the system would require appreciable efforts.
Flightsafety and maintenance benefits, however, are real-
ized with the high-dependability requirement. The mean
time before maintenancealert (MTBMA) willbe several
times the MTBF of a single channel. Improvement in sys-
tem unreliability is achieved, and depending on single-
channel failure rates, an order of unreliability improvement
can also be achieved.
This subsection provides analysis applicable to the incor-
poration of COTS + components in a quad-channel configu-
ration in lieu of a 12-channel implementation implied by
the desire to achieve 10-FO fault tolerance dependability.
The concept uses a deferred maintenance philosophy to
effect a lower cost, weight, and power configuration that
can be designed and implemented with currentexpertise.
The deferred maintenance or fly-without-repair concept is
also applied to expendable boosters in the strawmau
COTS + maintenance concept presented herein. Although
the deferred maintenance concept was not considered cost-
effective within MPRAS Point Designs, it is to be recon-
sidered here because of COTS + component cost utility and
opportunity costs.
3.4.1.2 Cost--Two distinct cost benefits derive from the
use of COTS + technology within a COTS + philosophy: (1)
reduction of missed opportunity costs and (2) reduced
maintenance support costs. Opportunity cost benefits are
the result of incorporating a deferred maintenance concept.
Reduced maintenance support cost benefits result from
implementing new COTS + HIM maintenance strategies
and reduced maintenance support costs.
Opportunity Cos_--Opporumity costs are viewed as
the additional costs incurred whenever an event or oppor-
tunity is delayed and rescheduled to a later time; a delayed
launch due to a component failure is an example. Another,
perhaps more costly, example is if an avionic failme occurs
enroute during a deep excursion mission and the end mis-
sion segment is scrubbed or postponed to another mission,
resulting in the space vehicle's loss or return to _ri-
mary mission unaccomplished.
Maintenance Support Costs..--Motivation toward the
incorporation of COTS + also exists because of cost bene-
fits that can be achieved in long-term maintenance and
support. To achieve these benefits, a COTS + maintenance
and testing strategy must be followed.
This subsection provides design guidance for developing a
maintenance strategy for COTS + IMA-equipped vehicles.
It includes guidelines for the maintenance community on
testing COTS +IMP, equipment. It focuses on specificrec-
ommendations concerningthe testability and maintainabil-
ity of IMA components. It discusses real-time reporting of
COTS+ IMA faults and the storing of dam representing
COTS + IMA faults.An interactivemaintenancefunctionis
dascribedtlmtidentifies,confirms,and isolatesfaults.
Actions taken to correctfaults and the verification of the
results of such actions are also discussed in this section.
3A.IJ Deferred Maintenamce--A COTS + deferred mmn-
tenunce concept will be used for all avionic subsystems
using COTS + components unless it is shown by analysis
(noted under recommendations for further study) that this
is not cost-effective. Analysis will include missed opportu-
nity costs, including the costs of all supporting
functions/organizations for the duration of launch recycles,
postponements due to missing orbital-celestial launch win-
dows, and postponements awaiting favorable weather con-
ditions. The deferred maintenance concept is herein
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earmarkedfor use within expendable launch vehicles and
extended-duration Iransfer/excursion vehicles because of
COTS + cost advantages. It is recommended that the con-
cept be evaluated for effectiveness in other client subsys-
tems.
Expendable Boosters--A quad-redundant fly-
without-repair architecture and maintenance philosophy is
hereby recommended for implementation in COTS + base-
line expendable boosters for the following reason. Prelimi-
nary analysis indicates that implementing a COTS +
deferred maintenance concept costs less than $90K per
ALS mission ($88.8K vs. $893K per ALS mission with
space-qualified components) [MPRAS TM1]. The cost
delta compares deferred maintenanceimplementation only
to maintenance costs. It is believed that an assessment of
opportunity costs, payload, and catastrophic losses will
favor a COTS + deferred maintenance concepL Table 3-4
shows the difference between using COTS + components
and space-qualified components when comparing deferred
maintenance costs vs. maintenance costs for the 347 mis-
sion ALS reference vehicle. COTS + costs were assumed to
be one-tenth of custom space-qualified component costs.
Five sets of avionic single-string MTBFs were used per the
MPRAS study for parametric quantification of costs. The
table shows triple modular redundancy (TMR) MTBFs for
single-channel MTBFs of 200, 600, 2000, 6000, and
20,000 hours per MPRAS Technical Memo - 1 (TM-I).
The table shows a much lower deferred maintenance cost
delta for lower reliability systems (e.g., $34K for a TMR of
66.7 hours).
Table 3.4. Deferred Maiatenance Delta Costs
TMR Data Costs Program
MTBF (hr) Technology per Mission Delta
66.7 MPRAS $838.0K $291.0M
COTS+ $34.0K $11.gM
200.0 MPRAS $873.0K $303,0M
COTS+ $70.0K $24.3M
667.0 MPRAS $887.0K $308.0M
COTS+ $83,3K $28.9M
2000.0 MPRAS $890.0K $309.0M
COTS+ $87.3K $30.3M
6670.0 MPRAS $893.0K $310.0M
COTS+ $88.8K $30.8M
Extended Missions--A maintained COTS + quad-
channel avionic baseline architecture shall be used in lieu
of n-parallel channels to provide the 10-FO desired goal
for deep-space, LTV/MTV, and excursion vehicles. By
manually replacing failed components of a quad-channel
system, the architecture can provide IO-FO dependability.
Although mathematical models and formulas show
improvement inavailability using multiplecomponents
with a given reliability, there is a def'mite limit on the bene-
fit to be gained by adding redundant elements. The utility
of the concept is sensitive to avionic reliability and equip
meat on-time because of the extremely long flight duration
of the MTV. Avionics may be energized for thousands of
hours.
Assuming 200 days for transit, 600 days for Mars sur-
face activities, and 200 days for return, 1000 days or
24,000 hours of avionic flight time is accrued. Avionic
reliability, comprising inverse exponential functions,
suffers immensely for mission times in the thousands of
hours compared to 1- to 2-hour missions. Unless future
manned mission single-string avionic reliability is
fairly high, parallel redundancy provides minimal
improvement.
To circumvent this problem, avionic equipment may be
turned off for extended periods and/or higher reliability
components may be used. The latter suggests Class S parts
instead of Class B or commercial parts; this alternative
does not fit within the COTS + concepL The avionics may
be de-energized for periods of time enroute and during sur-
face visitations, thereby reducingthe maximum 24,000-
houravionic on-time by a factor of three to 7,500
hours---which does not help much.
The COTS + philosophy will be to implement a quad-chan-
nel architecture to reduce cost and complexity. A defen_
maintenance concept will be instituted using cold spare
COTS + components to replace failed redundant elements
and using storage cabinets to protect cold spares. Advan-
tages of the COTS + concept include module longevity
derived from unpowered components, reduced power con-
sumption, protection from galactic and solar radiation,a d
weight/volume savings from the elimination of chassis,
backplane, and cable interfaces required for higher order
redundancy.
A maintained system COTS + concept will offer consider-
able reliability improvement for the LTV/MTV and excur-
sion vehicles over unmaintained systems. Preliminary
COTS + assessments indicatesystem safety and spares
count within goals. Further study of COTS + reliability and
maintainability is recommended toassessthisconcept,
establish baseline channel reliabilities, and establish
achievable spares requirements.
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3.4.2 Centralized Maintenance Concept
COTS* shall implement a centralized maintenance func-
tion for all spacecraft avionics. The function shall provide
fault detection, fault isolation, and fault containment and
allow faults to be positively identified before they are
allowed to propagate to serviceable components. A central
maintenance computer (CMC) providing these functions is
incorlxrated within the Boeing 777 airplane's AIMS and is
described in Appendix A. The CMC is defined within the
COTS + slrawman architectm'e herein.
Avionics functions shall be designed to report their status,
performance details, and faults during operation of the
spacecraft (i.e., the flight mode). This assists maintenance
personnel in scheduling maintenance actions before the
deferred maintenance is performed.
The COTS + maintenance concept is based on the applica-
tion of fault tolerance techniques to an entire avionics sys-
tem. Fault tolerance is to be applied to the entire avionics
system from the sensors through the interfaces, to the pro-
cessing, and ultimately to the display devices. The various
methods for achieving fault tolerance are described in Sub-
section 4.5.
The details of the central maintenan_ concept a_e decumented
in ARINC Report 624, "Onhoard Maintenance System."
3.4.2.1 Failure Dam Recording--A method of recording
fault information automatically should be part of the sys-
tem design. Dedicated nonvolatile memory should be used
to record all fault data. The capacity of the memory should
be sufficient to store failure events that could accumulate
in a 10-day period of 240 flight hours. This data shall be
downlinked to earth for extended-duration operation
(EDO) to clear accumulated data. Redundant storage of
fault records is recommended to ensure that the data is
available in the event of a storage medium failure.
The CIVIC cabinet should also contain nonvolatile memory
to record all cabinet and related module faults. A section of
memory should be dedicated to each cabinet to ensure fault
data recovery, even in the event of total system failure.
At the module level, nonvolatile memory will be provided
to record the module faults and the status of remaining
levels of redundancy. A section of memory will be dedi-
cated to each module to ensure failure data recovery in the
event of total system failure.
3.4.2.2 Operational Reporting--There will be displays on
the flight deck that can be used by the flight crew to deter-
mine the operational status of selected avionics equipment.
Annunciation--The flight crew should be automati-
caUy notified when a fault or accumulation of faults has
impaired system performance to the extent where opera-
tional res_iction or crew intervention is required.
Interrogative Annunciation--A method will be pro-
vided for the flight crew to interrogate avionics functions
that affect flight operations. This function will annunciate
the remaining levels of redundancy for each component.
This will assist the fright crew in the preparation of mainte-
nance actions prior to the deferred maintenance actions.
3.4.2.3 Maintenance Reporting--An avionics function
will report its operating status to the central maintenance
computer. In the case of a fully fault-tolerant avionics
suite, a maintenance alert annunciation will automatically
occur after a fault to indicate that corrective action may be
necessary.
Real.Time Fault Repor6ng--Provi_on for real.time
fault reporting is part of the COTS* maintenance concepl.
The occurrence of a fault and the associated level of fault
tolerance should be reported to the central maintenance
computer and stored on the aircraft. The improved diag-
nostic capability afforded by a COTS* architecture allows
the flight crew to downlink fault data likely to result in
maintenance assessments to the support maintenance cen-
ter via data link. Designers should consider this option in
their designs.
Ground-Based Downloading--The status of an
avionics function should be downloadable via VHF data
link or gate link by the launch support ground crew while
the spacecraft is on the ground.
3.4.30nboard Maintenance Equipment
3.4.3.1 Central Maintenance Computer--The central
maintenance computer is a key component in the COTS*
maintenance swategy. The cenwal maintenance computer
will conform to the recommendations of ARINC Report
624, "Onboard Maintenance System (OMS)."
3.4.3.2 Electronic L/brary--A database of maintenance
information is to be used with the COTS + concept. An
electronic library system (ELS) of maintenance records.
schematic diagrams, and ffoubleshooting tools is to be
stored on manned vehicles. This will extend the ability for
the spacecraft to be serviceable when it is away from
ground maintenance stations. Uploading of databases will
be provided via communication links while the vehicles
are in transit or stationed at their lunar or Mars destina-
tions. The ELS should conform to recommendations
(TBD) similar to ARINC Report 649, "ELS."
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3.4.3.3Maintenance Access Terminal--A maintenance
access terminal (MAT) should be placed in a location con-
venient to maintenance personnel. This terminal should
enable maintenance personnel to perform BITE on the
individual IMA cabinets, sensors, actuators, etc., and
should include interactive tests where appropriate. It
should also allow the operator to read maintenance mem-
ory and determine the current integrity level of IMA com-
ponents.
The details of the MAT are documented in ARINC Report
624, "Onboard Maintenance System."
3.4.3.40nboard Printer---COTS + status informafon
should be available on hardcopy printout. A standard
multifunction printer should be used for this function and
should conform to ARINC Characteristic 744A, Full-For-
mat Printer.
3.4.4 Interactive Maintenance Mode Function
In addition to passive reporting of faults and remaining
redundancy levels, avionic functions should provide an
interactive mode that can be accessed by authorized per-
sonnel. This mode can assist the ground crew in the identi-
fication or confh'mation of a fault condition and the
isolation of the fault to a single LRM. It should be possible
to interrogate avionic functions and access failure data
located in read-only memory while the aircraft is in flight
One method of accomplishing this is via data link.
3.4.4.1 Functional Testing--Each avionic function should
be able to he individually ground tested through a func-
tional test capability. Functional testing is defined as the
complete testing of hardware and flight software in the
operational mode. Such tests may be initiated by the main-
tenance crew and are performed by BITE within the vari-
ous system components. Some functional tests can be
initiated through the maintenance access terminal with no
test equipment attached to the system. Functional testing
may be used as a vehicle for verifying system safety after
maintenance repairs.
Spacecroft System Level---Functional testing at the
spacecraft level will be possible whereby the serviceability of
the sys_a'n as a whole is confirmed. In every case, there
should be a high level of assurance that all components of a
system are functional following a satisfactory test. Onboard
maintenance systems are to be used to debug aircraft system
wiringand conf'trmtheintegrityoftheinterfaces.
3.4.4.2 Hardware Testing--The ability to test hardware
will be provided. Testing of specific hardware may be per-
formed when functional testing detects a failure but is
unable to detect its source. Generally, hardware is tested
with the spacecraft in its normal configuration; however,
special test software may be required to be downloaded
into an LRM and special test equipment may be attached.
Spacecraft System Level--The spacecraft system tests
will support spacecraft-level testing of all hardware func-
tions.
Cabinet Level---Cabinet assemblies should be
designed such that any individual cabinet may be tested
independent of the total avionics system. A test access con-
nection should be provided to interface test equipment
such as a maintenance access terminal.
Module Level--All modules should be designed to
support testing of hardware functions. This function
includes the optional downloading of test software into the
module fi'om external test equipment.
3.4.5 Corrective Action Function
Corrective actions include those actions necessary to
restore system and/or LRM operation such that the redun-
dancy levels are present. Corrective actions can also
involve the updating of component software.
3.4.5.1 On Spacecraft--COTS + components will be
designed to minimize the mean time to repair (MTTR).
This includes both the removal and replacement of hard-
ware components and the loading of new software.
Hardware--COTS* components will be designed to
allow the removal and replacement of all hardware compo-
nents using hand tools. Spacecraft cable assemblies should
be able to be disconnected from both ends. All LRMs and
LRUs should be easily removable from the spacecraft.
Software--lt should be a simple process to load new
software into appropriate COTS + components using an
onboard data loader, maintenance access terminal, or data
rink. Protection should be provided to preclude actions by
unauthorized personnel. Safety measares should be part of
the loading procedure to ensure a successful load.
3.4.5.2 At Maintenance Stations--
Automatic Test Equipment--Automatic test equipment
(ATE) will enable surface support maintenance cente_ to
verify the proper operation of LRMs and perform u_u-
bleMmodng. Such equipment will provide the capability to
perform tests and down]oad/uanslate BIT s_us dam stored
in memory. The ATE will conform to ARINC Specification
608A, "Design Guidance for Avionics Test Equipment."
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LRMs will be designed with an ample number of clearly
labeled test points to aid in troubleshooting. They will be
designed to simplify their interface with ATE. Such a
design allows external access to test activation pins and
test points.
LRMs will be de,signed such that active component assem-
blies are not captive to their housings (i.e., with rivets or
epoxy, by cable muting), thereby permitting their rapid dis-
assembly/a_cembly.
Software Loading_Wh_ applicable, LRMs should
be designed to ease loading and downloading of software
from the repair equipment. Surfuce data loaders should
conform to ARINC Report 614, "Standard Firmware
Loader for Avionics Shops."
Standard Bus Testbtg--At the spacecraft level,
portable bus analyzers can be useful to support personnel
for engineering analysis and maintenance functions. They
can be used to verify the proper operation of the aircraft
system buses and monitor message traffic.
Standard bus testing is also recommended for surface test-
ing at the avionics module level. A high percentage of test
coverage should be achieved. As a goal, bus testing should
be able to isolate failures to the component level. The rec-
ommended commercial data bus is the IEEE Standard
1149.5 Test and Maintenance ('I'M) bus with boundary
scan lest.
3.4.6 Verb"wation of Repair Action
Once the corrective action has been taken, there shall be a
means of verifying the proper operation of the affected
components. The spacecrMt configuration database shall
be updated to reflect maintenance actions and results.
3.4.6.1 On Spacecraft--The execution of a system-level
functional test should provide a high degree of confidence
that the affected LRM is serviceable.
3.4.6.2 In Surface Maintenance Centers--Verification of
proper operation should be performed by executing the
LRM's test procedure on ATE.
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Section 4
COTS + Architecture
4.1 COTS Components and Technologies
4J.1 Space Candidate COTS +
This section identifies the domain of nondevelopmental
and commercial components evaluated within this study.
Representative types of COTS technologies, components,
and systems are described to illustrate the advantages of
using COTS and nondevelopmental items (NDIs).
Architectmal and functional features of several Honeywell
commercial and military avionic NDI subsystems consid-
ered to be candidates for space applications are presented
herein. Although military avionic subsystems do not fit the
strict definition of COTS, they are included to provide a
more comprehensive assessment of the variances and com-
plexities associated with the integration of COTS and
COTS-like components in space applications. Therefore,
the term Space Candidate COTS+ will be used to describe
both commercial and military candidate systems. This
study will also include modified COTS components within
the definition of Space Candidate COTS +.
Components and subsystems that represent expected
technologies, characteristics, and integration complexi-
ties for a general COTS-in-space insertion were surveyed
(see Table 4-1). Honeywell products were used because
of the availability of data and the study team's familiar-
ity with Honeywell product characteristics and descrip-
tions. However, study results and conclusions are
deemed applicable to all COTS and COTS-like subsys-
tems. The incorporation of any or all non-Honeywell
COTS and/or NDI components will be governed by
requirements and resuictions similar or equivalent to
those generated within this study. Further studies ate rec-
ommended to evaluate the validity of the results herein
for COTS + products in general.
Data and analysis is provided in greater detail for four
technologies selected for study emphasis. The four subsys-
tems represent various technologies, ccof_,urafions, com-
ponents, and/or concepts that can be evaluated for space
applications. Of the four subsystems, two are comme_ial
airplane subsystems and two arc military products. One
military product is derived from commercial technology.
The four technologies and subsystems and the reasons for
their selection are as follows:
Flat Panel Display Subsystem_The Boeing 777 air-
plane's active-matrix flat-panel display subsystem is
used for analysis. The system is a commercial off-
the-shelf prod_t being designed and integrated by
Honeywell for Boeing 777 aircraft cockpits. Flat
panels represent components or subsystems involv-
ing new teehnoiogy, man-machine interfaces (MMI),
and unique safety-in-space requirements.
Integrated Modular Avionics flMAy----The Boeing
777 airplane's Airplane Information Management
System (AIMS) is used to exemplify integrating
modular avionics (/viA), MA interfaces, and/via
cabinets. AIMS is also a commercial off-the-shelf
product. The AIMS is composed of dual integrated
prtgessing and I/O hardware cabinets that provide
flightmanagement, display interfaces, onboard
n_in_, integrated condition monitoring, com-
munication management, data conversim gateways,
and engine data interfaces.
Table 4-1. Space Candidate COTS+
Related Honeywell COTS + Products
end Technologies
• Inertial navigation system with embedded GPS
• Six-sensor dual-fault-tolerant inertial navigation system
• Fiber-optic gyros
• Digital map
• CentraJ maintenance system concept
• SAFEbus TM
• OpticaJdisk storage system
• Inertial reference system
• Production line automated diagnostics doncept
• Flight control maintenance diagnostic system
• Flat-panel display subsystems
• Smart sensors and actuators
• Pressure devices (air data)
• Inertial measurement unit
• Airplalne Information Management System
• Integrated INS/GPS
• Collision avoidance systems
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The AIMS incoq)orates two stme-of-the-art aircraft-
unique fault-tolerant networks: the SAFEbus TM back-
plane bus and the ARINC 629 intercluster bus. It
alsoincorporatesARINC 429 and opticalFDDI net-
works aswellastheHoneywell centralmaintenance
conceptlistedinTable4-I.
Optical Disk Storage System_This high-density
digital memory unit represents a fully militarized
nondevelopmemal item. This product was designed
specifically to survive ragged military environments.
Because it did not evolve from the modification or
hardening of a commercial off-the-shelf design, it
provides an example of changes necessary to modify
or upgrade military equipment to higher space quali-
fication levels. Application of optical disk technol-
ogy within this report is useful m examine require-
ments and methodologies necessary to track and
transition ongoing technical developments and
improvements for space applications.
Optical disk hardware exemplifies the complexities
associated with using or qualifying for use in space
devices that physically move and/or rotate and
exhibit mechanical operations sensitive to vibration,
acceleration, and shock environments. It also pro-
rides further evaluation of laser technology in space.
Integrated INS/GPS Subsys_--This militarized
nondevelopmental item was developed by integrat-
ing two separate subsystems (Honeywell INS and
Texas Instrument GPS) to form one product.
As shown inTable4-2,thesefoursubsystemsexemplify
COTS components ofdifferentavionictype,characteris-
tics,and technologies.Detaileddescriptionsofthefour
subsystemsand theseveralSpace CandidateCOTS + laOd-
ucts,systems,and technologieslistedinTable4-I arepro-
vialedinAppendix ,6,.
4.1.1.1 Flat-Panel Displays--Liquld crystal displays
(LCDs) are now being designed for aircraft cockpits. The
LCD display medium has significant advantages over cath-
ode ray tubes (CRTs), and the liquid crystal technology has
matured rapidly over recent years so that it can be commit-
ted to production programs. The advantages of LCDs over
CRTs are:
• Less space required,
• Significantly lower weight,
• Less power consumption,
• Increased reliability,
• Increased readabRity in directsunlight.
Table 4-2. COTS + Technologies, Interfaces, and Systems
Technology Distinguishing Characteristic8
Flat-panel display
AIMS
Optical disk
INS/GPS
MMI and safety
Electrical
Mechanically moving
Militarized NDI
Liquid crystal displays provide a good example of how our
space program may immediately benefit from usingCOTS
hardwareinspace.Ifspaceavionicrequirementsand archi-
tecturecan sccommedat_ LCDs intheirpresentform or
accept slightly modified commercial systems, the insertion
time to in_ flat-panel technology in space should be
considerably shortened. It is further desired that the requisi-
lion and logistical management of COTS LCD systems
would not adversely affect the inse_on process by requiring
additional time_ing procedures and requirements.
If, in addition to requirements and architectural changes,
modifications to the commercial designs are required, a
benefit is derived when required modifications are uncon-
ditionally incorporated within the commercial design.
Thus, if commerml products were modified to incorporate
required space application modifications with little or no
extra cost, the two products are obviously identical. In this
case, the modified product reverts to a COTS classification
since it comes off the commercial line. Developing tech-
nologies such as the fiat-panel subsystem are good candi-
dates for such a scenario.
Immediate applicationsinthe orbiter, wansfer vehicle, and
excursion vehicle cockpitscan be found for the multifunc-
fioncontroldisplayunits(MCDLD, theeleclaunicinstru-
ment displays(EID),and electroniclibrarysystemdisplays
(ELS) foravionicand theflighthmvigafionmanagement
systems.The fiat-paneltechnologyprovidesadisplayunit
(CDLD witheightcolors,high-contrust,crispdet'mifion,
and excellentoff-axisviewabilityformultifunctiuncontrol
display units and dlectronic instrument displays. The elec-
u'onic library system displays currently use half-page, high
contrast, monochrome technology to maximize resolution
for reading free detail.
Actlw.MatHx Flat.Panel D/sp/ays--Active-matrix
liquidcrystaldisplays (AMLCDs) arenow being designed
by Honeywell for aircraft cockpits. This new display
medium has significant advantages over CRTs. The LCD
technologyhasmatured rapidly over the past 5 years so
that AMLCDs can be committed to ix_luction programs.
Honeywell believes AMLCDs will be the preferred choice
for cockpit displays in the 1990s. Three cockpit display
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applications are in development" primary flight instruments
(F-FIS/EICAS), small instruments/control panels (TCAS
VSI/MCDU), and electronic library displays (ELS).
The major advantages of _D technology are summa-
rized below.
Volume and Weight--An important advantage of
AMLCDs over current CRT displays is the reduction in
both volume and weight of the display unit. A CRT con-
tains many items that are not needed in an AMI.,CD-based
display. The high-voltage power supply, cathode drive, and
electron beam deflection amplifiers are no longer required
for AMLCDs. The heavy CRT shielding and mounting
materials are also eliminated. The fluorescent lamps and
the light box required of the AMLCDs have low weight
and volume. The minimum depth display will have the
associated computational electronics placed in a host com-
puter, and the remaining drive electronic in the unit will be
reduced in size through VLSI techniques. Therefore the
volume and the weight of an AMLCD is less than 50% of
the same size CRT display.
Power--The significant portion of the power
required in the AML_D unit is consumed in the fluores-
cent lamps and lamp drivers and is a function of the bright-
ness set for the display. The remaining power is used in the
LCD row and column drivers and in the I/O and signal pro-
cessing. Analysis of a D-size display unit shows that the
lamp assembly consumes 20 to 25 W at a nominal bright-
ness setting. The LCD drive requires 12 to 15 W, the I/O
and signal processing use only 10 W, and the internal
power supply dissipates approximately 18 W. Total power
is estimated robe 60 to 68 W. This compares with 150W
(typical) for a D-size CRT display unit.
Passive Cooling-Because of the reduction in
power realized with an AMLCD-based unit, forced air
cooling of the unit is not necessary. By providing effective
thermalheatpathsand adequatesurface area for convec-
tion,an AMLCD-based unit can be effectively cooled
through natural convection. Direct thermal paths are pro-
vided between the cases of high-power electrical compo-
nents and the external heat sink. This heat sink eliminates
internal heat generated and Wovides structural support for
the unit Fins integral to the heat sink ate optimized in
terms of size and spacing. Even with this slight weight
increase caused by the additional heat sinking needed for
passive cooling, the AMLCD weighs much less than a
CRT with the same size screen. In addition, if passively
cooled flat-panel displays are adopted for all cockpit dis-
plays, the forc_ air cooling to the cockpit can be elimi-
nated, further reducing the overall weight of the vehicle
end the cost of the cooling system.
ReliabUity--Reliability of AMLCD willbe twice
that for CRT displays, which means an MTBF of 18,000
hours or greater. The LCD panel is very reliable, and the
fluorescent lamps are designed for long life. System patti-
tioning leaves very few electronic parts in the display unit,
and the parts that remain will be mostly very large scale
integrated circuits (VLSIC). Improved self-test and some
redundancy will assure high availability of the equipment.
Improved Safety--AMLCDs eliminate some of
the safety hazards associated with CRTs. Because they do
not contain a vacuum, there is no danger of implosion;
therefore, AMLCDs do not require a bonded implosion
panel or tension band. AMLCDs do not require high volt-
age to operate, so arcing (especially at high altitude) is not
a safety issue. Likewise, AMLCDs do not represent an
implosion or shock hazard for repair personnel. X-ray
emissions, which are genem_ in a CRT, are completely
eliminated with AMLCI_.
Environmentally Rugged--Unlike CRT displays,
AMLCDs are not affected by the earth's magnetic field or
other magnetic fields produced on the flight deck. There-
fore, AMLCDs will not have convergenceproblems from
external magnetic fields and will not require the special
shields used with CRTs. AML_Ds also have inherent
immunity to the harsh environment that exists on the vehi-
cle flight deck. This immunity is a direct result of the
solid-state nature of the LCD panel and the ease of packag-
ing it in a solid position because of the flat profile of the
LCD panel face versus the curvedgaol'de ofa CRT.
Because the LCD panel is mggedized and can be mounted
flush in the chassis, the AMLCD becomes immune to any
_gnment problems caused by vibration. The fluorescent
lamps me also mounted solidly and have no alignment
requirements.
AMLCDs do not have any deflection circuits, convergence
yokes, or a high-voltage generator, and the video signals
are all at logic level, thus making the circuit designs for the
display unit more immune toany magnetic or electromag-
netic interference. The passively cooled packaging, which
effectively seals the whole assembly also blocks EMI and
electromagnetic emissions.
HERF and Lightning Protection--The digital
nature of the AMLCD module makes it an attractive candi-
date for using a fiber-optic data interface to the remote
drive electronics. With fiber-optic cable, light is transmit-
ted through the glass medium rather than electricity
through a metallic wire medium. The transmitted light sig-
nals are not distorted by any outside electronic, magnetic,
or radio frequency interference. Optical fiber systems are
intrinsically immune to lightning strikes and High-Energy
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RadioFrequencies (HERF). The fiber-optic cable is also a
nonconductive material; hence, it will not generate any
cross-talk between adjacent transmission lines, and signals
on the cable will not be a source of EM1.
Enhanced Maintenance--Once installed,
AMLCD units are easier to maintain than CRT displays.
AMLCDs are designed to make replacement of the back-
light assembly simple. The lack of adjustments for purity,
convergence, focus, and deflection mean that there are no
sensitive adjustments or calibrations that must be done in
the field.
The in-line assembly construction makes disassembly and
repair times shorter and allows for easier troubleshooting.
No special handling or tools are required. Because of the
limited electronics in the display unit and the solid-state
digital design, the BITE and monitoring can provide essen-
tially 100% coverage for detection of failures.
ManufacturabUity--AMLCD units are simpler
and easier to manufacture than CRT displays for several
reasons. An LCD panel is flat and can be readily mounted
into a display chassis. A CRT is large, bulky, and difficult
to mount. A CRT must be mounted with a resilient material
to prevent implosion of the CRT during shock and vibra-
tion. An AMLCD does not require high voltage; hence,
pouing tools and processes required to pot anode leads,
CRT base leads, and high-voltage power supplies are not
required. Bonding cover glasses and falters are simpler for
LCD panels because they present a flat surface for the
bonding material. This means that the bonding material can
be thinner than that for a CRT. Furthermore, since the
bonding material will be of uniform thickness, mismatehes
of thermal expansion coefficients between the AMLCD
and the bonding material are less of a problem (i.e., the
bonding material will not pull away from the cover glass).
Because AMLCDs ate not susceptible to the effects of the
earth's magnetic field and other magnetic fields generated
on the flight deck, they do not require a magnetic shield in
the display unit. Magnetic shields for CRTs must be hart-
died carefully during production or their magnetic shield-
ing properties will be compromised. Since AMLCDs do
not require adjustments for purity and convergence, AML-
CDs are also easier to test and calibrate in production.
Larger Dbplay Surface--The desire for larger dis-
plays in all glass cockpits has been frustrated to an extent
by limits in CRT technology. Larger CRT displays typi-
cally translate to deeper display units with more display
surface curvature and a disproportionate increase in power
per unit display area. With the exception of increased com-
putational power and display memory size, which are both
accommodated by recent advances in semiconductor tech-
nology, larger AMI_Ds do not pose any limitations in
terms of physical display size or power.
In addition, CRTs are notoriously inefficient in extending
the active display surface to the boundaries of the bezel for
two primary reasons. First, the CRT bottle and the mount-
ing oftheshadow mask preclude the active area from
extending out to the edge of the bezel. Second, because the
CRT display surface is recessed below the bezel surface to
accommodate the contrast enhancement fdter and the dis-
play surface curvautre, the active area must be designed
smaller to prevent the bezel from occluding the view.
AMLCDs are flat regardless of their size so that the dis-
play surface can be placed just behind the bezel surface,
and AMLCDs can be designed with active areas out to
within 2 mm of the display bezel.
Better Display V'wwability in Bright Sun-
shine--Even with contrast filter enhancement, a CRT dis-
play's contrast ratio can fall to just 3:1 in bright sunshine.
AMLCDs, which intrinsically absorb rather than reflect
incident light, improve this contrast ratio by a factor of 3:4
without resorting to any special configurations. In addition
to contrast ratio in a color display, color discrimination is a
very important index of display readability. AMLCDs out-
perform CRTs in this regard as well. Because an AMLCD
is less reflective, the colors are not as de-saturated by
bright sunshine, making color differentiation much better.
Enhanced Display Formats--The AMLCD may
be considered a full raster type display as opposed to
hybrid slroke)raster displays that are currently being used.
The essential distinction is that there is no fundamental
limit to how much can be drawn on the display. CRT sys-
tems can display only a small amount of symbology mea-
sured in inches per second. In a sm)ke system, each vector
or line must be drawn individually at a speed limited by
deflection power and bandwidth. Because the brightness
decreases with writing speed, the CRT display will become
insufficiently bright if too much symbology is drawn.
The AMLCD allows the quantity and variety of graphics
effects to be much richer using the AMLCD panel because
each pixei can be controlled. Only a limited amount of
raster symbology is feasible with the CRT hybrid/stroke
raster systems. The all-raster capabilities of the LCD pro-
vide opportunities to enhance the display symbology.
One such enhancement is the use of a raster to draw ther-
mometer-type scales. This type of scale typically is used
for engine parameter tapes. CRT systems have imple-
mented this type of display by drawii_g several stroke lines
closely spaced. This implementation creates a narrow and
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bright stripe for the tape. The desired tape is wider and
dimmer.The AMLCD rastercan easilycreatewide tapes
ofany desiredbrightnessorcontrastbecauseofthevari-
ablebrightness control of every pixel. The rastered ther-
mometer-type display may also be used to draw effective
airspeed limits.
The AMLCD alsoallowsbackgroundrasterareas.This
backgroundrasteringisusedtoa limitedextentwithCRT
displays to enhance readability of scales, but CRT systems
allow only a few areas to be rastered on each display. The
LCD suffers from no such limitation. The entire back-
ground area may be rastered (use of a background that is
not black may reduce eye fatigue) or many separate areas
may be rastered. Background rastering also allows the use
of pop-up windows, where the window is separated from
the main display by a different color background. These
pop-up windows may be used for several different types of
functions,includingalerts,alternatewindows (FMS pert'or-
mance dataon a navigationdisplay),orACARS messages.
AMLCD raster displays can also display inverse video in
which the background is bright and the symbology or text
is black. This type of inverse video display is impractical
with stroke displays. Inverse video is very effective for
emphasis (alerts, required pilot actions, etc.) or highlight-
ing pilot selections.
AMLCD rasterdisplaysalsoallowhaloingofcharacters.
Haloingcreatesa verynarrow,darkboundaryaroundeach
character.Thisdarkboundary isveryeffectiveinreducing
clutterand improvingreadabilityofthesymbology.This
haloingtechniqueisespeciallyeffectiveindecluttering
map displayswhere textorsymbology from adjacentmap
featuresoftenoverwrite ach otheroroverwriteback-
ground rasterfielddatasuchasweatherradar.
AMLCD raster displays inherently allow the use of bit-
mapped graphic characters. Bit-mapped graphics describe
each character as a collection of small elements. Bit-
mapped graphics allow for filling characters (filling char-
acters with a stroke system requires many overlapping
strokes and much writing time). Additionally, many com-
mercial graphics applications use bit-malved graphics;
consequently, system development effort is reduced and
performance improved by the availability of commercially
developed graphics chips and software.
The AMLCD raster display is inherently compatible with
other raster displays. This compatibility allows for video
overlays of television or FLIR data. Additionally, it is pos-
sible to display graphics data, such as weather maps or
navigation charts, that may be uplinked or prestored in an
onboard eleclmnic fibrary system.
Installation Flexibility--The AMLCD offers
great installation flexibility. The shallow depth and pas-
sively cooled construction of the display unit allows it to
be easily installed in a variety of vehicles. The AMLCD
may be considered as two modules: the actual display
module itself, which is very thin, and the drive electronics.
The display module outline is constrained by the desired
display area, while the drive electronics may be packaged
in whatever outline is required to fit in the vehicle.
The AMLCD's relative immunity to environmental factors
also eases installation. The AMLCD is immune to the
magnetic and electronic effects of adjacent electrical/elec-
Ironic devices which have proven troublesome in the
installation of CRTs. The low power dissipation of the
AMLCD allows for passive cooling, and thus no plumbing
such as cooling air hoses is needed. In summary, installa-
tion of the AMLCD is considerably simplified.
High Connectivity--Switching of display infor-
marion to several different display units can be accom-
plished easily if the data on the interface is digital and a
simple protocol is used. AMLCDs, which are inherently
digital, are able to achieve high connectivity and still have
a simple low-power, low-weight display unit. The basic
approach to the interface dcfmition is to design a mini-
mum-complexity display unit and to uansmit a TV-like
signal using a standard bus protocol over a fiber-optic bus
with a bandwidth above 100 MHz.
The principal advantage of this high-connectivity approach
is greater flexibility in the flight deck configuration. One
display management computer (DMC) is capable of driv-
ing multiple displays of varying types via a standard bus
interface. High interconnectivity also improves the display
system availability since it provides more options for
rcconfigurarion.
4.1.1.2 Integrated Modular Avionics--This paragraph
specifies an important part of the COTS" space avionic
architecture-.-a commercial integrated modular avionic
concept that represents a significant part of COTS ÷ hard-
ware, software, and networks. The IMA concept described
herein is eventually networked together with LRUs in a
bottom-up insertion of commercial architecture and used as
an architectural point of departure foi this study.
To the greatest extent, two sources of commercial aircraft
modular architectural requirements are used herein to
define space integrated modular avionic requirements.
ARINC IMA guidelines and Boeing 777 architectures are
used to establish our spacecraft point-of-departure require-
meats, since these commercial architectural requirements
provide the means whereby commercial subsystems may
be incorporatedinspacesystems.
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This study will use the Boeing 777 airplane's AIMS design
as the primary reference for integrated modular avionics
definition. The A/MS design is more representative of cer-
tifiable, prod_tion-rcady IMA architecture than are the
ARINC guidelines. The ARINC guidelines referenced in
this study are preliminary and subject to changes, recom-
mendations, and inputs derived from applications such as
AIMS.
AIM$--The AIMS is a representative implemen-
tation of an integrated module cluster for space-vehicle
avionic architectures. AIMS integrates the following func-
tions in two cabinets:
• Electronicfright instumentsystem/engineindication
andcxewMerdngsystem(EFIS/EICAS) displaygcn-
eratofs;
• Flight management:
• Onboard maintenance(includingairplanecondition
monitoringfunction(ACMF) peaARINC 624);
• Communicationmanagement;
• Data conversion gateways.
AIMS was selected for assessment within this study
because it provides the space vehicle with a ready-made
fault-tolerant avionic subsystem. The AIMS operating sys-
tent and hardwareprovidestotalfunction separation and
isolation under a combination of partition errors. It we-
vents application software from controlling shared
resom-ces to the exclusion of other application software
(time partitioning), prevents application software from
contaminating memory areas of other appficafion or oper-
ating system software (space partitioning), and prevents
fnilum of a hardware element unique to an application
from affecting another application.
The AIMS provides maximum use of sharable re.umrces
and common designs, et_cient implementation of multiple
crificalides,computationalintegrity, and reduced life cycle
coststhrough stepimprovementsin maintenancediagnos-
tics, removal rate (nofaultfound),dispatchreliability,and
product reliability. Within two cabinets, AIMS provides
partitioning between critical (10 -9 mueliabiliv/), essential,
and non_ functions.
ARINC IMA--Gniderme, s/reqi_nements fxom
ProjectPaper651 areusedtofillinrequirementdetail.In
the event of conflictbetween requirements ARINC and
AIMS, either the ARINC requirements will be specified in
lieu of the AIMS, because the AIMS design is presently
proprietary, of an _ent will be made by study
authors to select the requirement best fitting the defmition
from the MPRAS study or recent U.S. Government-spon-
sored avionic studies such from General Dynamics, Martin
Marieua, and Lcr.kheed Sanders.
Module Clusters---Tbe COTS + architecture provides
for IMP, cabinets networked to other IMA cabinets and
LRUs. These cabinets (described in Subsection4.3) repre-
sent the standard module enclosures necessary to imple-
ment RDIs and module clusters. The cabinets provide
mechanical and electrical interfaces for standard modules
and/or custom modules in module clusters.
The following parasraphs describe and specify standard
module functions and components that are a pan of the
cabinets. IMA electronic modules, netw_k/bus interfaces,
software, and cabinet description/requirements are
included herein.
Core Processor Module---Many of the detailed
requirements for the processor module depend on IMA
architex,um: and will not be common for all aschitecmres.
F_ example, a multitasking processor module will require
more stringent requirements than a distributed processing
module, especially in m'eassuch as processing perfof-
mance and robust partitioning. The cabinet designerfmte-
gra_ is responsible for enstiring that a particular proces-
sor module design addresses the appmpria_ criteria for the
slx_:ff_ _ m_hi_ture being _ The de.uul_
characteristics of the processor module are (TBD) defined
in ARINC Characteristic 7xx.
The processof module contains the computational capabil-
iv/for the functional applications installed in a particular
cabinet. Identical lmXessof modules with only one part
number can be used in all cabinets, of mine than one lXO-
ces_ module implementation may be developed. It is
desired that the most capable _ modules be devel-
oped and implemented for IMA cabinets. This will ensure
that the Im3CeS_ module will have tbe greatest potential
application andalargegrowthcapability. All lroces.ux
module types will be capable of operating in any cabineL
The specification of the proces.u_ module and all its inter-
faces will ensure electrical and protocol compatibility with
respect to the cabinet backplane.
The pmcessof module employs a method of fault tolerance
that is transparentto the application software for faults in
shared _. Each applkation manages the fault toler-
awe details in its applicatim-sp_ific of pdvate resources.
As a minimum, the cofe module failure response is fail-
pa_i¥_.
Tbe Wocessor module will be Programmed in Ada as a
common high-ord_ language. Refer m Subsection 4A,
Software Design, for software design considerations.
Processor--The processor module provides the
maximum processing per[ormance available from the latest
generation of high-throughputmictowocessofs. Arithmetic
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accelerators such as coprocessors, floating-point units, and
cache memories are used where appropriate to enhance per-
formance and reliability and reduce cost. Cabinet growth
and flexibility in an IMA environment is very dependent on
processor module performance. The efficiency of the archi-
lecture improves as levels of integration increase.
Where floating-point operations are supported in the pro-
cessor module, they conform to a standard format. Because
of its widespread acceptance in the integration of floating-
point units on contemporary microprocessors, ANSI/IEEE
STD 754 is the preferred floating-point format.
I/O for the processor module will be implemented in a pro-
tected manner in support of robust partitioning.
Robust Partitioning--The processor module
includes mechanisms that enforce separation and provide a
robust logical boundary between the partitions resident in
the cabinet. This protection ensures that no one partition
can adversely affect another. The entire architecture shall be
carefully designed to extend this protection throughout the
cabinet, including the VO areas. The applications will not
be capable of compromising these protection mechanisms.
Memory management hardware is included in the proces-
sor module to provide separation and protection for I/O
resources and each application's memory space. The mere-
or), management hardware is often integrated into the pro-
cessor module's microprocessor. Control tables used by the
memory management hardware are fixed in memory
according to the analyses and decisions made during the
design process, and are implemented in nonvolatile repro-
grammable memory. The ability to modify these tables is
interlocked and safeguarded so that unintentional alterna-
tion is not possible by the executive or operational soft-
ware. This requirement assures a high degree of integrity
to the design.
A programmable, time-interval interrupt generator gives
the processor module the capability to partition and protect
applications in the time domain.
Memory--The processor module contains enough
nonvolatile memory to store all of the application pro-
grams, typical amounts of data that would be assigned to
any cabinet, and enough scratch pad random access mem-
ory (RAM) to handle any combination of assigned func-
tions. A smaller amount of nonvolatile memory available
for use by the cabinet maintenance function to implement
error logs and fault histories. The processor module design
includes provisions for accommodating unique applica-
tions that use very large data stores.
Like processor performance, the processor module's mem-
ory capacity directly affects the IMA cabinet's flexibility to
incorporate future growth. The processor module design
maintains a large reserve growth margin in the memory area.
Software ReprogrammobUiff--All aspects of the core
software that need to be altered to add or upgrade functions
are to be reprogrammable in-circuit through onboard soft-
ware loading. The application software load will occur via
the backplane interface and only be enabled after the
proper safeguards and interlocks have been verified. The
following software is to be reloadable:
• Programs in nonvolatile memory,
• Data in nonvolatile memory,
• Memory management tables,
• Backplane bus tables,
• Any other conrail data tables that allocate processor
time or other core resources.
Interface Spec_qcation----Core modules shall meet the
applicable specifications for the following standard inter-
faces:
• Interface to the global bus,
• Interface to the backplane buses,
• Interface between the executive and the functional
software modules,
• Hardware and software interfaces to support the cab-
inet maintenance function (BITE),
• Interface to the onboard cabinet data loader.
Backplane Data Bus Interface--The backplane data
bus interface shall support all modes of the operation. Both
control of and the interface to the backplane data bus are
accomplished in a fault-tolerant manner so that failure of
the interface or control circuitry causes no loss of that bus.
The design of this interface minimizes an application's
involvement in monitoring and redundancy management as
much as possible. The backplane bus interface provides
fault detection, isolation, and reconfigm-ation for failures of
the backplane bus itself, making bus faults tran_t to
the application software. The design of the interface sup.
ports applications and databases with all levels of criticality.
Power Supply Modules--The detailed characteristics
of the standard power supply module will be defined in
ARINC Characteristic 7xx. This subsection describes the
architectural requirements of this module.
Each power supply module has two power input line pairs.
The pair uses standard aircraft input power, voltage level,
and tolerance (power standard) as defined in the ARINC
characteristic.
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Each power supply module has separate output power line
pairs for each cabinet LRM. Each pair has independent
overcurrent protection so that an overload (including a
short circuit fault) on the power line to one user module
does not degrade the power to any other user module. The
power supply module is capable of reporting the status of
any overloaded output.
The cabinet designer/integrator is responsible for ensuring
that the number of redundant power somr, es available to
each user module is appropriate to the integrity require-
merits of the system(s) dependent on that module. The
installer is responsible for ensuring that the independence
of the power som'ces to the power supply modules in a cab-
inet is appropriate to the integrity requirements of the sys-
tems dependent on those modules.
The power supply modules will have some form of heat
sink or heat exchanger to operate in the cabinet. Since the
heat rejection requirement of any power supply is largely
dependent on the power level it supplies, and since the
loads are not'really shared, it has been suggested that pairs
of power supply modules be mounted so as to share heat
exchangers. Heat exchangers should be designed to handle
worst-case power load resulting Dom one power supply
failure in the cabinet-
Standard !/0 Module--The COTS + IMA approach
infers a number of standard I/O modules. This includes all
of the I/O types for which there is a general need through-
out an vehicle. This may include or refer to a specification
for a standard sensor or other vehicle standard interface
specifications. This section describes the desired capability
of I/OLRMs.
Standard I/O I.,RMs shall be developed to interface with
the vehicle. Each LRM may provide interfaces to a single
type of signal or to some optimum mix of signals with
some software programmable/reconfigurable selection of
signal interfaces. These should be designed to support the
most critical functions. A single failure within the LRM
should not result in the loss of more than one of the I/O
channels. The outputs should be fail-passive in nature.
It is the aim of IMA architecture to minimize the number
of specific I/O types. However, this may not be practical
and cost-effective for the foreseeable future. It is, there',-
fore, proposed that at least the following three types of
standard I/O LRMs be defined for interfacing the IMA
cabinet with other vehicle systems:
• ARINC 629 I/O
• Serial and analog discrete I/O
• Bus bridge and gateway
Several types of standard I/O functions are provided within
these three standard I/O modules.
ARINC 629 Interface--The ARINC 659 inter-
face module interfaces multiple ARINC 629 data buses to
the ARINC 659 backplane bus and include a bus bridge
function.
Serial and Analog Discrete Interface--This
module has the ability to interface with a combination of
low-speedserial,analog,and discreteI/Ochannelsof the
vehicle.The number ofI/O channels(serial,analog,ordis-
crete)isstandardizedforeachtypeofI/O.The LRM will
have programmable features to define characteristics of
input or output signals at each of the I/O pins under soft-
ware control. The following generic types of I/Os are sup-
ported by this LRM:
• Analog Input Interfa_--This module is capable of
interfacing with vehicle standard AC and DC signals.
The LRM will perform necessary signal processing
of the inputs and provide the digitized outputs to the
core processor.
• Analog Output Interface---This module will be capa-
ble of performing the functions of a programmable
arbitrary wavefonn generator and provides standard-
ized output signals.
• Discrete Input/Output Interface--This module will
be capable of being interfaced with commonly used
vehicle discrete inputs and will provide similar dis-
crete outputs for interfacing the IMA cabinet with
other vehicle subsystems. Specific characteristics of
each I/0 signal will be downloadable via the back-
plane bus from the core processor module.
• ARINC 429 Interface--TbeARINC 429 interfacewill
be capable of either accepting or transmiuing data at a
selectable rate of ARINC 429. This interface could be
a subset of programmable analog or discrete I/Os.
Bus Bridge and Gateway Modules--Bus bridges
and gateway functions shall be implemented as standard
I/O modules.
Special I/0 Moduh--Where special signal types
or interface requirements cannot be met with a standard
I/0 LRM, it will be necessary to design a special I/O LRM.
Itshall containonlycircuitrythatis necessarytomeet
those wxluireanents. The rest of the task should be per-
formed by an accompanying software application in the
core processor. In all cases, these LRMs shah meet the
same backplane bus interface characteristics as a standard
i/o LRM.
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4.1.1.30pFLcalOisk Subsystem_A Honeywell optical
diskmodule isincludedasan example forusingCOTS +
mass memory storage products in space. Optical disk mass
meanory storage provides an advanced form of data storage
exhibiting a relatively high degree of ruggedness. It would
replace the magnetic tape subsystem now used for mass
memory technology for space.
Duringitsyearsinthecommercialmarketplace,themag-
neto-optic(MO) rewriteablemedia usedintacticaldata
cartridges(TDCs) hasdemonstrateda highlevelofreliable
performanceprovidingessentiallyinfinite(greaterthan I
million)write-erasecycles.The media substrateisa tem-
peredglassthatprovidesfullperformanceoperationin
militaryaircraftvibration,acceleration,and temperature
environments.
Glassalsohasexcellentflatnessand opticalproperties,and
itprotectstherecordinglayerfrom hydroscopicmoisture
ingusion.Because therecordinglayerisfullyencapsu-
lated,thearchivalifeofstoredinformationhasbeen
demonstratedtobe greaterthan I0years.The fullfunc-
tionafityofglass-subslrate-basexlm dia has been demon-
stratedinthousandsofflighthoursinproduction_L
Furt_r detailson thecharacteristicsoftheopticaldisk
subsystem,itsperformance,and itsadvantagescompared
withothertechnologiesarepresentedinAppendix A.
Mass Memory Storage Module--The mass memory
storage module provides a fault-tolerant mass storage capa-
bility necessary for permanent storage of application pro-
grams and databases. Application software is to be loaded
from the memory's application module into processing
modules when needed. The memory unit is also used as a
storage device for navigation databases (maps, star cata-
logs, etc.) and an eleclxonic library to support specific
applications such as the onboard maintenance system,
charts for navigation and communications, and in-flight
training aids.
Application Function--The known advantages of
using a mass storage module for permanent application
storage are flexibility in recoafigurafiona d high reliabil-
ity. The application software can be stored permanently in
a mass storage module and downloaded to the processing
module when needed. This data exchange shall be con-
Ixolled by the processing module.
Separating the permanently stored applications in a high-
density mass memory storage unit and the processing mod-
ule provides more flexibility during failure recovery
because there is no fixed relation in location between the
applications and the processing mode. Alternate concepts
using smaller mass memory modules located within user
processor cabinets or requiring that the core module pro-
cessor contain sufl'lcient unpopulated growth capability to
allow adding large database memories to the module as
needed are deemed less flexible and cost-ineffective.
Database Funcdwn--The database information neces-
sary to support specific applications can be loaded from or
saved in the mass storage module when needed. This data
exchange will be conlxolled by the processing module
using the data.
Memory--The memory of the mass storage module
consists of a large, high-density, environmentally hard,
nonvolatile memory. The nonvolatile memory provides
permanent data storage for applications and/or databases.
Each applicationordatabaseisloadablewithoutremoval
ofthemodules.
The nonvolatile memory provides buffer memory to sup-
lXm:
• The interface between themass storagemodule and
processingmodule volatilememory.
Storage of status information dedicated to the appli-
cation being executed by the processing module to
create a smooth reconfiguradon transition after fail-
urn.
Mass Storage Controller--A mass storage controller
residingwithinthemass storage module controls informa-
tion flow, failure detection, failure isolation, and reconfigu-
ration strategy inside the mass storage module.
A part of the mass storage controller provides partitioning
between the applications, databases, and partitions thereof
to allow applications or databases of different criticality
levels in the same mass storage module.
The partitioning function is a hardware function driven by
the software part of the mass storage conlmller.
Fault Tolerance---The level and type of fault toler-
ance depends on the criticality level of the applications or
databases and the maintenance considerations. The fault
tolerance could be achieved by multipath possibilities initi-
ated by the mass storage controller or a processing module.
Appikation or Database Loading--All applications
or databases are loadable through onboard software
loading. The loading process of the appfications or
databases will be initiated by a processing module via net-
work interfaces, and the finallocation ofthe applications
or databases inside the mass storage module will he orga-
nized by the mass storage controller.
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4.1.1.4 int_ted IN$1GPS_Tne integrated INSIGPS
assessed within this study uses recently developed milita-
rized NDI technology. Assessment of an integrated
INS/GPS within the COTS+ study architecture provides an
evaluation of an LRU that provides distinct advantages to
the space vehicle:
• The military-grade INS/GPS uses elecu'onics that
come off a production line that produces both mili-
tary and commercial components. This study will
determine if the cost savings realized for military
applications are more or less applicable for space
applications.
• Accurate pseudo-range and range rate data arc not
available from a stand-alone GPS receiver because
of selective availability (SA). SA is the intentional
degradation of satellite-transmitted measurement
dam. The National Security Agency (NSA) or the
Department of Defense (DoD) control its implemen-
tation and activation. At this time, the degradation
causes approximately 100-m accuracy errors. NSA-
authorized receivers have a precise positioning sys-
tem--security module (PPS-SM) that removes the SA
errors, yielding accurate GPS navigation. However,
the NSA does not allow a sland-aione authorized
GPS receiver to lransmit accurate pseudo-range and
range rate data on a databus external to its own
chassis. To take full advantage of GPS measurement
data, the Honeywell H764-C3 INS/GPS has embed-
deal the receiver. NSA does allow internal uansmis-
sion of receiver measurement data.
The INS/GPS can be used as a point of departure naviga-
tion subsystem from which olber navigation subsystems
using emerging/developing technologies can be evaluated
for COTS+-in-spa ce applications. The advantages of fiber-
optic gym (FOG) and miniature GPS t_eiver (MGR) sub-
systems in space have been cited, and products inccq_orat-
in8 their technologies in integrated or separate designs are
being developed. These products, including the Honeywell
ARINC 743 GPS/GLONASS sensor unit being developed
in cooperation with the Soviet Union, would be likely can-
didates for near-term COTS + insertion. Expedient future
modification of the INS/GPS definition to include any or
all of these technologies is possible.
4.2 Supporting Commercial Technologies
4.2.1 Introduction
The COTS + in space architeclm'e is based on the applica-
tion of established commercial technologies that. together
with Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) (ARINC 651).
can be applied to form a complete system. This subsection
describes previous mentioned and several other elements
that are fundamental to the COTS + concept.; more detail is
provided for technologies used in the COTS+ strawman
architecture. The technologies described in this subsection
are:
• ARINC 653: Application Software Interface;
• ARINC 659: Backplane Data Bus---SAFEbus TM ;
• ARINC 653: Application Software Interface;
• ARINC 652: Software Management;
• ARINC 650: Packaging Concepts;
• ARINC 638: OSl Upper Layers_
• ARINC 637: Internetworking;
• ARINC 636: Onboard Local Area Network;
• ARINC 629: Data Bus;
• ARINC 624: Onboard MaintenanceSystem;
• Project Paper 167: Certification and Configuration
ConUok
• ARINC 613: Ada;
• ARINC 610: Flight Simulator Avionics;
• ARINC 609: Electric Power,
• ARINC 429: Dam Bus;
• Related Documents:
_ EUROCAE ED- 14x,
- EUROCAE ED-12x,
- RTCA DO-160x,
- RTCA DO-178x,
- RTCA DO-205.
4.2.2DataBuses
Commercial aircraft dam bus standards have evolved
somewhat independent of the DoD _cmft standards, since
the two types of aircraft have had vastly different require-
menm for intemnit and intraunit communication. The
development of commercial standards has been driven sig-
nificantiy by certificationrequirements.
The evolution began with the introduction of ARINC 429
and has resulted in the recent emergence of ARINC 629
and the HoneyweU-defmed SAFEbusm. At the time of this
report, the Honeywell SAFEbus used in the Boeing 777
airplane's Aircraft Information Management System
(AIMS) has become the leading candidate for adoption by
the Data Bus Subcommittee.
4.2.2.1 ARINC 659: Baetplane Data Bus--lnwacabinet
communication is performed using the ARINC 659 back-
plane data bus standard. ARINC 659 is a data bus designed
for medium-level data throughput inside the avionics cabi-
net. The bus has specified maximum fine length and
impedance and a standardized bus dfiverfmtedace. All
cabinet modules are expected to conform to the ARINC
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659 interface standard. The details of the backplane data
bus are documented in ARINC Specification 659, Back-
plane Data Bus.
Backplane Bus Characteristics--The ARINC 659
backplane bus is characterized by several parameters that
ensure compatibility at the interface. The physical
attributes of the bus include the number of wires associated
with it together with its signal levels and timing require-
ments. The bus message structure atlributes consist of
address/label structure, word bit significance, suing struc-
ture, error provisions and message acknowledgment capa-
bifity.
Speed--Tbe bus supports the bit rate estimated for an
avionics cabinet plus a growth capability of 100%. The bus
speed can be determined by I/O data trafficand intermodule
communication in multiple-core cabinet configurations.
Analysis shall consider encoding, addressing and error
detection over and above the basic data bit rate. Speed shall
be determined by a defined message structure, uansmission
frequency, error detection and correction capabilities.
Integrity Availability--To support the integrity and
availability needs, the bus provides error detection, parity
and string checksums, CRCs, together with error correc-
tion, access violation, detection, impersonation detection,
memory violation protection, data consistency checks and
re,configuration control.
Structure andRedundancy--As a minimum, dual
independently operating buses are used. l=_ch is indepen-
dently monitored on the basis of self-test and status data
received over the bus.
This structure allows flexibility in redundancy manage-
ment in that the redundancy provision can be tailored to
the specific application at hand. Bus provision is 100% by
limiting the bus traffic under normal operation to 50% of
installed capacity. Each bus is a single monitored bus with
access protocol monitoring and bus coupling provisions
directed toward preserving the function of the bus.
Features--The ARINC 659 backplane bus offers the
benefits of flexibility, commonality and maturity. The
requirements for the backplane are such that the ARINC
659 standard may be applied to offer flexibility in an eco-
nomic way. The desired features include:
• High bus loading without clash,
• Guaranteed periodic access,
• Protection against impersonation,
• Message overrun protection,
• Predictable operation,
• Broadcast and directed data transfers.
4.2.2.2 SAFEbus n, Backplane Bus--Honeywell has
designed SAFEbus, an innovative serial backplane bus to
provide communications of all data between the modules
in the Boeing 777 AIMS cabineL SAFEbus supports multi-
processor architectures. SAFEbus is being developed
because no existing protocol adequately meets all key
requirements of a bus (i.e., time determinism, memory pro-
tection, high-performance, high efficiency, low pin count,
and total fault containment). The standard also provides
additional support for conducting debug, verification and
certification operations.
The SAFEbus interface logic consists of a bus interface unit
(BILl) ASIC, and EEPROM table memory, and intermodule
memory and backplane transceivers. This logic is paired to
provide full concurrent monitoring. All communications
between application code in processing modules and other
modules is via messages that are assigned to fixed buffers
in the intermodule memories. The modules simply view the
bus as a protected memory-mapped peripheral.
The SAFEbus protocol is driven by sequences of com-
mands stored in EEPROM table memories. The BIUs in
every module on the SAFEbus are synchronized to the
same point in their respective tables, and mechanisms are
provided to quickly regain synchronization if it is ever lost.
Bus time is divided into a set of windows, each containing
a single message from 32 to 8192 bits in length.
The windows are separated by a fixed gap lime. The com-
mand in each BIU's table that corresponds to a window indi-
cates whether the B1U should transmit, receive, or ignore (a
skip command) the data during the time assigned to that
window. The tables also contain the intermodule memory
address of the data to be either wansmiued or received. The
commands are organized into cyclic loops (frames) of con-
stant length set by the sum of the individual window lengths.
One of the unique benefits of the table-driven SAFEbus
protocol is its extremely high level of efficiency. Because
all of the f'cted location and window assignment informa-
tion is kept in tables, assignments do not need to be trans-
miued on the bus.
The lack of arbitration also reduces the nondata overhead.
Except for the intermessage gap (two bit times per win-
dow) and the occasional synchronization messages, all
remaining bits are data. Thus, for a continuous stream of
32 bit messages, SAFEbus is more than 94% efficienL
Most existing serial protocols perform very poorly for such
short messages, typically in the 10% to 30% efficiency
range. Backplane messages of this length are quite typical
in avionics applications (those generated by ARINC 429,
for example). It is this high level of efficiency that enables
SAFEbus to be implemented using a serial backplane.
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The dataon theSAFEbns istransferredat30 Mbit/s(nom-
inal)overdualself-checkingbuses(SCBs).Each ofthe
SCBs isactuallytwo serialbuses,one drivenfrom eachof
the duplicated BIUs in the transmitter module. The data on
each bus in the pair is compared at the receiver. If a mis-
compare occurs,thedataisdiscardedand not writteninto
the intermodule memory. The transmitting module checks
what it actually puts on the bus to detect errors. The dual
nature of this comparison enstues that a babbling module
cannot stay on the bus. The net result of the SCB approach
is fault detection coverage that exceeds the coverage pro-
vided by CRC codes, without any throughput overhead.
The addition of the second SAFEbus SCB provides imme-
diate error correction for transient errors on the backplane.
It also enhances the cabinet availability since SAFEbus is
fail-operational/fail-passive.
SAFEbus Determinism--All shared resources in the
AIMS cabinet are rigidly partitioned to ensure thatthevar-
ious applications execute correctly under all possible oper-
ating conditions. Studies and work with the FAA have
shown that strictdeterministic conlJ_l is the optimum way
to meet the partitioning requirements for the backplane
bus.
An additional advantage of partition/bus synchronization is
the elimination of the need for most double buffering. It is
possible to schedule the transmission of a data block only
when it is known that the application software is not
acceding or modifying it. This reduces intermodule mem-
ory requirements and makes speeds access to the intermod-
ule memory.
Synchronization of the bus and softwarealsobenefits
debugging and validation. First, the explicit time determin-
ism of SAFEbus means that the system timing that a parti-
tion experiences is the same whether it is the only one in the
chassis or whether it isrunningin a fully populated cabinet.
Second, since processors are synchronized to the bus, they
arc implicitly synchronized to each other. Thus, anY timing
errors between partitions running in different cores will be
exposed quickly, making it simpler to debug. In asyn-
chronously scheduledmultiprocess_ systems, suchliming
problemsappearasintermittents,which can be verycostly
to track and make itimpossible to validate the system.
An additional benefit of the SAFEbus synchronism is that
when the system is stopped or single-stepped, there is a
simple relationship between the states of all of the parti-
tions as defined by the SAFEbus table, making it easier to
trace behavior. This degree of synchronization allows each
BIU to maintain a 32-bit global dmer that is used to time
stamp intermodule memory buffers.
Summary of SAFEbus A_ibutes--SAFEbus uses table-
driven protocol, which assigns time windows to each mes-
sage, eliminates arbitration requirements, guarantees deter-
minism and synchronization (to I/O and other processors),
issues real-time interrupts, anticipates partition data
requirements, eliminates address transmission require-
ments, thus increasing bus efficiency, and provides a swac-
tare for V&V and certification.
SAFEbus also features serial transmission with a minimum
pin count, 30.MHz worst-case operation with 94% effi-
ciency (anticipating 50-MHz, 2-bit-wide bus capability in
the future).
SAFEbus relieson fullconcurrentmonitoringthroughself-
checkingpairs.Alltransactionsareperformedby dual
BIUs. This allows dual monitoring at multiple points and
low-latency fault detection. There is total fault detection
and containment of bus-related errors. Data is transmitted
on two independent buses, and there is 100% correction for
single-bit transmission errors with no error coding over-
head. The redundancy of bus elements facilitates fault tol-
erance. The effects of a fault are contained by the self-
checking pair mechanism in the BIUs and the cross
connection of the transceiver enables, unless the fault is in
the final stage of the transceiver. Any contained fault is
easily isolated for maintenance purposes via the self check-
ing pair trip indication.
4.2.2.3 ARINC 629: Data Bus--The ARINC 629 data
bus is the preferred interface between commercial avionics
cabinets and the sensors, displays, and actuators. The bus
can be described as a serial bi-directional data bus system
which is capable of transferring data at the rate of 2 Mbit/s.
The bus is intended for use for functions having the highest
criticality requirements as well as for nonessential func-
tions. The detailed operation of the data bus is described in
ARINC Specification 629, Multi-Transmitter Data Bus,
Part 1, Technical Description.
The ARINC 629 Periodic-Aperiodic Mulfimmsmitter Bus
is a serial multiple-access dam bus intended for use on com-
merciai transport aircraft entering service in the 1990s. It is
a mastedess broadcast bus, like ARINC 429, operating on
the carrier-sense, multiple-access, clash-avoidance protocol.
Itistheproductofmore than 30 person-yearsofresearch
and development. Initially developed by the Boeing Com-
merciaiAirplane Company as Digital Autonomous Termi-
nal Access Communication (DATAC) to be a potential suc-
cessor to ARINC 429, the bus carries the designation
ARINC 629: Periodic-AperiodicMulti-uansmittet Bus.
During its development, the trends in avionics architeclure
were investigated, and the requirements for a central data
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communicationsystemwereestablished. In 1982, NASA
Langley Research Center installed and flight tested
DATAC hardware on the Boeing 737 Advanced Transport
Operating System (ATOPS) airplane. This provided indus-
try with an opportunity to gain flight experience with the
data bus. In 1986, the Airlines Elecu'onic Engineering
Committee (AEEC) formed the Data Bus Subcommittee to
develop the ARINC 629 data bus standard based on the
Boeing DATAC design.
ARINC 629 is a high-integrity data communication system
that uses a time division multiplexing protocol. The bus is
intended to be applied to systems requiring a high degree
of data integrity and moderate bandwidth. ARINC 629
employs a deterministic data transfer schedule mechanism
to ensure unimpeded data communication for all systems
under maximum bus load conditions. ARINC 629 con-
forms to Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) principles.
The ARINC 629 system can operate in broadcast mode and
point-to-point mode at speeds up to 2 Mbit/s. At this rate,
the theoretical data throughput is 100,000 data words per
second. As applied to commercial avionics, ARINC 629 is
capable of serving the following types of communications:
Intersystem data communication where the data bus
forms a data network and integrates participating
systems by sharing memory resources.
InWasystem data communications for any system
with a distributed architecture (sensors, conlrols, dis-
plays and actuators).
• Point-to-point data communications for sending data
from a source to a single destination with positive
message acknowledgmenL
• Global bus performance, status reporting and system
test capabilities to support future maintenance con-
cepts.
The ARINC 629 protocol is implemented in a very large
scale integrated circuit (VLSI) device. The output of the
protocol chip is connected to the bus medium through a
serial interface module (SIM). The data bus employs two
different protocols for u'ausmitting messages:
Basic Protocol (BP)----essentially the DATAC proto-
col proposed by Boeing. It is capable of operating in
two different modes: periodic mode and aperiodic
mode. The periodicmode assures periodicity on the
bus, and the order of transmission is dependent on
bus initialization. The equal priority access rule is
maintained even under overload conditions. If the
bus is overloaded, the bus will automatically transi-
tion into the aperiodic mode of operation. The aperi-
odic bus assures order of Iransmission on the bus,
however, update rates are determined by bus loading
factors.
Combined Mode Protocol (CP)--developed by the
AEEC Data Bus Subcommittee to combine both
periodic and aperiodic data transmissions on a single
ARINC 629 bus. CP assures that the frequency of
periodictransmissionismaintainedon thebus.It
provides three levels of bus access priority that cor-
respond to the priority level of the data wansmilIed
on the bus:
Level l--Normal periodic Iransmissions of con-
stant-length messages. Transmission sequence on
the bus is in ascending order of unique terminal
gap (TG) allocation. TG is a unique timer
assigned to each terminal on the bus. To avoid
collisions on the bus, each terminal on the bus
must have a unique TG.
Level2--1nf_equent,shortaperiodicwansmis-
sionsrequiringaccesswithinone periodicwans-
missioncycle.Only one level2 Iransmissionis
permittedperwansmitinterval('IT).To ensure
accessinany TI forallterminalsatlevel2,CP
busesaredesignedwithsufficientavailablebus
time,afterthelevell loadisaccountedfor,to
accommodate totalbus occupancy.TI isa system-
wide timing parameter that is set to the same
value in all terminals. It is start_ in a given ter-
minal at the moment the terminal starts transmit-
ring. Once a terminal has transmitted, it waits the
length of time specified by the TI before it can
transmit again. This timer's value typically ranges
from 0.5 to 64 ms.
Level3---Low-priorityaperiodicmessages witha
maximum lengthof257 words.More thanone
level3 Wansmissionperminor frame ispossibleif
sparebus timeisavailable.Sinceavailablebus
timemay be insufficientforallterminalstotrans-
mit duringthesame minor frame,thebus protocol
ensures that deferred terminals are given access in
the following frame(s).
Both BP and CP are capable of transmitting broadcast mes-
sages and directed messages and have the capability to
transmit bulk data such as navigation databases. For a bus
using BP, bulk transfer is performed by having the terminal
assume an alternate uansmit schedule. The transmittermi-
nal resumes its primary transmit schedule when the bulk
data transfer is complete. Depending on the amount of file
data to be Iransmiund, a periodic bus may transition to the
aperiodic mode. For a bus using CP, file transfer can be
handled by structuring the data in a series of single block
aperiodic messages.
4-13
There are several similarities between 629 and MIL-STD-
1553. Each word is 20 bit times long with 16 bits of data and
a parity biL A label word has a 3-bit-time high-low synchro-
nization pauem and a data word has the inverse 3-bit-time
low-high pattern. A message is composed of one to 16 word
sa-ings. Each word suing has a label word followed by up to
256 data words. The bus can operate in any of the configura-
lions used in MIL-STD- 1553 at a 2 Mbit/s rate.
Any one of three media can be used with the ARINC 629
data bus: shielded wire, unshielded wire, or fiber-optic
cable. Three modes of bus coupling are possible: current
mode, voltage mode, and fiber-optic coupling. However,
equipment can communicate on only one of the selected
media for a given application.
One noteworthy feature of the 629 bus is the ease of con-
necting to the bus using an inductive coupler. Figure 4-1
shows an inductive coupler for use in remote or line
replaceable unit (LRU) applications. A substantial contri-
bution to improved reliability and reduced electromagnetic
interference (EMI) effects is achieved by not having to cut
the media wire to make a connection.
Because ARINC 629 is an autonomous terminal access
bus, it is necessary for each bus terminal to contain its own
control.This controlisprovidedwithintwo erasablepro-
grammable read-only memories (EPROMs) that provide
transmit and receive functions. The transmit EPROM con-
rains the logic to determine if three conditions have been
met before enabling the transmitter. The receive EPROM
selects only those messages intended for the terminal and
acts as a monitor on the Iransmitter to guard against bab-
bling and other transmitter malfunctions.
4.2.2.4 ARINC 429: Data BusmThere are cases where it
is practical to use the ARINC 429 data bus to transfer digi-
tal information to the IMA, such as from areas of low data
concentration in the airplane. For example, sensor data
could be digitized at the probe and broadcast in ARINC
429 to a central processing location. ARINC Specification
429, Mark 33 Digital Information Transfer System (DITS),
describes the details of the ARINC 429 bus.
Aeronautical Radio, Inc. Specification 429 Digital Informa-
tion Transfer System, Mark 33, 429 is the most commonly
used data bus standard in commercial aircraft. It is also the
basis for digital buses in modem civil air uansports.
Certification requirements on civil Iransports drove 429 to
operate on either 12 to 14.5 KHz or 100 KHz on an unidi-
rectional bus (a unidirectional bus has only one transmitter
but has multiple receivers, up to a maximum of 20 for
ARINC 429). Communications on 429 buses are either low
speed (70 to 93 ms) or high speed (7.5 to 12.5 ms). The
low speed is used for general-purpose, low-criticality
applications, and a high-speed bus is used for Iransmi_ng
large quantities of data or flight critical information.
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URU Back View _J1
o
Si_ mlm4-_IA
Figure 4[-1. Electromagnetic Coupbrr for LRU AppUeatiorts
ARINC 429 imposes relatively modest and achievable per-
formance demands on the hardware. The cable used in 429
buses is a twisted, shielded pair of 20 to 26 gauge conduc-
tors. The shield is grounded at both ends of the cable run
and at all production breaks. Although there is no specifi-
cation placed on the cable impedance by the manufactm'-
ers, it generally falls in the range of 60 to 80 f_.
4.2.2.5 ARINC 636: Onboard Local Area Network--
ARINC Specifw.ation 636 was developed in anticipation of
high data throughput needs for communications data. This
standard is based on the Fiber Dislributed Data Interface
(FDDI) standard developed for office automation products.
It is useful for systems requiting high bandwidth in non-
critical applications. (Note: At the time of this writing, the
Data Bus Subcommittee is developing these standards.)
The FDDI (ANSI X3T9) standard provides a high-band-
width, general-purpose intetconnection between computers
and peripheral equipment using fiber optics as the trans-
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mission medium. The FDDI is based on the token ring
architecture, whereby a set of stations is logically con-
nected as a serial string of stations and transmission media
to form a closed loop. Information is transmitted on the
FDDI ring in frames. Messages in packets of up to 4500
octets in size can be sent from one station to another. A
timed token rotation (TTR) priority scheme is used to con-
trol access to the bus. A point-to-point clocking mecha-
nism is used with the clock being derived at the code-bit
frequency (125 MHz) from the incoming pulse stream.
The data are encoded using a 4BSB substitution code, e.g.,
a 4-bit data is converted into a 5-bit symbol. This is used
so that the synchronizing clock information can be recov-
ered from any given series of data bits and to ensure that
DC balance can be maintained to the degree feasible to
facilitate interface component and circuit designs. Data is
transmitted using NRZI modulation, where a polarity tran-
sition represents a logical 1 and the absence of a polarity
wansition denotes a logical 0. With a 125-Mbaud modula-
tion rate, an effective 100-Mbit/s data rate can be achieved.
The FDDI can be configured to support a sustained data
throughput of approximately 80 to 90 Mbit/s.
FDDI was originally proposed as a packet switching net-
work with two primary areas of applications: first, as a
high-performance interconnection between mainframes
and their mass storage subsystems and other peripheral
equipment, and second, as a backbone network for use
with lower speed LANs.
An enhancement to FDDI called FDDI-II adds a circuit
switching capability and thus expands the field application
to include those requiring the integration of voice, video
and sensor data streams.
The basic building block of an FDDI network is a physical
connection. This consists of the physical layers of two sta-
tions that are connected over the transmission medium by a
primary and a secondary link. This is particularly suitable
for implementing a dual counterrotating ring configuration.
If only one bus is active at a time, the other one can serve
as a standby to provide redundancy and reconfigurability.
If dual access is selected, then concurrent transmission can
be implemented. Other possible FDDI topologies include
multiple rings, star, and tree configurations.
An error detection scheme is used to ensure the reliability
of the message transmitted. The dual counter-rotating ring
concept will enable the FDDI system to be reconfigurable
if one or both links between two stations is faulty. A sta-
tion bypass switch with the capability to bypass any station
as specified is used to solve the problem of known broken
or powered-down stations. Counterrotating ring connec-
tions are required of all stations directly attached in the
ring. If a station or link fails, the two rings are folded into
one ring, maintaining full connectivity.
Up to 500 stations (1000 physical connections) can be
accommodated in an FDDI network, and a total fiber path
length of 200 km can be supported. The maximum station
separation can be up to 2 kin.
The FDDI local area network (LAN) standard is being incor-
po .rated into the electronic library and cabin management
pomons of the Boeing 777 airplane avionics. FDDI is being
selected by the ARINC Onboard LAb/task group of the Data
Bus Subcommittee, which is responsible for LAN standards.
The FDDI data bus was developed for use on Space Sta-
tion Freedom by a joint effort of Honeywell's Space and
Strategic Systems Operations (SASSO) in Clearwater,
Florida, and its Sensors and Systems Development Center
(SSDC) in Minneapolis. This data bus will carry all the
data required to control the environmental and ammde
functions of the space station. The FDDI technology repre-
sents COTS technology in transition to space applications.
4.2.3 ARINC 638: OSI Upper Layers
ARINC Specification 638 def'mes the session, presentation,
and application layer protocols for aeronautical data com-
munication. (Note: At the time of this draft, the Data Link
(DLK) Subcommittee is developing these standards.)
4.2.4 ARINC 637: lnternetworldng
ARINC Specification 637 defines protocols and addressing
definitions for network servicing in the aeronautical
telecommunication network (ATN). (Note: At the time of
this draft, the data link is developing these standards.)
4.2.5 ARINC 652: Software Management
Software management and the recommendations of
ARINC Report 652 are expected to ensure that the soft-
ware developed for IMA hardware complies with airline
desires. Airlines desire modular programs that are easily
maintained without prohibitive post-development support
costs. ARINC Report 652 also describes the desires of the
airlines with respect to software modification and software
re-use. (Note: At the time of this report, the Software Man-
agement (SWM) Subcommittee is developing software
standards.)
4.2.6 ARINC 653: Application Software Interface
A standardized application software environment is part of
the commercial IMA concept. ARINC Specification 653
defines an interface standard between the executive soft-
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ware and application software. ARINC 653 defines the
communication services and memory management facili-
ties expected to be used in avionics equipment ranging
from flight conU'olto electronic libraries. (Note: At the
time of this report, the APEX Working Group is develop-
ing this standard.)
4.2.7 ARINC 624: Onboard Maintenance System
ARIHC Report 624 is a design guido for onboard mainte-
nance systems (OMS) used within the IMA maintenance
systems. The OMS design guide discusses a variety of
maintenanceconceptssuch asBITE, BITE access,and air-
craftconditioningmonitoringsystems(ACMS). The docu-
ment recommends an English-based user interface, non-
volatile BITE storage and onboard maintenance
• documentation (Old]3).
4.2.8 ARINC 650: Packaging Concepts
The physical parameters associated with the IMA hardware
components are described by "form and fit" characteristics
documented in ARINC Specification 650, Integrated Mod-
ular Avionics Packaging and Interfaces. ARINC Specifica-
tion 650 specifies cabinet and module dimensions, stan-
dardized connectors, environmental criteria and associated
parameters that ensure physical interchangeability of mod-
ular components. (Note: At the time of this report, the New
Installation Concepts (NIC) Subcommittee is developing
packaging standards.)
4.2.9 Project Paper 167: Certification and
Configuration Control
ARINC Project Paper 617, Guidance and Avionics C.ea_ca-
lion and Configuration Control, describes procedmes used by
the induslry for certification and configuration control. It also
provides recommendations for improving these procedures
as evolutionary improvements in avionics occur. Section 7 of
this document provides general guidelines that apply to IMA.
ARINC Project Paper 617 exists in draft form.
4.2.10 ARINC 613: Ada
The Ada high-order programming language standard
developed by the United States Dcpat_ent of Defense
(DoD) as ANSI-MIL-STD-lgI5A is recommended for
use in IMA. Ada is the preferred programming language
of the airline community. Therefore, it is recommended
that all digital avionics be programmed in Ada. ARINC
Report 613, Guidance for Using the Ada Programming
Language in Avionics Systems, provides recommenda-
tions for software engineers using Ada in avionics
designs.
4.2.11 ARINC 610: Flight Simulator Avionics
ARINC Report 610, Guidance for Design and Integration
of Aircraft Avionics Equipment in Simulators, ad_
the use of avionics equipment in flight training devices and
flight simulators. Accordingly, where appropriate, the rec-
ommendations ofARINC Repon 610 should be considered
in the design of IMA. Simulator operators and simulator
manufacturers should be consulted early in IMA develop-
meat to determine the additional functions necessary for
applying IMA to flight training devices and flight simula-
tors.
4.2.12 ARINC 609: Electric Power
The IMA concept defines a standardized power supply
architecture for distributing power in the most cost-effec-
tive and weight-saving manner. In designing power sup-
plies with higher criticalities than that of the pastand
greater emphasis on weight and volume reductions, it is
essential thatrecommendation practices be followed.
ARINC Report 609, "Design Guidance for Aircraft Elecu-i-
cai Power Systems," describes airfine and industry con-
cerns and acceptable standards.
4.2.13 Related Documents
EUROCAE ED-14x--Environmental Conditions and
Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment (future revi-
sion).
EUROCAE ED-12x---Software Considerations in Air-
borne Systems and Equipment Certification (future revi-
sion).
RTCA DO-160x--Environmental Conditions and Test
Procedures for Airborne Equipment (future revision).
RTCA DO.17gx---Software considerations in Airborne
Systems and Equipment Certification (future revision).
RTCA DO-205mDesign Guidance and Recommended
Standards to Support Open Systems lnterconnection for
Aeronautical Mobile Digital Communications.
4.3 System Architecture
4.3.1 Introduction
This subsection examines the characte.tistics and atm'butes
of commercial aircraftarchitecture and subsequendypro-
rides examples of COTS + axchitectmes using commercial,
ruggedizod, and militarized technology. Candidate configu-
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rationsaredescribed,andissuesgoverningthedesirability
ofeachconfigurationarediscussedinthe context of perfor-
nmnce and dependability. A point-of-departure, strawman
architecture is used within this study as an example from
which further assessments and comparisons to other config-
urations can be made. The s_wman architecture incorpo-
rates the Boeing 777 airplane's Aircraft Information Man-
agement System (AIMS) arcl_tecmre and several other
COTS + technologies described within the Standard Mod-
ules section of this report. This subsection relates only to
architectural hardware components and design configura-
tions. Further definition of COTS + architecture, including
system-level rules governing the full or partial use of
COTS + hardware, software, requirements, interconnections,
and the developmental support resources required to imple-
ment designs are discussed elsewhere within this document.
COTS + systems are likely to be in existence for a long
time, during which there will be many technological devel-
opments that can improve architectural designs. These
developments are likely to occur at different times for dif-
ferent components, which places a requirement on the sys-
tem to be able to accommodate these different technolo-
gies. This can be achieved through careful definition of
architectural element boundaries and by ensuring that the
elements are loosely coupled to each other.
Data interface standards ARINC 629 and ARINC 659 have
been developed to positively influence equipment interop-
erability. This enables equipment to be specified, con-
structed, and qualified independently from the remainder
of the system, yet function with other modules in the sys-
tem following integration.
The focus of this subsection is guidance for the implemen-
tation of a COTS + systems architecture. As such, it is con-
cerned with the definition of components that lend them-
selves to standardization. It is, therefore, not concerned
with component (sensor, actuator, or indicator) design
details except for interfaces to other components.
4.3.2 IMA Derived COTS + Architecture
4.3.2.1 Distributed Architecture--
Commercial Approach to Functional Distribution--
The commercial aircraft IMA architectural approach pro-
motes the use of logical systems, or more importantly, con-
centrates functions without conslraints imposed by physi-
cal boundaries. This allows sensors, actuators, indicators
and processors to be shared by many functions.
The commercial IMA system architecture can, therefore,
functionally accommodate many cune_t aircraft systems
and may ultimately include them all. Figure 4-2 gives an
example of functional distribution. This figure illustrates
the diversity of functions that can be handled by any one
cabinet in an aircraft system. Functions are shown as being
allocated to a specific cabinet Because functions generally
need sensor information and usually provide an output to
either an indicator or actuator or both, they must be con-
nected in some way to the devices. These devices are
rarely collocated with the cabinet, and in general, require
many wires to perform their function. Where the sensors,
actuators, or indicators are distantly located from the cabi-
nets, commercial IMA architecture provides benefits by
incorlxrating electronics that convert source/sink data into
digital form so they may be connected directly to a serial
bus. Besides enabling the designer to maximize the poten-
tial for weight saving by minimizing discrete wiring, this
approach improves the maintainability of the system
because the vehicle's wiring can now be monitored in situ
by more than one componenL
COTS + Approach to Functional Diswibution--The
COTS+ space vehicle architecture uses the commercial
IMA architectural approach with the exception that it is
greatly influenced by physical restrictions that are imposed
by manufacturing partitioning and required to improve
space vehicle performance and fault tolerance. These dif-
ferences and their influences are explained as follows:
l° COTS + architecture must accommodate physical
restrictions imposed by the fabrication of space vehi-
cles. Some functions such as sensor buses may be
separated and included within different subsystems
because vehicle stages are physically separated by
stage size or to facilitate manufacturing and/or fabri-
cation operations.
. The COTS + approach is distinguished by its use of
physical boundaries and partitioning to promote the
use of NDI equipment qualified to operate under
commercial environments. COTS+ requirements may
require installations within environmentally protected
areas or within areas with less harsh environments to
ensure avionic performance and fault tolerance.
By adapting the functional distribution approach prmnoted by
commercial IMA architecture, it is possible to concentrate
functions and install processing hardware, for instance, at
remote locations within the space vehicle sffucture away from
their associated sensor sources and effectcrs. These locations,
selected because of their favorable physical environments
may be characterized by lower levels of vibration and/or
acoustic noise, less susceptibility to shock, lower radiation
levels, less susceptibility to electromagnetic environment
(EME), and less effect from outside temperatureextremes.
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A functionally distributed COTS + space-vehicle archi-
tecture is illuslxated in Figure 4-3. The figure shows two
examples of functional distribution that accommodate
physical restrictions imposed by manul'acturing pazli-
doning, performance, and fault tolerance. Engine con-
Ixollers are located at remote locations, allowing con-
troller avionics to be qualified to lower environmental
levels. For a given design, operation within more benign
environments assures higher levels of performance
(dependability and fault tolerance). The figure illustrates
remote engine conuol processors removed an apprecia-
ble distance away from the harsh engine environments.
Illustrations are shown for a manned and an unmanned
vehicle. Engine controllers installed within radiation-
protected, controlled cabin environments are illustrated
for the manned vehicle.
Sensor and effectm interfaces arc provided through remote
data interface (P.DI) units. The RDI cencentrates =nsor
and effectm signals/commands, pmvidus signal control and
conditioning, and provides a standard interface to the vehi-
cle's data network. The RDI's standard network interface is
es_ndal to the manufacturing partitioning of the engine
module, since it provides a network interface necessary for
independent testing of the engine module and establishes
an interface requiring minimum connedons.
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Figure 4-3. Functionally Distributed COTS + Space Vehicle
Architecture
Although the distributed architecture philosophy allows pro-
cessor electronics to operate within less harsh environments,
the RD]s in the above illustration are required to operate at
harsher environmental levels. For this example, provisions
would be provided for RDI operation within the engine
environment; that is, they would have to be either mggedi-
zed, militarized, or modified to the spacecraft environment;
or, by default, be replaced by space-qualified RDIs designed
specifically to withstand environments near engines.
43.2.2 Physical Distribution--
Commercial Aircraft IMA Equipment Distribution--
Commercial IMA equipment is distributed throughout the
aircraft in a way that minimizes the aircraft's life-cycle
costs. Three primary types of equipment are considered:
cabinets, LRUs and remote components.
Commercial aircraft IMA cabinet locations can be estab-
lished after analyzing the tradeoffs of the convenience of
the location versus proximity to sensors/actuators. Cabinet
I/O requirements may be affected by the choice of cabinet
location. Proper equipment location results in saving wire
lengths, connectors and manufacturing costs. Tasks that are
strictly performed in software could be run in a cabinet in
any location in the aircraft. It also is practical to have one
cabinet provide the IK) for nearby sensors and supply the
data over ARINC 629 buses to another cabinet. This
approach can significantly reduce the wiring for systems
that are spread throughout the airplane.
In cabinets containing gateways as their only I/O (i.e., they
do not interface to sensors/effectors), the cabinet is rela-
tively insensitive to location and can be placed wherever it
is most convenient to the maintenance personnel. Certain
applications with different cost drivers may result in other
I/O line-replaceable modules (LRMs) located in the cabi-
net. In such cases, the wiring associated with the I/O can
place restrictions on the cabinet location, and the cabinet
must be placed in a location that minimizes the airframe
wiring task.
Remote electronics are incorporated in the relevant device
where this is a practical solution, such as smart sensors and
actuators with intelligent bus/network interfaces. Other
devices may be handled by remote data concentrators that
service a number of physically close devices. Remote data
concentrators are located at points convenient to the
devices and the maintenance personnel. Where neither of
the above options is possible, the I/O should be placed in
the cabinet.
COTS Space Vehicle Equipment Distribution--
COTS + space vehicle equipment, like commercial aircraft
IMA equipment, is distributed throughout the space vehi-
cle in a way that minimizes the vehicle's life-cycle costs.
COTS + equipment, however, is first partitioned to reside
within physical and geographical boundaries established
to facilitate commercial equipment operation within com-
mercially defined environments. Within the physical
boundaries established by partitioning, cabinet and
remote unit locations are established after analyzing the
tradeoffs of the convenience of the location versus prox-
imity to sensors/actuators, and so on, as with IMA distri-
bution analysis.
The three primary types of commercial IMA equipment--
cabinets, LRUs, and remote components--are also the
principal components used in the COTS + space vehicle
architecture. Incorporation of unaltered IMA equipment
within the COTS+ architecture maximizes the use of com-
mercial off-the-shelf subsystems.
43.3 System Components
The comporwmts normally required to implement a space
vehicle avionic function arccontrols, sensors, actuators, indi-
cators and the processing necessary to transform data into a
form suitable for driving actuators and indicators. The COTS+
architecture treats these components as separate physical enti-
ties that communicate with one another via a network of data
buses. The COTS + architecture aims to reduce costs by opti-
mizing the location of the _g of many functions.
The components of a COTS + architecture include:
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• Cabinets;
• Data buses (ARINC 629, ARINC 429, FDDI, Taxi);
• ARINC 629.compatible devices:
• Peripherals that are directly connected to cabinet;
• Data concentrators.
These modules shouldbe interchangeableand shouldwork
together.Therefore,a rigorousdefinitionofthestatic
aspectsoftheinte.rfsm¢arenecessary.This includescon-
nectordet'milion, pin-out, and signal characteristics. The
level of redundancy provided as part of the fault-tolerant
aspects of the cabinet affects interchange, ability. Therefore,
the level of redundancy needs to be def'med to ensure that
each implementation conforms to the same standard.
For the systems that are implemented in the COTS + cabi-
net m meet their integrity requirements, the cabinet may
need to provide a means for incorporating dissimilarity.
This dissimilarity may be needed at the software or hard-
ware level or both. A high degree of integrity is recom-
mended for all COTS + equipment
The remainder of this subsection describes the components
in more detail. Previously described components are
described within the context of system architecture.
43.3.1 CabinetmTbe purpose of the cabinet is to provide
the computing resources and interfaces necessary for all
application software that resides in the cabinet. The cabinet
may also house I/O for local devices. A commercial off-
the-shelf airplane cabinet is illustrated in Figure 4-4.
Three prime elements are considered to be part of the cabi-
net: the cabinet frame, the functional modules, and the
backplane bus.
Cabinet Frame and Bactplaae Assembly--The cab-
inet frame wovides the mechanical and electrical envi-
ronment for installing a group of functional modules and
forms the interface between the modules and the air-
frame. The overall dimensions of the cabinet are flexible
so manufacturers can integrate a variety of modules into a
particular airframe. Cabinet designs are likely to be
unique so they can withstand different environments.
This allows maximum flexibility in locating cabinets in
the airframe.
The cabinet also contains the physical backplane that per-
forms the interface between functionalmodules and the
rest oftheavionics. The backplane can be divided into
three areas. The furst area interfaces vehicle wiring to the
physical backplane. The second area is dedicated to the
transfer of all intermodule waflic, i.e., backplane buses and
module interconnections. The third area is used for power
distribution. The ARINC 659 backplane bus is an impor-
tant functional element of the cabineL
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Cabinet Design_The cabinet design is the responsi-
bility of the system integrator, the vehicle manufaclm_r.
Each cabinet shall provide a fault-mlerunt environment.
Functions are distributed in cabinets based on the need for
I/O, data throughput and memory requirements as well as
their relationship with other functions. The cabinet con-
forms to the appropriate sections of ARINC Specification
650 and R'I'CA Document DO-160 standards.
The cabinet itself provides the basic mechanical structure
and environmental control/isolation for the modules. It
does not provide any electrical services such as power
transformation/regulation and bus control/monitoring.
Individual LRMs provide these services for the avionics
functions.
Several cabinet designs are to be defined to withstand dif-
ferent vehicle environments while allowing the LRIV_ to
be designed to a single environmental specification. The
cabinets are to be of open or closed construction to allow
maximum flexibility in locating them with respect to flu-
ids, particles, high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF), etc.
Different cabinets shall use the same modules. Additional
maintenance procedures caused by different cabinet styles
shall be minimized.
mon to most modules or configurable so that the number of
modules and their position in the cabinet need not be fixed
during vehicle design but may allow modification and
addition of functions, in service, without costly changes to
the cabinet and vehicle wiring.
Several modules have been defined for the COTS + archi-
tecture, including:
• Core processor,
• Standard I/O,
• Special I/O,
• Power supply module,
• Bus bridge,
• Gateway.
The function of each module and the definition of its inter-
face to the backplane is specified in separate ARINC char-
acteristics. This approach is intended to ensure interoper-
ability of equipment designed and installed by different
manufactarers. It also promotes the objective of equipment
interchangeability. When modularity is achieved, it will
result in avionic systems that are easy to develop, certify,
test, and maintain.
ARINC Specification 650, Integrated Modular Avionics
Packaging and Interfaces, defines the physical and envi-
ronmental characteristics of the cabinet. A general view of
a cabinet assembly is shown in Figure 4-5.
4.3.3.2 Line Replaceable Modules (LRMs)--The func-
tionai modules are packaged as LRMs. The ultimate aim of
COTS + IMA is that the vehicle interfaces are either corn-
The level of redundancy provided intemaUy is determined
by the implementer of the module and reflects the require-
ments of the program. The system integrator shall assess
the capabilities of the module against the system require-
ments and make the selection accordingly.
The LRM connector definition and pin-outs are to be stan-
dardizod to conform to ARINC Specification 650, Inte-
grated Modular Avionics Packaging and Interfaces.
Figure d_. General View of Cablnet Assembly
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Core Proce$$ors_The core processor provides the
computing power for the cabinet. The cabinet may contain
one or a number of processors together with their memory
and any circuitry necessary for redundancy management,
such as monitors, BITE, and isolation circuits. In the
COTS+ IMA concept, alternate core module designs may
be based on the cabinet applications.
Because thecore wocemor must runmany different functions,
it must provide a means of wotecting the functions to ensure
that no one funefioncan adve_ely affect another.The mcms
of isolation should be invisible to the applicationsoftware.
Each system implementation will determine how many
processors and how many different designs should be used.
The design of a core processor shall promote implementa-
• rion independence to allow true interchangeability with any
other core in the cabinet, concurrence between other cores
in the cabinet, and concurrence between suppliers.
Application software may be loaded in any of the core pro-
cessors within a cabinet, the design of which should allow
transparency of hardware support for the applications.
Consideration should be given to using hardware to sup-
port specific executive aspects such as:
• Partitioning for memory and time allocation,
• Privileged access to avoid interference between
applications,
• Redundancymanagementofthecoreorcabinet.
Data Bus Interfaces_A gateway module converts
data from vehicle bus fmmat to the format required by the
backplane bus (intercabinet and intracabinet buses, respec-
tively), to allow the distribution of data from the vehicle to
the cabinet modules and vice versa.
It is possible for a data gateway to provide data transfof-
marion service for the cabinet. The use of a separate gate-
way isolates the bus technology and protocols from the
remainder of the cabinet. Bus bridges may be used to trans-
fer data to and from data buses of the same type. All hard-
ware necessary to implement the gateway and the related
software should reside in the gateway module.
AlthoughtheprimaryCOTS + dam busisARINC 629,
othernetworksandbuses,suchastheARINC 429,FDDI,
andTaxidatabuses,shallbe accommodated.Therefore,a
familyofbusbridgemodulesandgatewayswillbedevel-
opedtocoverdifferentmixesofbusstandardsanddiffer-
entcapabilities.
The COTS +systemdesignershallconsiderthefullcom-
plementofdatabusinterfacestothecabinet.To copewith
possible evolutions of cabinet functionality or the module
technology, gateways should be used to convert protocols
from different data buses. A typical gateway would convert
the ARINC 629 global bus protocol to the ARINC 659
backplane bus protocol and vice versa.
If a gateway may be the sole interface between the cabinet
and other aircraft systems, its design should take into
account the safety and availability requirements of the
entire system.
The gateway shall take into consideration the recommen-
dations of the OSI Reference Model. This concept is aimed
at providing the module with the desired level of flexibil-
ity. Gateways should be configurable and contain some
processing capability.
Repeaters, bridges, and routers are ocher data bus interface
techniques that shall be considered in system design. Sub-
section 4.4, describing data networks, provides additional
background material.
llO Modules--A family of LRMs will be developed
to transforma standard set of analog ,-roddiscrete sensor
data types into digital data to be transferredto the core pro-
cessors via the backplane bus or vice versa. Each LRM
may contain interfaces to a single type of signal or to some
optimum mix of signals.
Standardization of I/0 modules will promote efficient
acquisition of data to be mmsmitted to the processing mod-
ules via the backplane bus. The standardization of an indi-
vidaal I/0 module should consider the means for reconfig-
uration. The I/O module can be configured by the
applicationsoftwaretomeetthecabinetrequirements,and
thisconfigurationcanbestoredintheI/Omodulememory.
Where specialsignaltypesorinterfacer quirementscan-
notbemetwithastandardI/OLRM, itmay benecessary
todevelopaspecialLRM. Thisshouldbedoneonlywhere
absolutely necessary, because the cost advantage of stan-
dardization may not be realized. System engineering
should be used to minimize the various types of signals
that require special I/0 LRMs.
The definitions of the standard FO modules are provided in
Subsection 4.1, Standard I/O Module. Descriptions of syn-
chronous and asynchronousaspectsofI/Omodulesfollow.
Synchronous I10 Modules--Synchronous FO
modules exchange data between the I/0 module and the
core processing modules as required by the application
(i.e., they are synchronous with the application). The mod-
ule performs data acquisition, preprucessing and block
storageaccordingto therequirementsoftheapplications
presentinthecabinet.
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Each application configures the I/O for its own use imme-
diately after the determination of the cabinet configuration.
After this, the preprocessing unit should cyclically refresh
the memory allocated to each application. The same data
can thus be found in the memory of the I/O modules in the
areas specific to the application.
Asynchronous 110 ModulesmIn the asyn-
chronous mode of operation, the exchanges between the
I/O module and the core processing modules are left m the
initiative of the I/0 module. These transmissions are asyn-
chronous with respect to the application. These modules
provide data acquisition, preprocessing, and block storage
functions to the various applications present in the cabinet.
When the cabinet configuration has been determined, each
application can inform the I/O module of the signal charac-
teristics it requh'es---the type of signal, the electrical value-
physical value conversion, the signal refresh rates on the
backplane. After the module has been configured and ini-
tialized, it should transmit all its acquisitions to the appro-
priate modules.
In both synchronous and asynchronous modes the prepro-
cessing unit should be capable of processing the data. In
addition, it should be capable of acquiring and storing I/O
signals. The characteristics of the processing should be
loaded in the same way as the channel characteristics.
Power Supply LRMsmFor modular architectures,
the power supply LRM provides power to other modules.
The power supply LRM provides power isolation and
conversion between vehicles power requirements of other
LRMs (user modules). The set of supply modules in each
cabinet should have redundancy commensurate with the
integrity requirements of the functions executed in the
cabinet.
Two independent sources of standard Vehicle power pro-
vide input power to each supply module in a cabinet. Out-
put power from a supply moduleis a conditioned voltage
level. The supply modules should provide separate output
lines for each connected user module. These output lines
should have independent fault protection so that a fault in
one user module does not affect the integrity of the power
supplied to the other user modules.
User modules are normally connected to at least two sup-
ply modules. Each user module automatically draws power
from either (or both) of the supplies as required to accom-
plish the module's functions.
Design guidance for power supply modules is contained in
Subsection 4.1.
4333 Backplane Bus--The ARINC 659 serial data bus
is used for intermodule communication. A serial backplane
data bus has many advantages compared with a parallel
bus, including minimal pin count and associated inte_on-
nections inside the cabinet. It also provides exceptional
architectural flexibility for high criticality systems that
require multiple backplane buses to meet the integrity
goals.
433.4 Test and Maintenance Bus--A separate data bus
is recommended for the purpose of uploading ARINC 659
software tables. The recommended data bus is specified in
IEEE Standard 1149.5.
433.5 Vehicle Data Bus--The primary vehicle data bus
is ARINC 629 defined in ARINC Specification 629, Multi-
transmitter Data Bus, Part 1 - Technical Description.
ARINC 629 serves as a global resource and should be used
to Wansfer all data between cabinets. In addition, ARINC
429 and other networks can be used for particular applica-
tions where it is appropriate.
The ARINC 629 data bus is a serial bidirectional data bus
used to transmit all data including critical data. The overall
system requirements determine the number of buses
needed for a specific implementation. Initially, buses
should be designed to operate at no more than 50% of
capacity, thereby allowing sufficient growth margin. In
cases where the data path is specialized or high traffic vol-
umes are anticipated, such as su'uctured OSI communica-
tions, dedicated ARINC 629 buses should be used.
433.6 ARINC 629-Compatible Devices_Interfaces to
the outside world (sensors, actuators and indicators) may
contain remote electronics to perform signal conditioning
buffering, conversion, and low-level control. The remote
elecl_ronics can be incorporated in devices such as an air
data probe where there is a practical solution. Such devices
include ARINC 629 compatible actuators and sensors.
Other devices not compatible with ARINC 629 can use
remote data concentrators that service a number of devices
in proximity. Data concentrators convert device data into
digital form, which is transmitted on the ARINC 629 data
bus. In the receive mode, they convert digital data into ana-
log form. The remote devices are responsible for condi-
tioning the data from the concentrators under their control
and fcf monitoring the health of the sensors/actuators and
any circuilry within themselves. This approach has the
advantage of minimizing the number of discrete wires in
the aircraft.
The COTS + architecture encourages the development of
ARINC 629-compatible devices, since they enable a
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greaterdegreeofsystemimplementationandfreedomof
modification.Themaintainabilityofsystemsalsois
increasedbecausev hiclewiringcanbemonitoredand,
becausethebusisamulfiaccessbus,it canbemonitoredat
morethanonepoint.
4.3.3.7 Simple Devices--Peripherals, incapable of being
directly connected to the ARINC 629 data bus, are referred
to as simple devices. This implies nothing about the inter-
nal sophistication of the devices. Simple devices may out-
put raw data or may have complex internal processing to
perform signal conditioning, buffering, conversion, and
low-level control. Their data output may be in analog form
or in digital form other than ARINC 629. It is recom-
mended that simple devices interface to data concentrators
for transmission on the ARINC 629 bus or interface
directly to cabinets through standard I/O modules.
When special signal types are presem or special interface
requirements cannot be met, vehicle-specific devices must
be designed. This should be done only when there is no
other practical solution. If the reason is cost-effectiveness,
the total vehicle and program cost should be considered,
not just the cost of the device.
4.3.3.8 Display Devices--Generally, ARINC 629 data
buses are used to interface display devices. However, some
display architectures and economic tradeoffs result in
attractive alternatives. For example, some display devices
may be connected to the cabinets via high-speed video
buses. This type of interface would be necessary if the cab-
inet designer elects to integrate the display graphics gener-
ation into the cabinet hardware and transmit video data to
the display devices.
Several issues should be considered when assessing the
desirability for a high-speed video interface. System
designers should consider the users' desire for increased
equipment reliability. Minimizing the complexity of dis-
play devices will improve the cabin equipment reliability.
This improvement typically will require increased band-
width between the cabinets and the display devices. Other
design issues to be considered include reducing the number
of pan numbers, reducing flight deck power distribution,
and increasing availability through multiple reconfigura-
tion paths.
4.3.3.9 Remote Data Concentrators--A remote data con-
centrator serves a number of simple devices in close prox-
imity. It converts source data from simple devices into dig-
ital form, which is transmitted on the ARINC 629 data bus.
It accepts analog, discrete, RF, etc., data in the form suit-
able to the device. The data concentrator can be responsi-
ble for monitoring the health of simple devices or sensors.
When it is impngfical to interface simple devices directly
to the COTS* cabinet, remote data concentrators should be
used to the greatest extent possible. Remote data concen-
wators are defined in Subsection 4.7, Data Sourc_ and
Destinations.
4.3.4 High.Integrity Design Requirements
A basic goal of commercial COTS + IMA is to develop an
architecture that meets dependability and safety rezluire-
ments. _ding on the architectm_, the approach to inte-
gratiou, and the number of systems being integrated, some
level of fault tolerance will be necessary to meet the
requirements.
High-integrity COTS + designs are needed to satisfy
dependability and safety requirements. In addition, avion-
ics systems must demonstrate high availability, even for
systems that are not flight critical. This approach positively
contributes to efficient vehicle operation and minimizes
opportunity cost losses. As a minimum, fault tolerance is to
be applied to all functions that could jeopardize reliable
operation. This philosophy drives space system designs
and is used as design criteria for determining space system
architecture, its level of fault tolerance, and candidate sys-
tems for integration.
4.3.5 Candidate COTS + Architectures
Six commercial off-the-shelf architectures are described in
this subsection. They comprise coufignrations exhibiting
different logical, functional, and physical structures. Five
architectmes are described in AR1NC Report 651 and the
sixth, Boeing' s 777 avionics architecture, is presented as a
design currently being implemented.
The COTS + architecture defines the physical and logical
relationships among the components, their connections,
and their functional elements, which include sensors, pro-
cessors, monitors/displays, and control/actuating devices.
The physical relationships are determined by the geograph-
ical distribution of functional elements, while the logical
relationships are detezmined by the hierarchy of control for
data and signal processing among the various elements.
The processing for an element of COTS* includes its
means for controlling and/or being controlled, whether it is
implemented in software, firmware, or hardware.
Based on the physical and logical relationships among var-
ious elements and components, COTS + architectures can
be classified into several categories. Five categories are
presented in ARINC Report 651. Design Guidelines for
Integrated Modulm" Avionics. The architectures, although
described individually, are not absolute. It is envisaged that
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system requirements may render a hybrid of these architec-
tures to be most effective for some specific applications.
The ARINC Report 651 architectures are identified alpha-
betically from Architecture-A through Architecture-E. Fur-
tiler detail on these architectures is provided in ARINC
Report 651.
Boeing' s 777 avionics architecture is an alternate manifes-
tation of commercial concepts and may be considered a
hybrid of the ARINC 651 architectures. The 777 architec-
ture contains Honeywell AIMS cabinets and will be used
as the baseline architecture of this study.
4.3.5.1 ARINC Architecture.A__Architecture.A con-
nects autonomously operating LRUs in a fashion similar to
that established for commercial LRUs (the ARINC 700
series LRUs). Because the architecture is partitioned simi-
larly to traditional avionic architectures, avionic certifica-
tion requires few innovations compared with established
procedures.
Architecture-A employs four cabinets interconnected by
quad 629 data buses; all avionic functions are implemented
in the four cabinets. Each cabinet uses similar hardware for
redundancy. The general architectural outline is shown in
Figure 4-6. Each avionic cabinet contains separate data and
signal processing capabilities to support different avionic
functions simultaneously. LRMs implement different
avionics functions. The functional relationship between
different LRMs is logically distributed, but each LRM pro-
rides logically centralized control with physically dis-
tributed architecture.
VO I/0 I/0 l/O
' II '
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*identical Cabinets
Ci10877-_4
Figure 4-6. Architecture.A
Fault Tolerance Considerations--Each module is to
provide a fault-tolerant environmenL Each LRM contained
in the avionics cabinet has its own fault containment area
to ensure that faults can be isolated to an LRM for mainte-
nance purposes.
4.3.5.2 ARINC Architecture-B--Architecture-B is based
on a concept of logically centralized processing. The core
processor is collocated with the I/O electronics for sensing
and control functions. All I/O functions operate under the
control of the processor. The main advantage of this archi-
tecture is simplicity and analyzability that results when all
interface circuits and their operations are under complete
control of the processor, which is the logically cenlral con-
trol element. The general architectural outline for Architec-
mre-B is shown in Figure 4-7.
I/I3 1/13 tO 1/O I/O
Minimum of 2 629 Buses
"Dissimilar Cabinets c*1=n77.'=
Figure 4.7. Arckitecture-B
Fault Tolerance Considerations--The key considera-
tion in this architeclare is the provision for deterministic
operation. The remotely controlled sensors and actuators
are designed with interfaces that are fldly testable and ana-
lyzable. The architecture may employ dissimilar sensors
and actuators to reduce the probability of generic errors.
This type of architecture lends itself to a relatively straight-
forward validation procedure.
Functional integrity and availability of the system is
achieved by providing a fault-tolerant cabinet environment
and also through system-level cabinet redundancy. Cabinet
fault tolerance is achieved by implementing fault tolerance
at the module level. Core processor module fault tolerance
is provided by requiring redundancy of processor compo-
nents within the module. As a minimum, each fault tolerant
module implements a pair of dual-redundant processors.
This is analogous to a dual-daal redundancy configuration.
Fault tolerance for the cabinet is implemented using simi-
lar hardware to provide redundancy, but dissimilar redun-
dancy is implemented by coding the application program
in two or more cabinets with different processors.
System-level redundancy is provided through implement-
ing redundant cabinets to further enhance the functional
availability and integrity of the system. The number of
cabinets is limited to interunit perfonaance limitations
only.
At the module level, each module provides its own fault-
tolerant environmenL This is to ensure that faults can be
isolated to an LRM. Maintainability is designed into the
cabinet so that all failures causing loss of a function can
automatically he isolated to the faulty LRM.
At the backplane level, the backplane data bus provides the
capability to detect and isolate bus faults and provides a
reconfiguration path around the failure. The backplane bus
is implemented in a dual-redundant configuration. The bus
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contains error detection and correction capability and has
the ability to contain bus faults. There are no single-point
bus failure modes that could cause the loss of both buses.
d.3.5.t ARINC Architecture.C_Architecture'C is logi-
cally centralized and physically dismbuted. A general
architectm'al outline for Architectured[_ is shown in Figure
4-8. Each component of this architecture is a virtual node
capable of providing autonomous operation in a coopera-
tive manner with other nodes.
Sensors
•Dissimilol CaWinots c_lmn-_s
Figure 4-8. Architecture-C
This architecture is based on the physical dismbution and
separation of functions, while the logical relationship
between different functional elements is a hierarchy of con-
trol determined by the core processor. The core processor
monitors all the I/O interfaces (whether located centrally or
remotely), determines the appropriate action, and controls
the displays and/or actuator and control mechanisms.
In a preferred configuration, I/O is handled by remote data
concentrators located remotely from cabinets, thus physi-
cally separating processing functions from their sources of
raw data and sinks of processed data. This is especially
important to minimize the complexity of system upgrades.
Wherever possible, sensors and actuators are also remotely
located. They are "smart" in the sense that all inner-loop
conu'olfunctions are located on the devices themselves.
The major difference between Architectme-B and Architec-
une-C is that processing resources are physically indepen-
dent of their I/O data in Architecture-C, whereas in Archi-
tecture-B they are not, because of the association of both
applicationsfunctions and their I/O data in the same cabinet.
In Architecture-C, the preferred cabinet external dam inter-
face is to the ARINC 629 data bus. All system-level com-
munication between cabinets, sensors, actuators and other
devices is via ARINC 629 data buses. However, the archi-
tectore does not preclude other forms of cabinet-resident
I/O where costs dictate that I/O be located in the cabinet.
However, where I/O is located in cabinets, the location
independence of applications may be compromised.
Fault Tolerance ConsidemtionswThe architecuwe
employs fault detection, fault isolation, and a redundancy
management scheme passing active control from failed ele-
ments in the network to functioning elements to provide
transparent operation.
In Architectare-C, functional availability and integrity are
regarded as top.level properties of the avionics suite and
can be achieved by the appropriate interconnecfion of ele-
ments that need not in themselves be as fault tolerant as the
complete system. Fault tolerance in Architectme-C can be
provided by the replication of applir._.ions functions onto
redundant elements at the system, cabinet, and/or LRM
levels. This structure enables dependability to be provided
most cost-effectively for the individual elements of avion-
ics functionality. The design of the fault tolerance is imple-
mented in such a way that the system-level disruption and
recertification effort because of new application programs,
LRMs, or cabinets is minimized. Additionally, because of
the separation of applications from their raw data sources,
Architectme-C supports the conceptof gracefully degrad-
ing system operation in the presence of noncritical faults.
System-level redundancy is achieved by the implementa-
tion of redundant cabinets where applications are repli-
cated across these redundant cabinets. The cabinets may be
dissimilar. The outputs of the replicated applications are
used for failure detection and isolation at the system level.
System-level redundancy is further enhanced through pro-
viding multiple data transfer paths between system ele-
ments by means of redundant ARINC 629 data buses.
Cabinet-level fault tolerance is provided through the repli-
cation of applications functions across redundant LRMs
within a single cabinet. These LRMs may be dissimilar. In
Architecture-C, the LRMs need not be fault tolerant since
replication at cabinet and/or system level is available.
LRM-level fault tolerance may be provided by the
replication of application functions across a single LRM.
These applications may be of dissimilar design and imple-
mentation but targeted to a common processor.
4.3.5.4 ARINC Architecture'D'--Architecture'D pro-
vides a flexible, fault-tolerant avionics architecture that can
be reconfignred. The architecture is physically and logi-
cally distributed. The system architectore is illustrated in
Figure 4-9.
Fault Tolerance Considerations--Each cabinet con-
tains fault-tolerant elements to provide redundancy on the
module and backplane levels so maintenance actions can
be deferred to a scheduled maintenance time and an appli-
cation may be configured.
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Figure 4-9. Architecture.D
After a failure that affects a certain application, the config-
uration of applications at the cabinet level must be reorga-
nized so that theaffectedapplication can continue to oper-
ate properly. This reconfiguration within a cabinet or
between cabinets expands the application lifetime ("fit and
forget" philosophy).
The avionics applications are distributed in the cabinets
based on level of criticality, relationship with other appli-
cations, memory/processing power, location of used
remote systems, and so on.
In Architecture-D, the level of redundancy is determined
by the level of criticality of the application function. It also
requires a certain level of redundancy of data buses to be
considered, depending on the criticality of the data, to
account for integrity of the transferred data.
Fault tolerance can be applied on the cabinet modules, data
bus level (multipath possibilities) by reconfiguration within
and between cabinets. Reconfiguration within and between
the cabinets is employed to defer maintenance actions.
Reconfiguration--Reconfigurability in commercial
architectures is used to improve the fault tolerance of the
architecture. The components in a logically distributed
architecture are able to independently and dynamically
control their operation, rather than being dependent on a
central element controlling their operation. This allows
dynamic reconfigurability in the architecture. In Architec-
ture-D, this feature is used to improve the fault tolerance of
the architecture.
The re,configuration function defers maintenance actions
without jeopardizing the safety aspects. This function is
part of the executive (core processing module). It uses con-
figuration information from the reconfiguration strategy
table, which provides multiple reconfiguration paths to the
executive.
In the case of a processing or application module failure,
this function attempts to reconfigure the affected applica-
tions to other processing modules in the same cabinet or to
other cabinets so there is no performance degradation in
the system.
This technique may be used to reduce processing module
burden. The rcconfiguration function can determine via a
specific table which applications are needed to fulfillthe
intended avionics functions at every moment of flight. Not
every application has to run simultaneously. For example,
there is no need for the wind shear function in the cruise
mode of flight
4.3.5.5 ARINC Architecture-E--Architecture.E is a
combination of a physically centralized and distributed
architecture. Architecture-E also is distributed logically.
The system architecture is illustrated in Figure 4-10.
Because the architecture is highly integrated, the core mod-
ule is shared by several applications. The executive soft-
ware supports multiple applications and invokes strict seg-
regation between application software.
629 Data Bus c9_oa77._
Figure 4-10. Architecture.E
Segregation between applications is achieved by robust
partitioning between application memory space allocation.
Communication between applications themselves and
between applications and health monitoring functions is
performed through executive software services. Each
application will have its own memory space, which is
accessible by the application and the executive through
specific services only.
Fault Tolerance Considerations--To meet the safety
and availability aims for critical functions, software dis-
similarity is applied. For flight-critical functions, hardware
dissimilarity is essential. This means that two different
designs for each module shall be required.
4.3.5.6 Boeing 777 AvionicsArchitecture--The Boeing
777 avionics architecture is a hybrid between a federated
and a fully integrated architecture. The architecture takes
advantage of cabinet integration but maintains a federated
architecture for flight-critical components. The basic archi-
tecture of the Boeing 777 avionics architecture is shown in
Figure 4-11.
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A key subsystem of the 777 avionics architectme is the
AIMS. It consists of two integrated cabinets that are repfi-
cared for redundancy. Each cabinet contains four core pro-
cessing modules, four standard I/O modules and two power
supply modules. Two processing modules have graphics
capability, one provides basic processing functions and one
is dedicated to the F'DDI communication interface. Each
I/O module Im3vides ARINC 629, ARINC 429, analog and
discrete signal interfaces. The AIMS architecture is shown
in Figure 4-12.
Seven primary applications sharing the processor and I/O
resotar.es are implemented in each cabinet. Some applica-
tions, such as displays, are replicated twice in each cabinet,
providing high integrity and availability.
The information transfer system is based on a multiproto-
col communications network and provides avionic
integrity and availability through the use of redundant
ARINC 629 data buses, ARINC 429 buses, Taxi buses, and
FDDI networks to fulfill performance, fault tolerance, and
cost-effectiveness requirements. Communications between
cabinet modules is provided by the SAFEbns TM backplane.
Primary communications between LRUs in the airplane
and the AIMS system is provided by two sets of triple-
redundant ARINC 629 buses: the Fly-by-Wire 629 bus set
and the System 629 bus set. Only the Fly-by-W'tre 629 bus
set connects components that axe critical to aixplane flight,
examples of which are:
• Primary fright control computers,
• Actuator control elements,
• Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU),
• Secondary Attitude Air-Data Reference Unit
(SAARU),
• Air (lala ¢ompuu=" primary flight sensors.
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Other less critical LRUs (radios, printers, and some control
panels) also reside on the System 629 buses.
Gateway and bridge functions are incorporated within the
AIMS. AIMS provides bridges between the Fly-by-Wire
629 bus sets and the System 629 bus sets, and gateways
from 629 buses to other data bus interfaces.
Other data interfaces are incorporated to match subsystem
interface requirements. The FDDI LAN standard provides
high data throughput required by the elecu'onic library and
cabin management portions of the airplane. The FDDI net-
work is defined by the ANSI X3T9.5 F'DDI committee.
The FDDI network, which is presently used in the Space
Station Freedom avionic architecture, provides a fault-tol-
erant high-throughput (100-1Vlbit/s data rate), multinode
(up to 500 network nodes) transmission medium that can
span distances up to 2000 meters.
The ARINC 429 bus is used to maintain compatibility with
some existing equipment that wiU not be redesigned to
incorporate the newer ARINC 629 standard. Similarly,
analog and discrete interfaces support signals from sources
where it is not cost-effective to provide sophisticated data
bus interfaces.
4.3.6 Strawman Architectural Framework
A strawman COTS* architectural framework for Earth to
Orbit (ETO) launch vehicles, Lunar and Mars Transfer
vehicles (LTV/MTV), orbit, and excursion vehicle future
manned missions is presented as a study point-of-depar-
ture baseline. This is shown in Figure 4-13. The frame-
work incorporates Boeing 777 airplane avionic architec-
ture and features; two AIMS cabinets are integral to the
architecture. The framework is intended to replicate Boe-
ing 777/AIMS architecture to the greatest extent, thereby
providing this study a bottoms-up assessment of COTS
utility.
The baseline framework incorporates commercial IMA
system architectural concepts and follows the concepts of
modular network-oriented Pave Pillar and MPRAS azchi-
tectures. The architecture is flexible and accommodates
most types of avionic equipment, inclading equipment
without 629 bus interfaces and/or nonmodular LRUs. The
suawman comprises a number of LRUs and cabinets that
contain equipment to do the bulk of the processing and any
local I/0 to sensors, actuators, and indicators that do not
justify the use of remote electronics.
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Two ARINC 629 bus networks ='¢ incorpom_ wi_in the
arddtecmm. Tbc cabine= am com_ted to one anod_ and
to flight.critical components by way of a fly-by-wire ARINC
629 databus called theFlight-Critical Vehicle Management
networL A second ARINC 629 _ the System 629 lxts
set, called the SystemsData Bus, Wovidcs iatgafaces to
flight-critical functions. ARINC 429 databusesprovid=
point-to-point communications for equipment with existing
429 intgafaces. An FDDI LAN network is available for high-
dsroushpmeJectmnic5brarydisplays,cabinLAN rescue.
maintenance rod/or trainingdata-basemass storage, and
main_ access to the avionics. Several Taxi bus= are
used economically to provide high-speed 100-Mbit/g, one-
way,pad=d _ua mcabin displays.11g Taxibm rtquiresa
much simpler inttaface and less hantware than theFDDI net-
work. which mmsfers data atthe sane rate.
Because the strawman frangwo rkis _,it will be p°ssi"
bit to modify the frameworg to includeother netwod_ and
sut_stems. Ga=ways cm be laovid_ to includc o_a" ne_-
wars suchas, thc Uncar_kca-pessing bm (I-"rPB),_ hig_
speedringt_=O-TSgS),ord_ lVJPR,_hiSh-sPeeddamb=
(HSDB). Established subsys;ems connected via these net-
works can be integratedwithin the COTS* atthitecuae.
i
43.7 Strawman Arckitectural Con_qgumtions
The strawman COTS* architectmes for bunch and uansfer
vehicles are presented to illu.mate application of the point-
of.depmme architecture. The two aschitecmral configura-
tions ase shown in Figures 4-14 and 4-15 for transfer and
an unnumncd bunch vehicle, respecdvely. These configu-
rations represent examples of how a strawman framework
can be modified or adapted for differcat missions or spe-
cific applications. Similar conf'_mrationsmay be dcvcl-
opcdfor orbitings;ations,excursionvehicles,andhabita-
fion modulcs.
The keyfeamrcsallowing useof the COTS+ framework
for the various appfcafions or missioasare asfollows:
• Scalability upward or downward to implement (1)
mote ca"less capabifity and/or performance or (2)
more or fewer networks and/o¢ functions.
• Fault-t_lerantdesigns, faultc.omainmentwithin defined
botmda_, aadtheabititytomaintainsystemintegr_y.
• Effective validation of designsto assgrcthatthe
avionics does not compromise flight safety.
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4.3.7.1 Transfer Vehicle Configuration--The Lunar and
Mars Transfer Vehicle swawman architecture incorporates
several COTS* products described within this study. These
products are identified within a double-boxed COTS label
within Figure 4-14. The configuration is identical to that of
the baseline framework.
43.7.2 Launch Vehicle Configuration--The launch
vehicle strawman architecture requires more interfaces and
subsystems than the baseline framework; additional inter-
faces to monitor and control booster avionics are required.
Fewer functions are required, however, in other areas. The
unmanned launch vehicles do not requite functions related
to manned vehicles; therefore, displays, display interfaces
(FDDD and environmentalcontrolunits(ECUs) need not
be provided.
_iosol-_mo
A booster strawman architecture is represented in Figure
4-15. Physical partitioning of engine controllers to remote
locations within the core vehicle is incorporated. Booster
avionic functions are restricted to health management,
control sensing and actuation, and pyrotechnics.
43.73 Orbital Vehicle Configuration--The orbital vehi-
cle architecture generally will be more complex than that
exemplified by either the launch or transfer vehicle straw-
man configurations.The vehicle may be partitioned into
many avionic station environments, each with several major
syslems within the infaslrucmre. Independent station archi-
tectures may exist, each exhibiting a COTS + architectural
framework in which monitoring, communicating, and con-
Irol between stations may not exist. Interconnected stations.
however, will use the fauh tolerance features of the COTS +
architecture to communicate in a fail-safe manner.
4.3.8 Architectural Partitioning
The strawman architectures are physically partitioned to
separale and place all COTS+ components in environments
within their environmenlal operating ranges. This favor-
able juncture is realizable because of the study premise that
changes to either the vehicle, architecture, and/or compo-
neat requirements will be made to ensure the integration of
COTS + products within space avionics. It is also possible
because the COTS + architecture allows physically dis-
tributed components and equipment.
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Physical partitioning of the transfer vehicle architecture is
illustrated in Figure 4-16. Almost all COTS + prodt_ts are
grouped and located within a common environment: this
can be an easily accessible, controlled-environment equip-
merit bay adjacent w the fright deck. The COTS + INS,
however, must be mounted at specified locations. To
accommodate the INS, either the environment around it
must be conlrolled or the product must be modified to
function at its required location.
4.4 Data Networking
4.4.1 Introduction
The spacecraft data communications environment is a
highly specialized communication network that manages
the flow of data from multiple sources and/or sensorsin
real time. This dam is handled at the priority needed to
ensme safe, reliable spaceraft operation.
Commercial aircraft data link protocols are based on the
Open System interconnect (OSI) reference model and are
used to facilitate interprocess communication among a
_IUl
m
m
m
m
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varietyofcomputingelementsconnectedtodifferentdata
buses, LANs, and other communication media. Typical
data sources include, but are not limited to, Satellite (Sat-
Corn), Mode S Transponder, and Aviation VHF Packet
Communication (AVPAC) equipment. These systems com-
municate with ground-base.A and space-base, d communica-
tion systems that are part of a global communications net-
work. Collectively, this system of communication is
referred to as the Aeronautical Telecommunications Net-
work (ATN).
An effective data networking concept ensures interoper-
ability of communication among user systems. Messages
can originate from one cad system and be directed to
another end system, such as fi'om a spacecraft ccatral
maintenance system to a central maintenance facility thou-
sands of miles apart, while being muted via a variety of
physical links, with complete Iransparency to the end
users.
This subsection provides design guidance for the assess-
mcat, development, and use of commercial protocols
required to exchange digitized data in a spacecraft OSI
environment.The OSI referencemodel providesvarious
functionsand servicesforcommunication among differcat
systems.COTS + IMA-based systemsprovidea Irans-
parcacyofOSI protocols,includingitsfunctionsand sex-
vicestotheuserand applicationprogrammers.
4.4.2 Networking
The amount of communication between spacecraft avionic
systems and space/ground facilities as well as between var-
ious onboard avionics systems is ever increasing. A vital
design aim for COTS + IMA-based systems is to make the
interconnection mechanism transparent to the cad users. To
achieve user wansparency, standard procedures must be
followed when implementing the protocol needed for inter-
connecting two networks.
Intemetworking in the ATN environment, where different
computer networks are interconnected using OSI protocols,
is ensured by compliance with ISO 8208. This ISO stan-
dard ensures intcroperability of different computer net-
works. The application of OSI networking principles saris-
ties the following objectives:
• Meet the communication needs of equipment with
different levels of performance;
• Allow transition of technology;
• Provide growth, capability, and interchangeability;
• Interconnect with existing networks exterior to the
aircraft;
• Provide communications strictures consistent with
the consu'aints of fault tolerance and dispamhability.
4.4.3 Examples of Data Networking
The high level of integration within the COTS + IMA sys-
tem requires communication between various spacecraft
systems and their subsystems. Some systems that depend
on each other or are located in the sanle area naturally form
a networkgroup.These groupsareconnectedtoothersys-
tems ina networkedgroup orindividually,which resultsin
a need for an intercounection mechanism between these
networks. A number of interconnection methods are used,
depcadingon thecharacteristicsofthenetworkstobe
interconnected.
4.4.3.1 The Repeater Function--A repeater is the sim-
plest mechanism for extending the geographical bound-
aries of similar computer networks. Its function is to
receive a message and then retransmit it, regenerating the
signal at its original s_'cagth.
4.4.3.2 The Bridge Function_A bus bridge interconnects
physically distinct networks having different physical layers
but a common data link and upper layers. The bridge
receives all messages on each computer network of which it
isapan.The destinationaddressofthereceivedmessageis
checked by the bridge, and when a message intended for a
station in a different network is recognized, the bridge wans-
mits the message on that network. The bridge connection
implementsa store-and-forwardfunction,sincemessages
are temporarily stored in the bridge and then forwarded to
another network. Within LANs, a bridge is also capable of
resolving any frame format or other differences between the
two media accesscontrolmethods.Only thephysicaland
data link layers arc needed to connect similar buses.
4.4.33 ]'he Router Function--The router interconnects
computer networks that have different physical and data
link layers but have a common protocol for the network
and upper layers. The function of the router is to direct the
message through intermediate nodes. Two addresses must
accompany messages sent through intermediate nodes. The
first is the address of the final destination node, which
remains constant as the message Iraverses the network, and
the second is the address of the next node along the route.
The second address changesas themessage moves from
node to node along the route it takes through the network.
4.4.3.4 The Gateway Function--The gateway function
resides at the highest level of internetworking. The gate-
way provides the flexibility needed to interconnect com-
puter networks with completely different architectures and
different protocols. Typical functions of the gateway
include:
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• Message format protocol,
• Address wanslation,
• Protocol conversion.
All layers of the OSI protocol are required to provide intex-
connection for the applications.
4.5 Fault Tolerance
#.5.1 Introduction
The COTS + architecture should be implemented to take
full advantage of fault-tolerant design. Fault tolerance is
the ability of equipment to provide its function and to con-
tinue operation in a defined manner after one or more
faults have occurred. A fault may be the failure of a hard-
ware component or a defect in the implementation of the
design in hardware or software. Continued operation spans
the range of performance from full operation of all func-
tions to various defined levels of degraded operation.
Fault-tolerant concepts have been developed to meet the
need for high reliability, and airlines have recognized its
potential for enabling avionics maintenance to be per-
formed on a scheduled basis. If a module, or a function in a
module, fails in a fault-tolerant system, the system can
automatically reconfigure to accommodate the failure and
then continue satisfactory operation until a scheduled
maintenance opportunity, at which time the faulty module
can be rei_! or replaced.
Three processes need to take place for fault tolerance to be
achieved: first, he fault needs to be detected; second, the
faulty component need to be identified and isolated; and
third, system resources must be reconfignved to eliminate
adverse operational fault effects.
The desire for a function to be fault tolerant significandy
affects equipment design. To continue operating, either
resource redundancy or a hierarchy of tasks must be sacri-
riced. Monitors and switching mechanisms are also
required to recognize faults and provide a reconfiguration
path.
4.5.2 Application
Two distinct goals may be achieved by designing a fault-
tolerant function; both goals are COTS + objectives. One
goal relates to the dependability issue of how to provide
operational integrity such thatflight-critical functions will
be performed safely. The other is to provide sufficient
equipment availability to receive an economic benefit from
deferred maintenance. These goals are quite diverse in their
objective and will influence how the fault-tolerant design
should be implemented. The influence of these two goals
on design are discussed in Subsections 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.2.
The specification of requirements for an avionics function
establishes, when necessary, the desire for fault tolerance
and the extent to which it should be achieved. Generally, it
is necessary to specify allowable modes of degraded opera-
tion, that which constitutesfailure ofthe function, and the
time interval within which faults are expected to be
absorbed without reaching functional failure.
#.5.2.1 Functional Integrity---When a function is
required to possess high integrity in its operational perfor-
mance, several factors, discussed below, are impommt.
A single fault must not be allowed to cause a functional
failure that creates a potential hazard. This applies to hard-
ware failures throughout the system, from its sensors and
data sources, through its computations, to its actuators and
annunciations. This also applies to the potential for defects
in the design of software-implemented functions.
The monitoring must provide sufficient coverage of the
equipment circuitry to ensure that no failure that might
lead to a hazard can escape detection. The ability of the
monitors to perferm their intended functionand cause
reconfiguration of the system cannot be compromised by
the fault itself.
Sequences involving multiple faults are considered analyti-
cally to establish that the potential for an undetected haz-
ardous situation is sufficiently remote. This combines con-
siderations of failure rate, detection coverage, and
exposure time. (Exposure time is the interval of operation
since the function was last confirmed to be free of faults.)
The induslry-accepted standard for the integrity of a sys-
tem performing flight.critical functions is that the probabil-
ity of a hazard resulting from total functional failure be
extremely remote. Achieving these low probabilities
depends on low failure rates, high monitor coverage, and
short exposure times.
Once the responsibility for continuedsafe operation has
been vested in a system, thee shall b¢ assurance that the
integrity required is in fact achieved. This is accomplished
throughverification te_ng to show that the implementa-
tion meets the specification over the range of anticipated
operational conditions and environments.
4.523 Fu_tional Amilabilir.c.--If the purpose of design"
ing a fault-tolerant function is economic advantage, a dif-
ferent set of factors influence the design.
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High-availabilityequipment is designed to sustain multiple
faults and continue to operate. It does not necessarily need
to be completelyfreefrom defects.Inthistype ofequip-
ment,a singlefaultdisablingafunctionorsome undetected
faultscan be tolerated,providingtheydo notoccuroften.
The implementation will be judged primarily on the eco-
nomic tradeoff between acquisition cost and crew work-
loads. The desired duration of continued service and
acceptable levels of degraded performance must be speci-
fied, just as for the high-integrity case.
4.53 Design Considerations
Fault tolerance can be achieved by a wide array of hard-
ware and/or software design techniques. For hardware, the
basic approach is to check the correctness of input and out-
put signals and multiple processors of the same or different
types. For software, a similar approach uses multiple, pos-
sibly different, versions of code to perform the same func-
tion and, again, the outputsarecompared orvoted.
The design of a fault-tolerant function is guided by a set of
specifications stating integrity and availability goals. These
requirements are just as relevant as the operational perfor-
mance of the equipment.
The specification of fault tolerance is conveyed by several
distinct parameters. Several are listed below; others may
exist, depending on the nature of the function being
defined. These parameters must be defined for COTS +
future manned missions. The following functions are
required:
• The desired acceptable operation after a fault for
each mode of normal operation.
• Functional failure staled in terms of lack of capabil-
ity below some minimal level.
• The tolerable risk of functional failure resulting from
a single faulL
The system reaction time to detect a fault and
accomplish reconfiguration.
The tolerable risk of functional failure resulting from
a combination or sequence of faults.
The mission time over which the function is
expected to absorb faults and continue to provide its
intended operation.
4.53.1 High.lntegrity Data--As equipment resources
expire, the integrity margin of continued operations dimin-
ishes. These factors are conslraints on the design of the
performing the primary functions of the equipment.
Some form of functional redundancy must be chosen to
provide the ability to continue operation in the presence of
a fault. This is necessary if there is a requirement to sur-
vive any single fault and if most or all of the functional
capability must be maintained. The COTS + quad channel
and AIMS architecture provides this redundancy.
Isolation of resources is also necessary. The various redun-
dam components must operate independently of one
another. The monitor of a function must also operate inde-
pendently of the function itself. This independence shall be
such that no normal, abnormal, or failure event can create a
common effect in the redundant resources or in a function
and its monitor. The Boeing 777 AIMS architecture and
theMPRAS cross-channel comparators/voters provide the
needed isolation.
The monitoring must be highly effective. It needs to pro-
vide coverage of all the operational components and be
capable of detecting all hazardous failures. It must periodi-
cally be exercised to ensure that it is capable of both
detecting anomalous behavior and communicating to the
reconfiguration mechanism.
The implementation of a high-integrity function must meet
its operational performance requirements and its fault-tol-
erant design specifications with the assurance that design
defects are acceptably remote. This implies that the design
needs to fulfill its intended function and be free of any
unintended function. Such validation is accomplished
through a combination of testing and analysis of the equip-
ment to establish proof of correctness.
When equipment resources expire, the crew is informed
that even though the function is performing all intended
operations, the risk of functional failure has increased, and
the crew may need to operate with limitations or initiate
maintenanceaction.
There is a question of how much information, if any, is
needed to inform the crew that the fault-tolerant system has
automatically reconfigured to accommrglate faults. The con-
cem is that the crew should be aware when the system is one
or two failures away from reversion to emergency procedures
so they can be prepared to assume control or institute fail_fe
prccedures. On the other hand, continuously lit caution lights
or continuously displayed caution flags or messages soon
lose their effectiveness.
When equipment remains in service and accumulates
faults, it will gradually degrade. At some point, the space-
craft cannot be launched, if on the launching pad, or con-
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tinue assured operation, and maintenance becomes neces-
sary. Preferably maintenance will be performed at a conve-
nient time prior to ultimate functional failure. For mainte-
nance to be effective, the accumulated, but masked to
normal operation, failures must be visible to the mainte-
nance crew. This implies that fault history is maintained
and that mtenvgation capability is included in the imple-
mentation. Once history is provided, there will be a means
of updating the history when the equipment is partially or
fully restored.
Many systems contain functions with varying integrity
requirements. Whenever functions of differing integrity arc
combined in a system, the equipment needs to be utated
according to the highest level of integrity. An exception to
this can be achieved through partitioning of the resources
and functions according to levels of integrity. If functional
partitioning is employed, it must be managed by resources
of the highest integrity in the system.
4.5.3.2 High Availability Design--Similar to the high-
integrity function, the implementation of equipment speci-
fied to achieve high operational availability has unique fac-
tors. These factors are constraints on the design of the
resources performing the primary operational functions.
Equipment redundancy is applied to increase availability.
In the COTS + architecture it is essential; however, if the
function is not involved in any flight-critical application,
task shedding may also be useful. With task shedding, as
resources expire due to failures, the services performed by
the equipment are reduced in a specified manner to con-
centrate the remaining resources on the most desirable
operations.
If total functional failure is not hazardous, the extra effort
required to ensure isolation of redundant resources is not
necessary; however, it is good design practice to isolate a
monitor from the function being monitored.
Monitor effectiveness is robust to significantly improve
availability. However, minor lapses of coverage and unde-
tected failure to an insensitive state may not detract from
the availability achieved.
Since improved functional availability is the main goal,
maximizing the MTBF of the equipment is one implemen-
tation strategy. This implies the need to keep complexity to
a minimum while creating as many success paths as possi-
ble, which in turn allows a wadeoff to be made between
failure rate and level of redundancy. For very reliable
devices, a single implementation maY be chosen, applying
redundancy only to selected components that do not have
inherently high reliability. The COTS + architecture mini-
mizes complexity with its quad channel implementation
and applies redundancy to its modular components.
4.5.4 Implementation Technique
COTS+ equipment is composed of both hardware and soft-
ware resources. The fault-tolerant enhancements, like the
operational characteristics of the function, are distributed
between these resources. Hardware and software are used
to complement one another in performing fault detection,
identification and reconfiguration.
4.5.4.1 Hardware Implementation Techniques--Hard-
ware fault tolerance is achieved by a variety of means. The
specific avionics application influences the methods used.
The following paragraphs describe typical COTS÷ hard-
ware techniques that conu'ibute to a fault-tolerant configu-
ration. Technique topics discussed are:
• Input and output checking
• Computational performance monitoring
• Partitioning
• Mid-value select
• Plurality voting
• Redundancy
• Dissimilar hardware
• Monitoring
• Reconfiguralion
• Fault tolerance renewal
Input Checking--Reasonableness checksareusedfor
single-input sources to determine if their signal falls within
prescribed limits before it is passed to the computation pro-
cess. Comparison is used when two inputs are available.
The two inputs are compared, and if different by more than
some preset value, the inputs are rejected and the computa-
tion uses previously obtained inputs. For three or more
inputs, the inputs are voted and the majority or middle
value is used.
If invaiid inputs continue, the input source is considered to
have failed and alternative input sources are invoked.
Computational Performance Monitoring---Computa-
tional performance is monitored through watchdog timers
and self-checking pairs (SCPs). Watchdog timers monitor
the execution time. If the time exceeds a prescribed limit,
the processor is taken off line for diagnostic testing. If the
processor passes the diagnostic testing, it is reconnected to
the system. SCPs provide bit-for-bit comparison of two
paired signals. If the SCP signals or data do not match,
both sources are considered faulty.
Alternatively, different versions of software, usually with
reduced execution time and computational capability,
could be used.
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Output Checking--Output checking is also used in
fault-tolerant systems. Like single inputs, output from a
single processor is subjected to reasonableness checks. For
a pair of processors, the outputs are compared in a manner
similar to that for input comparison. If the outputs do not
match, both processors are disconnected and diagnostically
tested to identify the faulty processor, if any, before being
reconnected to the system. For several processors, the out-
puts arc voted and the majority value is passed on through
the system. The processor(s) producing the rejected out-
put(s) are taken off line for diagnostic checking.
Partitioning--Partitioning, the physical and system-
atic separation of functions, is used to limit fault propaga-
tion throughout the system and therefore reduce the proba-
bility of system failure. Partitioning also minimizes system
test effort and the time needed to perform hardware and/or
software modifications.
Mid-value Select--Mid-value select is a simple algo-
rithm for enabling a system to tolerate a single fault in any
information source whenever the system has three or more
.sources of the same information. The basic technique is to
ignore the maximum and minimum values of any input
parameter. The remaining values is within an acceptable
tolerance, assuming no more than one failure. This
approach also provides some probability of tolerating two
failures, especially ff it is combined with reasonableness
tests or if there are more than three sources of information.
If two or more redundant input sources have passed rea-
sonableness checks, the average (mid-value) signal is used
if no other condition dominates the selection of either the
highest or lowest value.
Plurality Voting--Plurality voting is a technique for
enabling a system with at least triple redundancy to tolerate
single output faults. If all redundant outputs are summed,
and if all outputs have limited authority, a system can be
designed so that the sum will always have the correct
value, no matter what the value any one failed output
takes. Like the mid-value select technique, plurality voting
can also tolerate certain classes of double faults.
Redundancy--Hardware redundancy is essential since
hardware elements expire due to failures over time--espe-
cially over thedurationofextendedordeep-spacemis-
sions.Unfortunately,ashardwareisadded tocreateredun-
dancy,fileoverallsystemfailureratealsoincreases.For
high-integrityfunctions,thisisa necessarycostofprovid-
ingtheservice.
Assuming that the same level of technology is employed, a
fault-tolerant implementation has a lower mean time to
first failure than a non-fault-tolerant design due to the
added number of parts. Whether this complication can be
offset in terms of cost and utility is usually determined by
the system designer. The COTS + maintenance concept cir-
cumvents this complication.
Well-established mathematical models and formulas pre-
dict the improvement in availability using multiple compo-
nents with a given reliability. They show a definite limit on
the benefit to be gained by adding redundant elements. The
COTS + philosophy will be to circumvent this limit by pro-
vidingcoldspareCOTS + components toreplacefailed
redundantelements.Furtherdiscussionofthisconceptis
providedinSubsection3.4,Testabilityand Maintainability.
Wherever redundant circuits are used or data from redun-
dam sources is processed, isolation must provided. The
benefit of the multiple resources may not be realized if a
single event or failure has the same effect on several or all
of the circuits. This can allow the equipment to misbehave
if the monitoring is unable to detect such events.
Analytical redundancy is sometime used to replace failed
sensors in fault-tolerant systems. In the case of a sensor
failure, algorithms can use data from remaining sensors to
compute a probable signal from the failed sensor. The com-
puted signal is then treated as a valid input by the rest of the
system. Similarly, in the case of a flight control actuator
failure, the remaining actuators and control laws can be
automatically reconfigured to compensate for the failure.
Dissimilar Hardware--For functions that must oper-
atewith high integrity, implementation using dissimilar
hardware is considered a means of protection from certain
types of design defects. Such configurations have unique
benefits as well as liabilities.
Dissimilar implementation may be the only method of
avoiding common mode faults in redundant circuits that
result from or are aggravated by design defects. Faults may
be more easily detected by simple monitors, and the poten-
tial hazard of latent faults is reduce.&
The level of effort necessary to create a dissimilar imple-
mentation has several added liabilities. The most obvious
is the multiplication of development costs and efforts for
the design of multiple circuits and their associated verifica-
tion. Each different version must be demonstrated to have
complete operational capability. More subtle is the need to
verify the dissimilarity itself. If the function is to derive
protection from the presence of dissimilarity, that dissimi-
larity needs to be proven and shown to be without any
opportunity for common mode faults.
Monitoring--Generally, monitors fall into three cate-
gories: paired comparison, which is the comparison of
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pairs of pngesses; absolute comparison, or the comparison
of a parameter relative to a fixed threshold; and detection
of an cvenL Each monitor must be implemented wilh a
level of integrity consistent with the function being
observed. This can mean either that the monitor be fail-
safe or rcplicatod to ensure that detection occurs.
Monitors implemented in hardware typically are dedicated
to the specific circuit being observed. However, hardware-
implemented mcaito_ can also observe the performance of
software-implemented functions. In addition to detecting
an event or an exceeded level, the monitor should also
communicate the abnomml state. This may be done via an
interrupt to a processing resource, a flag that is passively
interrogated by sttother lXOCeSs,a uigger for reconfigura-
lion, of an annunciation fo¢ the orew to resolve.
Reconfigm,atlon.--Reconfigtaw/mn is the process or
of changing the agrlve re,soulw,_ with/n the equipmenL
Examples of hardwan_ reconfqluration devices are voters,
reset pulses, interrupts, and dam steering switches. When
implemented in hardware, these reccnfiguralion devices
generally are dedicated to specific single parameters of
dam paths. This is a necessary comp_misc due to the com-
plexiW of these types of circuRs.
Once reconfig, uratice has taken place, the equipment oper-
ates at a lower level of dcpendabili_. A failu_ has been
absod_ by the system, and it may not have thc ability to
m'mth_ similar faulL Careful consideration must be
given to returning to the original system state. A balance
between gecovez'ing from transient faults and retaining pro-
toction from new possible failures within the reco_gut_
state must be implemented.
Fault Tolerance Renewal--Fauh tolerance renewal is
an event that establishes that a component is fault free to
some conf_nce level. The mathematics of predicting fail-
ure pmbabilit/es provide _ from the last point of
fault tolemmce renewal.
If no method isavailable to ensure thata component is
faultfree,theexposure_ grows to infinity and _ prob-
ability of a failm_ approaches unity. Fault tolerance
retgwal _ may be included in the equipment to
detect otherwise latent faults, thereby limiting exposun_
times and reducing hazard probabilities.
Fault toler_ce renewal can be accomplished by scheduled
seif-te_ periodic maintenance inspection of w_. on-condi-
tion maint_ncc t_t,ofoxiginMmanufacturingtest.Each
of these techniques provides a limiton thee_posu_ time.
All the hardware elements of the equipment need their
exposure time established to compute hazard probabilities.
The COTS +usesCMC and integrated health maintenam_
to minimize exposure time and ensure, with a high proba-
bility, that a component is fault free.
4.5.4.2 Software Implementalion Techniques--Software
does not wear out and, therefore, does not have a failure
rat_ as a function of operating time. The concern with soft-
ware is the possibility of design defects. More sophisti-
cated systems lend to vest their complexity in the software
implementation. This, in turn, increases the potential for
residual design defects, even after cxl_nsive vetif'_
and validation testing. The applic_on of fault tolemnc_ to
software implementation attempts to neutralize the effects
of any residual design defects.
The paragraphs below describe typical COTS + software
techniques that can contribu_ to a fmdt-tolerant coni'_ra-
tion. The topics of N-version proganuning, recovery
blocks, consensus, exception handlers, monitoring, recon-
figuration, and fault tolexance renewal are discussed.
N.Ver_on Programm/ng--N-version programming is
a widely used fault-tolerant software technique. In this
approach to fault Iole_nce, two of more versions of soft-
ware ate developed indepeadently to accomplish the same
rusk and to a common specif'w.adon. Tlw_ vetsiom can bc
sequentially run oe the same _ howevex, g_Y
they are run in parallel on separate processors and, fie"
quendy, as an added fault tolcz'ancc measure, on different
types of _ Tlg outputs arc then votcd and the
most probable value is passed to the system.
To be effective, each diffca'cnt software vez'sion must be
completely vcgified. Oth_, the residual cswors may not
be small, and the function may suffer fx_quent reductions
in integrity and availabih'ty as the errors axe dctectccL Due
to the cost, N-venion Wogtmmning should only be consid-
ered for functions with the highest integnty requirements.
If N-venion wogtanuning or any form of dissimilar _lun-
dancy is used as a means of protecting a function fn_n
design defects, the schievement of disshnilatity needs to be
ccadirmed. Studies have indicated that similar errors can
occur in different program versions, pn_umably due to
specifgation ambiguities or complexities.
Recovery BIockt--The simplest form of fault-tolerant
software is recovery blocks. In this approach to fault toler-
ance, the output of lhe code is mbjected to m acceptance
chec_ If it fails, the same code can be t_cxccuted; alterna-
tively, diff¢_nt versions of code can be executed until an
acceptable output is obtained. If no _,ceptable output is
obtained, the software is assumed to have failed.
The corn:eros with recovery blocks are the additional exe-
cutim/te-executioa time, the integrity of the acceptance
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test, and the storage of the input for repeated computations
until recovery is successful.
Consensus--A third fault-toleram software technique
is consensus, which blends features of both N-version pro-
gramming and recovery blocks. The output of N-versions
are compared, and if two or more agree, the output is
passed to the system. If no two versions agree, the outputs
of each version, beginning with the most capable, are suc-
cessively tested until an acceptable output is found. If no
acceptable output is found, the software is declared failed.
Although N-version software is widely used in flight-criti-
cal systems, it may not always be the proper approach. An
alternative view is that if the resources needed to develop
N-versions of code were applied to the careful design and
complete validation of a single version, the single version
would be preferred.
Exception Handlers--Fault-tolerant software also
includes exception handlers for invalid operations, such as
dividing by zero or computing the tangent of 90 degrees.
Monitoring--Many of the monitor functions found in
hardware are also appropriate for software implementation.
In addition, software programming allows complex bound-
ary value and parameter reasonableness checking.
Software monitors confirm that the program is executing
properly by performing sequence and timing checks. In
addition, an independent means of assuring valid central
processing unit (CPL0 operation is necessary for high-
integrity applications. This is provided by using a combina-
tion of hardware- and software-implemented functions.
Software monitors are also used to confirm proper opera-
don of the hardware functions. Such techniques as wrap-
ping outputs back to the input plane, tracer signals on data
paths, and periodic diagnostic routines are capable of
achieving high levels of monitor coverage.
Reconfiguration--As with monitoring, software pro-
gramming allows more sophisticated reconfiguration func-
tions than are possible with hardware. Signal select algo-
rithms can be applied to a large number of parameters
using mid-value or weighted vote for acceptance. Equal-
ization between sources can provide compliance for time
skew or system tolerances. In addition to signal steering,
processes can be activated or suspended. Exception han-
dlers can be created to provide unique programming or
execute in response to specific events. Data may be reini-
tialized for a repeat attempt at execution.
Fault Tolerance Renewal---Since software does not
wear out, fault tolerance renewal is not necessary. Software
is assumed to continue to provide its intended function
indefinitely.
There is a tendency for software to degrade daring the
course of modifications and corrections. This is character-
ized by errors appearing after modification in areas of the
program that were not intended to be changed.
Therefore, it is essential that proper attention be given to
the verification of each extrapolated version of an existing
software program.
4.5.5 Role of Monitors Displays
Typical fault-tolerant systems require that a very high per-
centage of possible faults be detected and identified. Meet-
ing these goals calls for careful design of the built-in test
equipment (BITE), the tests it executes, and the reporting
mechanism. BITE design should be based on the results of
a fault tree analysis and/or a failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA).
4.6 Software Architecture
4.6.1 General
The functionality of the COTS + avionics system is pro-
vided by a Common Application Software Environment
that offers greater flexibility for functional enhancement.
Application software development costs are likely to domi-
nate the cost of ownership for COTS +, and it is therefore
necessary to make use of modem methods of design,
implementation, and test to manage those costs.
Existing avionics software is traditionally packaged with
the hardware as a complete, operating avionic system. This
association is being changed in future subsystems. COTS +
software may conceivably be produced by a party other
than the hardware supplier:, therefore, the method of
procuring avionic software is likely to change. This will
result in new business opportunities for traditional avionics
manufacturers, software developers, and others who have
yet to do business with primes. It is expected to be advan-
tageous to users and suppliers and eventually to reduce
avionic system cost.
Because application software development costs are likely
to dominate the cost of ownership for COTS +, minimizing
this cost is the main driver for the standardization
described herein. However, there are additional standard-
ization benefits, such as the reuse of reliable verified soft-
ware developed in other COTS + applications.
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Softwareapplicationsareonlyoneofmanyfunctional ele-
ments of the COTS + architecture that offers a building-
block approach. For the software building-block approach
to be successful, a common application software environ-
merit is necessary that is consistent with both system and
hardware architecture.
4.6.2The SoftwareArchitecture
The COTS* AIMS/IMA software architecture performs a
key role in achieving COTS* goals. Components of the
software architecture are:
Application software that performs the avionic func-
tions.
Core software that provides a standard and common
environment in which application software executes.
The core software is further partitioned into:
A COTS* operating system (OS) that manages
logical responses to applications demands. OS
functions include allocating processing time,
coordinating communications channels, and man-
aging memory resources. The OS function maps
application requests to system-level logical mech-
anisms and provides uniform logical interfaces m
the applications. The system health monitoring
function within the OS initiates error recovery or
re.configuration strategies that perform a specific
recovery action.
A hardware interface system (HIS) that manages
physical hardware resources on behalf of the
operating system. The HIS maps logical requests
made by the resources and assures fault contain-
ment within the physical boundaries of the hard-
ware.
The software forming the HIS maps the particular
implementation of hardware onto the operating
system. This software is unique to the hardware
implementation. ALso at this level are BITE and
BIT functions that are also unique to a particular
hardware implementation, as ate any hardware-
level fault-containment mechanisms.
Hardware provides the physical means of access
to the COTS* system via the backplane bus,
together with the memory management and other
partitioning functions, which ensure that applica-
tions cannot interfere with either each other or the
operating system.
COTS* software will be loadable onboard space vehicles.
This feature will be transparent to the application software.
This function will be implemented using small blocks of
code with well-defined interfaces. Proper attention is paid
to software reliability, maintainability, modif'mbility, and
certifiability for the code design.
4.6.3Benef_
The benefits of providing a common application software
environment include the following:
• Multiple independently produced applications may
run togetheron thesame hardware.
• The standard interface decouples hardware changes
from software changes.
• Possible verification cost reduction by segregation of
verification into independentprocessesassociated
with:
- Hardware,
- Applications software.
- The interfacing software or operating system.
• Software portability is improved.
• Development test equipment may be standardized.
• The costofownershipofsoftwareisreduced.
4.6.4 Language
COTS + software is written in Ada. AEEC has adopted Ada
as the standard high-order language (HOL). The features of
Ada recommended for use in real-time avionics applica-
tions are documented in ARINC Report 613, "Guidance
for Using the Ada Programming Language in Avionic Sys-
tems." Ada and modem design techniqueswill be applied
to create software in modular form that allows applications
to be partitioned to minimize the impact ofsoftware
changes.
The COTS + operating system presents the compiler with a
uniform interface m hardware resources in logicalrather
thanhardwareform.The generationofAda run-timesys-
tems isthereforegreatlysimplified.Although theoperating
systemoffersclearbenefitstotheAriacompilerinterface,
the interface need not be constrained to Ada, and as future
languages emerge, they may be used just as effectively.
4.6.5 Software Functions
The software functions applicable to a COTS + core proces-
sor arC"
4-.4O
• Applicationsoftware,
• Operating system software.
All data flow bctweexl the core hardware and applications
is cona-olled via the operating system through smndardiz_
interfaces. The goal is to de.couple the applications from
the hardware.
4.6.6Interfaces
Software interfaces are standardized in the form of ARINC
specifications. The interfaces are:
• APEX_the applications/executive interface.
• COEX--the core hardware and I-HS/executive inter-
face.
The APEX interface completely defines the common envi-
ronment for the applications. To achieve a common envi-
ronment, the APEX interface requires rigorous definition.
Application programs communicate with the executive via
this standard interface. APEX consists primarily of system
procedure calls. This executive interface specification will
be adhered to for all application software that uses the
APEX interface.
The COEX interface defines the higher level functions
making up the operating system and the lower level hard-
ware-specific functions. A health monitoring recovery
strategy table is defined within the operating system.
The primary aim is to provide a common environment for
application software through the standard interface, APEX.
A secondary aim is to provide another interface, COEX,
between the operating system and the low-level primitives
that map the functions onto the physical hardware. Such a
feature allows the applications to be integrated with the
operating system on general-purpose computers, where the
interface COEX would be tailored to that environment and
would provide a suitable medium for simulation. Given a
rigorous definition of APEX, it will also be possible to
integrate and test applications on a general-purpose com-
puter that simulates the APEX interface: It will be possible
to host a variety of applications without modifying the
operating system.
4.6. 7 Applications Software
The applications software is software that performs a spe-
cific avionics function.
4.6.7.1 Software Integrity---In COTS +, the method and
level of redundancy, fault detection, fault isolation, and
reconfiguration (FDIR) is transparent to the application
software. Application FDIR software is only responsible
for the redundancy management of a specific function and
for signal selection and failure monitoring of inputs from
external sensors or other systems.
Modular software design enables the implementation of
software partitions to isolate avionic_ functions within a
common hardware envimnmenL Application software will
be independent of hardware. Some software modules may
be developed by independent sources and integrated into
the cabinet. Therefore, it is necessary for software within a
partition to be completely isolated from other partitions so
that one partition cannot cause a fault in another partition.
The application software is specified, developed, and veri-
fied to the level of criticality appropriate to its system
function. Regardless of the level of criticality, applications
must be partitioned from each other.
To ensure partition integrity, partition load images will be
statically and separately builL They will stand alone as
independent program modules, with no interdependencies
with other program modules. The partition code can be
used to change process scheduling attributes and thus alter
the execution or state of a process within that partition. In
this way the integrity of one application is not compro-
mised by the behavior of another application, whether the
other application is deemed more or less crifcal.
Allcommunications between applications will be per-
formed through the operating system, whose mechanisms
ensure that there is no violation of that interface and that
no application either monopolizes a resource or leaves
another permanently suspendedawaiting an inter'applica-
tion request.
4.6.7.2 Input and/or Output (I10) Control--In tradi-
tional applications development, I/O handling is one sig-
nificant area that is very specific to the spacecraft configu-
ration of sensors. In the interest of portability and reuse,
the partitioning of the applications software architecture
will identify the spacecraft-specific I/O software and parti-
tion it from the functional and algorithmic elements of the
application. Such sensor I/O conditioning is logically
placed as a separate function associated with the sensor.
Furthermore, the COTS + aplxoach encourages the integra-
tion of intelligence within sensors and actuators. In such
cases, the sensor I/O conditioning is physically placed with
the sensor. The network architecture of COTS + also allows
this conditioning function to be physically decoupled from
the sensor, and it may be physically placed in either the
sensor or actuator itself, within a remote data concentrator,
or within the cabinet. This method also provides more
cost-effective management of sensor data since the data
emanating from any sensor manager performing I/O condi-
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tioning is available to more than one application. Replica-
tion of this sensor data function in each application is
avoided, with savings in critical processing loads. This
method also allows for sensor fusion, sensor dam extrapo-
lation from alternative source types in the event of failure,
and, most importantly, local fault-containment strategies.
The characteristics of sensor managers are determined by
application needs and hardware capability. It is necessary
to specify parameters that define the update rate, fusion,
and conversion from raw data to engineering data and error
handling.
The use of ARINC 629-compatible sensors or logical I/O
conditioning has an important effect on the form of the
data appearing on the network and the interfaces to func-
tions that employ them. The use of ARINC 629-compatible
sensors allows data to be made available on the network in
logical form rather than raw signal form. In addition, the
interfaces to functions are defined as logical data inter-
faces, and this has far-reaching implications in terms of
ARINC characteristics. In a networked environment with
logical data on the network, an approach other than a black
box approach at a physical level is needed to defme func-
tional characteristics. In the COTS+ concept, software
interfaces replace physical interfaces.
The provision of a generalized mechanism allows further
decoupling of application software from spacecraft configu-
ration specifics and hardware implementation. Most appli-
cations require functional data at specific rates. The design.
feature of applications that ties them specifically to a parac-
ularspacecraft system is the sensor handling. The removal
of this function from the appfication increases portability,
and, furthermore, itconcenwates the sensor handling in a
single area, allowing sensor data with specifg: characteris-
tics to be available to mote than one application.
The impact of change in sensor characteristics is confined
to sensor data managers, thereby increasing portability and
reuse of application software.
4.6.7.3 Managenwnt_The application software is
invoked by the scheduling component of the operating sys-
tem in a deterministic manner. The frequency and priority
of scheduling required for cyclic applications will be
defined to the operating system via a data block within the
process list data structure.
Applications will invoke APEX interface procedures for
purposes including, but not limited to:
• Initial resource allocation requests (e.g., memory
allocation);
• Communication requests.
An application may or may not wish to monitor resource
response at each communication. For those communica-
tions it wishes to monitor directly, thc application may
specify a status area corresponding to the resource channel,
thus allowing the operating systemto respond to events.
In providing these facilities, the operating system manages
resource allocation and arbiwadonin this multiprogram-
ruing environment.
Software interruptsor events relevant to the applications
are passed on to the application by the operating system.
Other interruptsare handled by the operating system alone.
These software interrupts are notvectored directly to the
application but cause a specified interruptprocess embed-
ded within the application to be scheduled. Alternatively, a
flag is set in the interruptprocess message area that may be
monitored by the application.
Applications are constrainedto the resources (memory,
data channel, etc.) allocated by the operating system.
Potential violation of these resources, detected by the hard-
ware, can cause immediate suspension of that application.
4.6.8 Operating System Software
The operating system software serves several major pur-
poses in the COTS + concept. Therefore, a standard operat-
ing system should be defined for COTS+.
The main role of the operating system is maintaining func-
tional integrity in scheduling and dispatching application
programs. It will be possible to prove a level of temporal
6-._erminism in the scheduling of all applications and to
prove that this is unaffected by the later addition of lower
priority applications to the system. Functions of the operat-
ing system include ensuring pamtion isolation, allocating
processing time to the partitions, dispatching processes for
execution, and maintaining a standard interface that allows
application programsto be ported to different core proces-
sors.
One COTS+ method of achieving this is to implement a
method of time slicing and to split applications into strict
tempo and scheduled groups. Each strict tempo application
is assured a specific amount of processing time in each
time slice so that it can perform a certain number of
defined algorithms in eachallocated Ume SIOLIfits pro-
cessing is completed in its allocateA time, it will relinquish
control to the next application. If an application overruns
itstime slot,itistimedoutby the operatingsystem.The
schedulingprovides sufl'tcienttime to each time slice for
this to work efficiently. Hence, the addition of other sched-
ule.level applications has no effect on the strict tempo
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applications and merely causes the schedule-level applica-
tions to take longer. It is important to note that a strict
tempo application may not be interrupted by a software
interrupt. This is the reason for scheduling an application's
interrupt process rather than vectoring the interrupt directly
to the application.
The operating system will be capable of recognizing both
periodic and aperiodic processes and scheduling and dis-
patching all processes. The operating system will provide
status and fault data for each partition.
Since the operating system will need to perform with a
high degree of integrity for critical applications, it may
have unique certification criteria. It should therefore be as
simple as possible.
The operating system also manages the allocation of logi-
cal and physical resources on behalf of the applications. It
is responsible for the management of memory and commu-
nications. It receives interrupts associated with power fail-
ures and hardware error, relaying these incidents to the
health monitoring function, which in turn directs the neces-
sary actions to allow recovery or other actions. It will also
channel application-specific software interrupts or events
to the appropriate application and to a defined time scale.
As manager of all physical resources in this multiprogram-
ming environment, the operating system monitors requests
for resources and conuols access to those resources that
cannot be used concurrently by more than one application.
It has access to all memory, interrupts, and hardware
resources.
Fault tolerance, redundancy, and reconfiguration are inher-
ent to the operating system. It will be capable of reporting
faults and executing subsequent actions. The operating sys-
tem software shall manage the redundancy within the core
processor.
In allocating and managing resource requests and commu-
nication interfaces from and to applications, the operating
system has linlited conl_olled access to the application
memory. The operating system monitors the hardware
responsible for the integrity of the software partitions and
communicates with a health monitoring function on soft-
ware and hardware integrity failures.
The health monitoring function is specific to the core pro-
cessor design and to the spacecraft installation. Therefore,
it is recommended that this software be parutioned into an
operating system health monitor and a recovery strategy
table. The latter requires configuration def'mition and
embedded recovery strategies.
The operating system contains an error repotting capability
that can be accessed by applications. If an application
detects a fault in the operation of the system, it is able to
report this to the operating system, which in turn invokes
the health monitoring function.
Applications may need to check system health and recon-
figuration status for any reconfiguration that may have
been performed.
The operating system is conswained by the APEX interface
specification allow interchangeability of application soft-
ware. A secondary aim is that it be conswained by the
COEX interface specification to allow interchangeability
of core hardware from different manufacturers. Specific
hardware enhancements may be configured or added, and
these features themselves may be a combination of both
hardware and software.
It is recognized that combinations of applications vary in
overall complexity. Simple applications may use only the
basic features of a full operating system. The operating
system may be designed to allow itself to be built to pro-
vide only those essential features or a full set of features.
The configuration status of the operating system will then
be available for applications to check compatibility.
It is also recognized that not all features of the operating
system are available at the outset, and that some features
will evolve. Again, the design of the operating system will
allow this evolution, and, similarly, its version identifica-
tion will be available as part of its build identification.
4.6.9 The APEX and COEX Interfaces
The COTS + approach allows for the applications, operat-
ing system, and core hardware to be developed indepen-
dently by separate manufacturers. For this approach to
work, the interfaces require that rigorous standardization
and detailed specifications be defined for each. The APEX
interface is being defmed in ARINC Specification 653. It
is anticipated that these interface specifications may
require updating as the technology progresses. Therefore, it
is important to define the revision status of the interface
specifications as part of system configuration management
definition (see Subsection 4.6.11).
The APEX interface places rigid constraints on the operat-
ing system, application software, and to some degree, the
entire system. Communication is standardized by making
the format of all communications the same, whether the
transfer is application to application or application to sen-
sot/actuator. The APEX places layering and partitioning
demands on the operating system to allow growth and
functional enhancement.
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Operating system requests, particularly communication
requests, are made in one of several modes. Either the
application can request that the function be performed and
then suspended awaiting completion of that request, or that
it continue running and either poll the status of the request
or merely be alerted that the transaction is complete.
It is anticipated that the interfaces will be split into
groups/areas such as memory management, data I/0, etc.,
and that each area will be furthersubdivided.
The processing of a communication request within the
operating system consists of setting up the appropriate
backplane bus format and passing the message to the hard-
ware interface.
To ensure temporal determinism, each message definition
includes a maximum and minimum time of response. Cer-
tain message types also include a time.out specification,
which can be set up by the application. The response time
canbecalculatedfromthemaximum andminimum delays
of the backplane and network buses with an allowance for
operating system processing. An operating system must
meet this response time allowance. In this way, the inter-
face specification constrains those functions that are time-
dependent.
Hence all communications, including requests, commands,
responses, and dam I/0, between the applications and the
operating system are processed by this rigorously defined
message interface. Partitioning between applications and
between applications and the operating system is con-
trolled by standard hardware mechanisms. It can therefore
be shown that if an application can be proved to be com-
patible with the APEX interface, it will interface correctly
with the operating system.
The APEX interface is designed with full consideration for
forward compatibility. Standardized operating system mes-
sage def'mifions allow a growth path for future enhance,.
merits to the APEX interface. As long as any future APEX
definition is a superset of earlier definitions, no conflict
will arise as a resuk of any enhancement. A staged imple-
mentation is recommended.
The COEX interface specifies the hardware capabilities
needed to support the operating system. These include ini-
tialization, memory management, bus interface, and inter-
rupts.
It should be noted that application designers undoubtedly
make assumptions about the response time of the operating
systemandhardware.Therefore.su'ingentconstraintsare
placed upon the response of the operating system and hard-
ware to ensure that different suppliers provide components
with a similar grouping of response times and that the
re_ of COTS +systems integrated from different com-
ponents will behave as required. Otherwise, this time ele-
ment could defeat the aim of interchangeability. At the
same time, the scheduling method will be both consistent
anddeterministic.
4.6.10 The Health Monitoring Software Function
An OS health monitoring function resides with the operating
system and interfaces to a recovery strategy table defined by
the spacecraft designer or system integrator. This health
monitor is responsible for monitoring hardwarefaults within
the cote module and functional faults within the operating
system. This OS health monitoring function is a subset of
vehicle Integrated Health Monit_ing System (IHMS).
Hardware faults detected by the BITE system include
memory and processor faults and fauRs with the backplane
data bus interface. Any local hardware reconfilztwation
strategies are hardware implementation specific, will take
place within the hardware or the hardware interface sys-
tem, and will be transparentto the rest of the system. The
fault will be repom, d to the central maintenance system.
Some faults need to be reported and acted upon at a higher
level: therefore, an interface between the BIT/BITE func-
tions and the health monitor is specified.
Faults detected within the operating system will include
application violations, communication failures with remote
devices (i.e., anything over the backplane or network
buses), and faultsdetectedby applications and repmxed
back to the operating system.
A recovery table is usedto specify the action to be taken in
to the particularfauILThis action is initiated by
the health monitor and includes terminating an application
and startingan alternative application, together with an
appropriate level of reporting.
The recovery action is largely depend_at on the design of
the system. The health monitor shall determine the need
for action and initiate the recovery process. The recovery
action is largely determined by the architecture of the core
module.
Faultsdetectedbyotherapplications, such as sensor errors,
will be reported to the health monitor.
4.6.11 System Conf_uration Management
The ability to load software onbomd the spacecraft means
there is a need to control the compatibility between differ-
ent software components or between software and hard-
ware components.
4-44
The system configuration management function of the OS
health monitoring software is responsible for checking the
versions of software loaded against compatibility criteria.
One criterion is to check the revisions of APEX and COEX
used for developing the operating system and applications.
Only those configurations deemed compatible by this func-
tion are executable.
Initially, in addition to compatibility criteria, the total con-
figuration of the system requires definition. This encom-
passes applications, sensors, actuators, indicators, and so
on. In addition, that defmition requires flow down from the
system level onto the physical components of the system,
i.e., cabinet configuration, core module, remote data con-
ce,nuators.
Providing these definitions at each level is essential to
allow the monitoring functions of the health monitor to be
performed and any necessary fault recovery su'ategies to be
defined at the appropriate level.
The operating system must know how the applications are
configured to perform the necessary installation, ini_-
don, and channeling of communications.
4.7 Data Sources and Destinations
4.7.1 Introduction
Data sources can be defined as those aviomcs components
that provide data to the avionics cabinet for computation.
Sources communicate their data through the network data
busor through inted'ace modules.
Data destinations or dam sinks receive data as a result of
computations taking place in COTS +. Destination equip-
merit receives data from the network data bus or from
interface modules.
This subsection describes data sources and components
used to process data in the COTS + architecture. It includes
data originating in w.ripherals and directed to computing
equipment, data originating in computing equipment that is
diw_ted to peripherals, and equipment that communicates
through special-purpose interfaces.
4.7.2 Objectives
This subsection recommends guidelines for standardizing
electrical interfaces used in transferring information
between data sources and destinations to minimize the
number of signal types. It also provides guidelines for stan-
dardizing interface equipment, either integrated in the
avionics cabinet or contained in remote equipment
4.7.3Identifwation
Typical data sources are seasors, control panels, relays, test
generators, program pins and other avionic subsystems.
Examples include sensors, conlxol units, and antenna units.
Typical destination equipment includes actuators, displays,
relays, test storage, antenna units, and other avionic equip-
menL Subsystems are generally classified as equipment
located outside the cabinets. They generally communicate
with the cabinet-mounted equipment through digital Irans-
mission links.
4.7.4 Signal Types and Characteristics
Signals transferred between the processors and the somr_
or destination can be analog, digital, or discrete.
4.7.5 Network-Compatible Devices
Network-compatible devices are those sensors, actuators
and data concenu-ators that communicate with the cabinets
via the global data bus or network, e.g., the ARINC 629
data bus. Where it is cost-ineffective or physically imprac-
tical interf_e directly with a seasor, simple devices may
be interfaced by being clustered around a remote data con-
centrator. A remote data concentrator is a device that can
serve as a source of data to or a sink fxom several simple
devices (refer to Subsection 4.7.6).
4.7.5.1 Availability Considerations--The availability
requirements of network-compatible devices themselves
are wide ranging. The availability of these devices in terms
of integrity, redundancy, and deferred maintenance needs is
governed by the criticality of the function with which the
device forms an integral part. The method of providing that
availability may be internal fault tolerance of conventional
function-level redundancy.
The availability needs will be determined by analyzing the
functions, their criticafity, and the network architecture.
The maintenance needs of a network-compatible device
will also determine its availability needs. Sensors/actua-
tor's may be located in inaccessible regions of the space-
craft or where their removal from associated equipment
may cause considerable disruption and reteSL The main-
tenance needs of these devices may range from "fit and
forget," deferred, and scheduled to as-required mainte-
llallce.
4.7.5.2 EnvironmentaIConsbleraflons--Thedesign of net-
work-compmible devices is determined by a wide range of
environmental requ_ncnts. Some of the devices will be sub-
ject m exaemely harshenvimcments such as vibration, fluids,
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andelectrical effects (e.g., FADEC, fuel management). Others
will be subject to relatively benign environments and may be
located in the cockpit or cabin areas.
4.7.5.3 Sensor CapabUities---Sensors may have different
levels of intelligence. The maximum level would be the
ability to interface to the global data bus or network and to
provide signal conditioning, calibration, health monitoring,
and buffering. The minimum level would provide sensor
data in raw form. Increased intelligence within sensors is
encouraged since it reduces the necessary data bus waffle
between the sensor and the associated processor. An air
data probe may provide pressure in global data bus form
rather than raw encoded form.
Similarly, an actuator may embody its inner-loop conlrol
and lessen the cabinet processing burden. In spa_
configurations that require intelligence, but where it is
impractical to provide that within the actuator itself, a
remote data concentrator may perform that task on its
behalf, together with intelligence for other sensors/actua-
mrs. In such cases, and where the devices have different
integrity needs, the remote data concenwamr will offer
sufficient functional partitioning so that integrity is not
compromised. However, such partitioning may be more
appropriately provided in other ways, e.g., where sensors
of similar integrity needs are grouped around one remote
data concentrator and those of another level of integrity are
grouped around another remote data concentrator.
The depth of intelligence allows improved built-in-test
capability and applies equally to individual devices and
remote data concentrators. A minimum requirement is the
ability to determine device health (failure or malfunction)
as well as data path health.
4.7.6 Remote Data Concentrator
In general, remote data concentrators within the COTS +
architecture are network-compatible devices. The funda-
mental purpose of a remote data concentrator is to act as a
bridge between peripheral devices located in remote areas
on the spacecraft and the global data bus.
A remote data concenuator provides a means for peripher-
als that would otherwise require dedicate! wiring to pro-
cessing cabinets to be accessible via the global data bus.
Consequential benefits include decoupling the physical
location of the peripheral from the processing center and
increasing accessibility of the peripheral's data to several
functions without increasing wiring.
To reduce dedicated spacecraft wiring and make such
peripherals accessible via the global data bus, a remote
data concentrator placed in the proximity of simple periph-
erals concentrates that data from several sinks/sources onto
the data bus.
4.7.6.1 Degrees of Sophistication--In its simplest form,
the remote data concentrator function operates as a pure
data gateway between a collection of peripherals and the
global data buses. Therefore, it multiplexes data from actu-
ators and sensors and demultlplexes data arriving from
processing centers.
The provision of a remote data concentrator allows degrees
of sophistication to be made available for sensors and actu-
ators that would otherwise be impractical. System monitor-
ing and BIT functions can be provided for peripherals if
they are unable to provide these functions themselves.
Thus, sensor status could be transmitted over the global
data bus to allow further isolation of faults, with conse-
quent benefits in diagnostics and maintenance. The stan-
dardization of sensor I/O interfaces also makes it easier to
implement this capability.
When the remote data concentrator is operating as a pure
data gateway onto the airframe data bus, the form of data
emerging from it is dependent on the sophistication of the
sensor itself. An unsophisticated sensor provides its data in
raw form.
The remote data concentrator can provide a degree of
sophistication on behalf of simple sensors and actuators.
An example is data fusion of several sensors to provide a
more functional form of data, such as lrue airspeed (TAS),
in digital form from air data probes. In addition, data
fusion could provide additional integrity check on redun-
dam sensors or parameters from an otherwise inoperative
sensor by interpretation of other sensor data, thus provid-
ing a degree of fault tolerance. Similarly, the inner-loop
conffol of an actuator could be provided where it is
impractical to integrate into the actuator itsel£
Such sophistication reduces data traffic along the global
data buses and decouples higher, more complex functions
from the physical characteristics of sensors and actuators
by enabling standardization at the digital interface level.
4.7.6.2 Availability--The availability of a remote data
concenlrator, in terms of its integrity, redundancy, and
deferred maintenance needs, will be determined as a result
of an analysis of the configuration of the spacecraft periph-
erals and their criticality.
The method of providing those needs is not specified
herein. Availability requirements result from individual
design tradeoffs between internal fault tolerance and sys-
tem redundancy. The design of any I/O within a data con-
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centratorwill rake into consideration that it may gather
data from many sensors on behalf of several func6ons with
different criticalities.
In relevant cases, provision shall be made for partitioning
of signals on a functional basis and allowing verification of
data path and data source.
4.7.6.3 Design Aims---Remote data concentrators are sub-
ject to a wide range of environmental conditions, depend-
ing on their physical location. Each location determines the
method of implementation for that particular remote data
concentration function.
Factors that affect the internal implementation of the func-
tion are:
• Environmental, ranging from benign (cockpi0 to
harsh (engine/wing);
• Maintainability, accessibility, fit and forget, deferred,
or scheduled maintenance needs;
• Location and space.
Therefore, the design goal is interoperability at the func-
tional level rather than its internal implementation.
With greater degrees of sophistication, functions similar to
those in traditional commercial IMA cabinets can emerge.
Where they exist, the design guidelines for equivalent cabi-
net functions will be applied to the remote data concentra-
tor. It is recognized, however, that the peculiar constraints
applied to remote data concentrators may suggest that the
physical implementation and packaging may be quite dif-
ferent.
The use of generic modules for remote data concentrators
is encouraged.

Section 5
Technology Shortfalls and Needs
5.1 General
Technology shortfalls and needs are classified under three
categories: needs, concerns, and technology gaps. Since
COTS + technology is assumed mature by definition, short-
falls and needs occur when COTS + technologies do not fit
top-down space application requirements. Differences in
avionic requir_ents or COTS + characteristics requiring
further development are identified as needs. Difficult dif-
ferences are considered concerns. Diffeze.nces requiring
significant involvement, time-lapse, or risk are identified
as technology gaps.
5.I Technology Needs
The following COTS + technology needs were identified.
The disparity in linear accelerationrequirements is to
be accommodated by requiring qualifr.ation of
COTS +products to additional acceleration testing.
Commercial aircraft normally do not specify acoustic
requirements. Under MIL-STD.810, equipment
located in areas where noise levels are 130 dB or less
do not require testing to noise environments. There-
fore, acousticqualification will be required for
equipment installed in high-acoustic environments
such as near engines.
SEU recovery with error detection and correction
(EDAC) mechanisms and lachnp protection must be
providedinsubsystems.
• For extended-duration missions, a storm cell or
equivalent must be provided to protect critical avion-
ics from major upsets. A safe must be used for stor-
ing COTS + avionics cold spares.
• COTS + avionics must be qualified by analysis to
ensure that there are no detrimental outgassing
effects.
The operating system software serves several major
purposes in the COTS + concept. Therefore, it is a
goal that a standard operating system be defined for
COTS +.
• Commercial products will have to be designed to
withstand humidity and salt spray environments.
The health monitoring function is specific to the core
processor design and to the specific spacecraft instal-
lation. Therefore, it is recommended that this soft-
ware be pardtioned into an operating system health
monitor and a recovery strategy table. The latter
requires configuration definition and embedded
recovery strategies.
• The applications/executive (APEX) interface
requires a detailed specification.
Any COTS + equipment that may be operating ina
partial vacuum during the ascent phase shall be
proven by operation during the evacuation phase of
thermal vacuum chamber testing.
Standardization of the avionics fimctions or hard-
ware components is insufficient to provide unam-
bignous application function interfaces. For example,
new functions may be added at a later date. Require-
ments for an overall common application soRware
environment are necessary to integrate the building
blocks of avionic applications.
From a software perspective, COTS + is a function-
ally distributed system that encourages the integra-
tion of numy software functions. Requirements must
be provided to:
Manage the communication flows between appli-
cations and the data on which they operate within
the system.
- Provide conu'olroutines to be performed as a
result of system-level incidents that affect space-
craft cg=ation.
As with any other element within the COTS + archi-
teclare, unambiguous software environment inter-
faces axe necessary, not only between the elements
within the software architecture but also at the inter-
faces between software and other physical elements
defined in COTS".
Within the COTS + concept, the placement of func-
tionsand softwaxe applications is distributed among
the network ofprocessing centers. Several applica-
tions axe hosted on each processing center. These
applications may originate from different avionics
sources and be integrated intotheselectedimple-
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mentation of the core processing hardware. For
applications of different software criticality, reliable
software partitioning must be used to ensure fault
containment between applications.
To provide application-to-application and applica-
tion-to-hardware integration, comprehensive specifi-
cations must be generated. These specifications must
define fault-tolerant interfaces between e.ach applica-
tion and the hardware resources and define how
hardware resources are made available.
Requirements for software potlability must be gener-
ated. Portability of application software requires
interface standardization between application soft-
ware and core processor hardware. This interface can
be a combination of both hardware and software,
representing a common environment for application
software. It can clearly be divided into two areas of
focus:
- The logical method of resource management and
intercommunication;
- The means of mapping those logical methods onto
the physical hardware.
Configuration controlproceduresmust be generated
to demonslrate that all conditions necessary to satisfy
certification and V&V requirements are also satisfied
after modification.
• The configuration conlxol procedures generated must
be capable of identifying hardware and software con-
figurations that are compatible and constitute a vali-
dated configuration. It may be necessary for the
equipment design to incorporate safeguards to
enforce compatibility.
The COTS + parts list applicable to a particular series
of vehicles' lists will identify alternate parts that
have been determined to be acceptable. This list may
include interchangeable components specified by an
ARINC characteristic supplied by different manufac-
turers. While this type of documentation has proved
to be of significant economic benefit to the airlines,
in the COTS + concept, it introduces the problems of
identification, change control, and modification sta-
res accountability necessary of a configuration con-
Irol system. This issue must be addressed and
resolved.
At a minimum, COTS + components in RDIs must
have to be some space-qualified characteristics
because they may not be installed in protected envi-
ronments. This means that some COTS + products
will have to be ruggedized.
5.2 Technology Concerns
The following COTS + technologyconcern was identified.
• A cost-effective means of providing reliable COTS +
operation in radiation environments for missions
other than ETO must be explored. This includes a
study of radiation hardening and shielding.
5.3 Technology Gaps
No COTS + technology gaps were identified.
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Section 6
Development Direction and Recommendations
6.1 Administrative Recommendations
This study emphasized the identification of COTS + techni-
cal shortfalls and nee.As, although both adminiswative and
technical shortfalls and needs exist. In the administrative
realm, there are perceived needs to organize and administer
further effort in the exploration of COTS + in space. Spon-
soring and establishing technology maturation programs
and COTS + engineering and standards committees are
deemed necessary and are recommended fox furthering
COTS + integration.Administratingtotheseneedsisrec-
ommended.
A comprehensive COTS + development plan is needed.
The complex COTS + infrastructure requires establishment
ofCOTS + program priorities, partitioning ofnumerous
tasks (software, hardware, networks, qualification testing,
configuration control), and a schedule commensurate with
levels of desired integration and funding. However, before
thisplanisinitiatedfurther assessmentand analysisof
unresolvedstudyissuesshouldbe completed.Itisbeyond
thescopeofthis tudytorecommend sucha planatthis
time. Transitional COTS + integration, described below, is
recommended for inclusion in the development plan.
6.2 Technical Direction and Recommendations
The COTS + concept looks aaractive. This study showed
that COTS + components and technologies are feasible in
spaceapplications.However, onging studies and technical
development are recommended toanswer unresolved ques-
tionsand further exploxe the COTS + concept.
The following development directions and recommenda-
tions are suggested for study. They provide additional
detailed explorations, refine assessments, and provide
means to resolve technology issues, needs, and concerns.
This assessment must further evaluate the physical parti-
tioning archilecture presented in this study. The alternative
to the partitioning architectme is to employ ruggedized,
hardened components that are able towithstand environ-
meritswithouttheprotectionprovidedby partitionedareas.
Becauseitrequires7.1pounds toplaceeachpound ofpay-
loaddestinedforMars inlow-earthorbitusinga cryogenic
engine[RAFIgl], a comprehensivecost/weightradeoff
studyisrequired.This studyisnecessarytoassessthecost-
effectivenessofusingvariouslevelsofCOTS + ruggediz-
ingand hardening.The evaluationmust includean
assessment of all missions and various vehicles and
engines.
6.2.1 Comprehensive Assessment
Itisrecommended thattheCOTS + conceptbe testedfora
completevehiclearchitectureincorporatingCOTS + as
wellasspace-qualifiedsubsystems.Assessmentsusing
qualityfunctiondeployment(QFD) and analytichierarchy
process (AHP) melrics are recommended to properly eval-
uate the utility ofCOTS + in space. These toolsarevery
effective and provide a means to compare configuration
characteristics such as power, weight, reliability, and cost
m weighted evaluation critexia.
6.2-2 COTS + Deferred Maintenance Study
It is believed that a study of opportunity costs, payload
losses, and catastrophic losses will favor a COTS +
deferred maintenance concept. The concept is especially
appropriatefor expendable launch vehicleavionics using
low-costCOTS + components.Thisstudy,which empha-
sizesopportunitycostsand channelreplicationfordepend-
ability, is recommended to resolve COTS + cost utility
questions [SPACgl; WENSg0].
6-2.3 Transitionai Integration
The COTS + concept represents a step in avionic design
philosophy fox space avionic systems. It is recommended
that implementations of COTS + be incorporated in transi-
tional stages to reduce the technical and economic risk for
each space vehicle. It is hoped thattheapplication of
COTS + can be fully achieved over a number of yearsas
new spacecraft and spacecraft model derivatives arc intro-
duced and as confidence in the COTS + concept grows.
Each step should represent an improvement in the overall
avionics suite in accordance with the goals set for COTS + .
As inmany technologytransitions,the benefits of the ini-
tialsteps may not seem to offset the development cost and
the risk if viewed in a narrow, first-cost analysis. The wan-
sition plan for full COTS + implementation should there-
fore be viewed in its entirety. The first development of the
initial COTS + implementation should be viewed as an
investmentinthefuture.
If the orderly Wansition into COTS + is shunned for reasons
of first cost, disorganized de factointegrationmay evolve
and result in increased equipment cost and certification
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complexity.This will likely prohibit the growth in the c,oM-
tribution to overall spacecraft performance and emciency
promised by the COTS + approach.
6.2.4 Other COTS + AijpHcatJons
Although this study investigates the use of COTS + in
space missions, COTS + integration within ground-based
systems or applications is also apwopriate.
6.2.5 Maimenance Study
A maintainedsystemCOTS + conceptwillofferconsider-
ablereliabilityimprovement fortheLTV/MTV and excur-
sionvehicles over nonmaintained systems. Further COTS +
reliability and maintainability study is recommended to
assess this concept, establish baseline channel reliabilities,
and determine spares requirements.
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Section 7
Notes
7.1 Def'mitions
Aria---The Ada wogrmnming language standard clefmed
by ANSI/MIL-STD 1815A.
Appficafion--That software consisting of tasks or pro-
cesses that perform a specific avionics function on the
spacecraft.
Availability--The expected probability that a system or
piece of avionics equipment will be in an operational state.
Backplane--The physical circuit card and components
consisting of the electrical connection points for interfac-
ing cabinet resources to the outside world and integrating
avionics modules.
Backplane Data Bus---a. The portion of the physical
backplane that is dedicated to transferring data between
modules internal to an avionics cabinet, b. The logic and
protocol (network and data link layer) functions of the data
bus used to integrate modules in the cabinet.
Best Commercial Practico -Government-sponsored new
or modified designs that will not stand up to military envi-
ronments but are solid enough to withstand civilian duty.
Bus Bridge--A module or function of a module that trans-
fers data between data buses of the same format (e.g.,
FDDI to FDDI).
Cabinet--The physical structure used in IMA to provide
an environmental barrier and house the avionics modules,
cabinet resources and avionics backplane.
Civil Market COTS--Commercial products that are
bought exactly as found in the civilian market and axe
allowed to flow with the changes and updates the vendor
provides his customers.
Common Element--Those shared resources in the avion-
ics cabinet that include the core processing module(s), I/O
modules, LVPSs, and backplane.
Common Mode Failure---A failure occurring in common
elements that tends to cause simultaneous failures in asso-
ciated elements.
ComputerBA device or group of devices that performs a
data _g function.
Confidence--The extent that a combination of formal val-
idation, verification, and analysis render a system or unit
suitable for service.
Core Processor--A module that contains at least the pro-
cessing resources and memory.
Core Software--All software and firmware in a core pro-
cessor that is not part of the application process.
Coverage--A measmement of the ability of a fault toler-
ance mechanism to detect faults; expressed in _t.
Critical---A failure (or loss of component/function) that is
likely to cause injury to persons or significantdamage to
material t_E).
Data Concentrator--A component that collects various
types of data on the vehicle and outputs that data on global
buses. A data concentrator is equivalent to a smart sensor.
Deferred Maintenancx,---Maintenanee performed at a
later, more convenient time and place after the idenfit'r.a-
of a failure. This corresponds to "fly with failure" for
ELVs.
DeterministicBThe property of software to produce a pre-
dictable outcome based on the preceding operations. Usu-
ally, the outcomes occur in a specified period of lime with
some degree of repeatability.
Dissimilar--ln software, the intentional deviation in
design method with the goal of producing the same result.
This is often used to reduce the impact of generic faults in
a design and therefore improves overall system integrity.
Essential--A function or component other than critical
that is likely to reduce the ability of a more complex item
to perform missions.
Event Driven---The occurrence of an asynchronous dis-
crete action that causes a resultant action.
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Executive Software--The software resident in the core
processor that is respons_le for scheduling and dispatch-
ing all application software, pe_orming memory manage-
merit, processing interruptsand has a standardized
interface to the application programs.
Fail Operationni--Tbe property of a system that enables
it to continue uninterrupted operation in the event of a fail-
tire.
Fail-Pnssive---The property of a system that recognizes
that a failure has occurred and transitions the system into a
passive state to avoid adverse affects on system operation.
Failure -Tbe inability of a system to perform a required
function or functions. A failure is the functional peffor-
deficiency resulting from a fault, a. Hard Failure: A
failure that has existed continuously since its occurrence.
b. Inter_ten: Failure: A failure that occurs for a limited
time, after which the functional ability gecovers.
Fault--A fault is a physical co|tdition that causes a device,
component, or clement to fail to perform in a required
manner.
Fault Containment--To ensure that all faults are isolated
to an individual LRM for maintenance action.
Fault Detection---Tbe ability to positively identify that a
fault has occurred.
Fault Isolaflon_Tbe ability of a system to identify the
location of a fault once the fault has cccun_
Fault Propagatioa--The inducement of a fault into
devices other than the device in which the fault originated.
Fault Tolerance--The built-in capability of a system to
provide continued correct execution in the _ of a
limited number of hardware or software faults (IEEE).
Fault Tolerance Renewsl--_ a fault-tolerant
compotgnt to a completely operational state.
Funefiow--A function is equivalent to a subsystem (e.g.,
autothmtfle, autoland) and generally requires both hard-
ware and software in its implementation.
Gateway--A module or function of a module that con-
verts data from one data bus format to another (e.g., FDDI
to  gh-Speod DamBus).
Generic Fault--Those faults occurring primarily as a
result of a flaw in the specification or design of a system
and therefore tending to surface in any implementation.
Global--Of or pertaining to the spacecraft.
GLONASS--Global navigation sensor system developed
by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Hard Failure--Those failures that are nonrecoverable and
generally require a maintenance action.
Integrated Health Monitoring--An automated means of
verifying the operational status of all critical hardware
associated with vehicle assembly, launch, and support
is able to verify initial subsys-
phases of operations. HIM performance andtent fanlt-ffce status, detect abnormal
impending failures, and identify suspected components.
Integrity Geai----A targetbased on statistical analysis that
describes the operational, performance, and reliability
objectives of a system.
Latent Failure--Failures that tend to occur without detec-
tion and have the potential to manifest themselves at a lat_
time.
Memory Management--The property of the core pro-
cessing module to allow system memory to be partitioned
in away thatdifferent application software can share mass
memm3' devices without interaction.
ModuW---a. Hardware: A component whose packaging
confmns to packagingconcepuforintegratedmodular
avionics, b. Sofware: A functional grouping of wogram
statements to perform a specificprocessor task.
N-Version Programming--The practice of using multiple
dissimilar versions of software to perform the same task
for the purpose of improving system integrity.
Network--The integration of information associated with
digital ccsumunication systems.
Olive Drab Commercini---Militarized products developed
by commercial vendors at their own expense. The govern-
meat has no control over the specifications or product
delivery schedules.
Operating System--That portion of core softwmre that
includes the executive software and the software that con-
stimtcs the application executive and _ executive inter-
faces.
Partitioa--a. An atchitocture c.mcept that enst_s the
electronic sepam_ of avionics functions so that a fault in
one function cannot affect another, b. In software, that por-
tim of code dedicated to a specific application. It usually
depends on the use of memory management hardware to
prevent inadvet'te.ntcorruption of adjacent memory space.
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ProbabilisUe--The property of software to produce a
dictable output based on the statistical analysis.
Process--A programmable unit contained within a parti-
tion that executes concurrently with other wocesses of the
same partition. A process is the same as a task.
Processor--A device used for processing digital data.
Random Failure--An uncorrelated failure of a hardware
componenL
Reconfiguration--The ability for equipment to automafi-
caUy use alternate resomr.es, logic, or computing paths in
the case of a failure so as not to interrupt system operation.
Recovery Block--A portion of software dedicated to fault
recovery that is executed in the event that a fault occurs.
Reference Vehicle---A future manned mission vehicle,
platform, or module used to integrate COTS + architecture
for different missions.
Reliability--The property of an avionics system or com-
ponent to perform over a predictable time period; usually
expressed as mean time between failure (MTBF).
Repeater_A function or device that relransmits dam on
the same type of medium without altering the data.
RouterBAn intermediate function or device used to inter-
connect physical networks without altering the protocoL
SAFEbusm--Fault-tolerant, high-speed backplane bus for
the Boeing 777 airplane avionics.
SensorBA measuring or monitoring device for real-time
data.
Soft Failure---A failure that is automatically recoverable.
Standard UO--A family of modular I/O modules that
interface a cabinet through its intracabinet bus and provide
the interface to external systems, sensors, and actuators.
Strawman Conrg, urafion--COTS+ avionic architecture
applied to different reference vehicles.
Strawnmn Framework---Generic COTS + avionic archi-
tecture that can be modified and applied to different refer-
ence vehicles.
System---Any group of components, modules, or subsys-
v_ns describing an operational entity.
Task_A programm/ng unit contained within a partition
that executes concurrently with oth_ processes of the same
partition. A task is tbe same as a pincer.
Terminal---The Wotocol circuitry, memory, crystal oscilla-
tors, and serial interface module that make up a complete
transceiver.
Validation---The process of evaluating software at the end
of the software development process to ensure compliance
with software requirements (IEEE).
Verification--a. The process of determining whether the
products of a given phase of the software development
cycle fulf'dl the requirements established during the previ-
ous phase, b. Formal woof of program _mess. c. The
act of reviewing, inspecting, testing, checking, auditing, or
otherwise establishing and documenting whether items,
processes, services, or documents confrere to specified
requirements (IEF.E).
ACAF
ACARS
ACMF
ADIRU
AEEC
AHP
AIMS
AMLCD
AMU
APEX
ARINC
ASIC
ASRB
ATCRBS
7.2 Acronyms and Abbreviations
Airplane Crew Alerting Function
Aircraft Communication Addressing Reporting
System
Airplane Condition Monitoring Function
Air Data Inerdal Reference Unit
Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee
Analytic Hierarchy Process
Airplane Information Management System
Ac.tive-mmrix liquid crystal display
Avionics Module UnitmThe basic dimension of
a hardware module as defined by ARINC Spec-
ificatiou 650
Application/Executive Interface
Aezonautical Radio, Inc.
Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
Advanced Solid Rocket Booster
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System
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ATN
ATOPS
AVPAC
BIT
BITE
BIU
CDU
CMC
COEX
COTS
COTS +
CRT
DMC
DME
EEPROM
EFIS
EICAS
EID
ELS
ELV
EMI
ETO
FADEC
FBB
FDDI
FDIR
Am,onautic,M TelecommunicationNetwork
AdvancedTraHicOperatingSystem
AviationVHF PacketCommunication
Built-in test
Built-in test equipmem
Bus interface unit
Color display unit
Centralmaintcoancecomput_
Core/executiveinterface
Commercialoff-the-shelf
Commercialoff4he-shelf(includingruggedized
andmilit_izexl)equipment
Cadz)dc ray tube
Display nmnagement computer
DistanceMeasuring Equipment
ElecricalIyern,_bleprogrammablerend-only
memo_
ElecmmicFlightInsm_ent Symem
Engine,Indication and Crew Alerting System
Elecn-onic Insmunent Display
Elecu'onic L_rary System
Expendable Launch Vehicle
Elecuomagnetic interference
Earth m orbit
Full-Authority Digital Engine Control
Flyback Boos_
Fiber Disu-ibuted Dam Interface
FaultDetection, Isolation,andReconfigum-
doe
FMEA
FIVlE_S
GPS
HERF
HOL
ICAO
IHMS
IMA
INS
ISO
Isp
I/O
LAN
LCD
LEO
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Hight Management, Elccu_nic Fright lnsu-u-
ment System
Global Positiomng System
High-energy radio f_lu_ncy
High-order language
International Civil Aviation Organization
Integrated Health Monitoring System
Integrated Modular Avionics
Navigation System
Imernmional Organization for Smndanlization
Specific Impulse
Input and/or output
Local-arm he.york
Liquid crystaldisplay
Low-Earth orbit
LOX/LH2 Liquid oxygem/liquid hydrogen
LRM
LRU
LTV
MA
MAT
MCDU
MEL
MGR
MITS
MO
Line.replaceable module
Line-_placeable unit
LunarTransfer Vehicle
Modular avionics
Maintenance Access Terminal
Mulfifunc_n Conuol Display Unit
Minimum equipmentlist
Minimme GPS receiver
Iz,eo ed
IVlan-nmchi.einterface
7-4
MOPS
MPRAS
MTBF
MTBMA
MTBUR
lVlWIR
MTV
NASA
NDI
NSA
OS
OSI
OTV
OFD
RTCA
SA
Minimum operational performance standards
Multi-Path Redundant Avionics Suite
Mean time between failures
Mean time between maintenance alert/action
Mean time between unscheduled removal
Mean time to repair
Mars Transfer Vehicle
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nondevelopmental item
National Security Agency
Operating system
Open Systems Interconnection (Interconnect)
Orbital Transfer Vehicle
Quality Function Deployment
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
Selective availability
SAARU
SARPS
SASSO
SCB
S_
SEI
SRU
SS_
SSME
SS_
STME
_D
TDC
TM
V&V
Secondary Atumde Air Data Reference Unit
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
Space and Strategic Systems Operations
Self-checking buses
Self-checking pair
Space Exploration Initiative
Shop-Replaceable Unit
Sensor and System Development Center
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Single Stage to Orbit
Space Transportation Main Engine
To be designated/determined
Technical Data Change
Technical Memorandum. Test and Maintenance
Verification and validation
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HG-1128AA01 Smart Instrumentation
Module System (SIMS)
Advance Information_
Description
The HG-lI28AA01 Smart Instrumentation
Module System (SIMS) is a universal
sensor interface that integrates low-power
sensor preprocessing electronics with
application-specific r.nsors to provide
embedded sensing and monitoring for
health management applications and
sensing and actuation for control
applications. It is designed to increase
system availability and lower-life-cycle cost
by reducing both the time required for
inspection and the need for scheduled
maintenance.
The SIMS is programmable to receive
input from a variety of sensors of to
accommodate different sensor parameters.
System capabilities include data logging,
local qualifr.ation and decision making,
selFcalibration, fault and anomaly
detection, diagnostics, and embedded
control. SIMS for EmbeddodMonitoring, Diagnostics, and Control
Features
• Univexsa]sensor0/0)
• SmaUpack_
• Low power
• Extensive digital signal processor (DSP)
algorithm suppoa
• Flexible bus (I/O)
• Multiple high-resolution analog-to-
digital converters
• Militm'y qualified
Applications
Avionic system diagnostics .
Acsmpacc system environment,
monitoring
• Air data/flight control system
monitoring
• Local-loop industrial control
• Test dam acquisition
SIMS Bus (serial)
(wire, fiber, telemetry communical/ons)
Functional Schon_tic of SIMS
A-_
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Supporting Viewgraphs and Annotations
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B-_
Launch System Requirements
°
.
3.
°
°
°
,
°
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Reliability:. Performance (MTBF, environment), BIT, use of expert system, distributed
test & fault isolation
Maintairiabi/ity:. packaging, modularization, VHSIC, local maintenance
Autonomy:. ground checkout & integration, quick turnaround, launch readiness
assessment
Autonomous Integrated Flight Control: autonomous near real-time system/subsystem
reconfiguration in response to faults
Guidance, Navigation, & control:,autonomous to adapt to faults & variations in
environment
Low operational costs: standard common modules, replaceable modules, integrated
avionics/ground support
Health monitoring: automated on board prelaunch checkout, inflight monitoring,
redundancy management, maintenance system activity scheduling, eliminate vehicle
ground inspection activity, fault avoidance, used to obtain a diagnosis of potential system
failures to increase system availability, on-board data compression
Monitor, analyze, and archive LRU data
Monitor performance in test
Determine flight readiness
Monitor performance in flight
provide for interactive operator participation
Analyze & report post-test & post-flight
Fault Tolerance Requirements:
•Provide avionics & power systems which are failure-free to the extent required by
flight mission reliability
•There shall be no maintenance activities post-rollout
• assume TBD failure rates & system operating times
•with a post-factory checkout failure of any LRU, meet the mission reliability req, i.e.
fly with a failed LRU
+ From integrated Health Monitoringstudy (Avionics, propulsion, Engine, EMA)
" Sources: MSFC/HLVC, ICS, MDAC ALS, MPRAS
B-71
17.
20.
•Fault tolerant methodology should consider use of existing (COTS) software and should
be compatible with use of distributed digital systems, common hardware, and growth
capability
Maintainability:. Simple, reliable, Standardized design (i.e. standardized interfaces)
Adaptive Flight Operations (launch in maximum weather conditions with adaptive GN&C
and predictive health management function
Automated: Req analysis, design, manufacturing, assembly, test, inspection, in for
integration, mission planning, ground processing, logistics, records management, access
to design & manuf., data
Manuf. & assembly completed prior to launch site processing
Standardized & minimized ground operations (to accommodate all aspects of mission req
envelope, minimize steps & complexity of ground ops)
Right & Ground software: procedural language (i.e. Ada), conventional real-time
software on vehicle only, use expert system to replace standing army, common software
modules, common protocols
Incorporate Health Management to minimize on-board complex logic
Provide system status information during health and redundancy management,
acceptance, integration and checkout
+ From integrated Health Monitoring study (Avionics, propulsion, Engine, EMA)
* Sources: MSFC,/HLVC, ICS, MDAC ALS, MPRAS
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Requirements List
Cost t'I'BD)
Low cost
Reliability
nominal mtbf high rel mtbf
15,000 hrs 30,000 hrs
(class B) (class S)
ultra rel mtbf
150,000 hrs
(order of mag. improvement)
Component (module) reliability, nominal estimate based on supplier MIL-HDBK-217,
common module reliability calculations. Assumptions: missile launch environment, 50
deg C at card edge, class B parts
Maintainability
Vehicles operating in a space environment must utilize built in test and fault isolation to
track faults to single (or small number of) replaceable modules. Equipment must be
spacesuit compatible without tools and should include handholds for leverage on zero g
class vehicles.
Useful Life
Earth to orbit: 1 - 200 hours (8.3 days), up to 720 hours (30 days), reuses -- 0, 50-250
Transfer/Excursion vehicles:
Lunar: 200 - 2,000 hours (8.3 - 83.3 days), 4 days excursion, 30 days transfer,
reuse = 5 missions/life
Mars: 12,000 - 35,000 hours (500 days - 4 years), 600 days excursion, 1100 days
transfer, reuse = 1 use for chemical vehicle concept, 2 uses for nuclear
vehicle concept
Orbital platforms: 85,000+ hours (10+ years)
Personal maneuvering units: 12 hours, 5 year life
Orbital maneuver and cargo transfer:. 30 days
SSF exploratory probes: 10 years, single use per life
Mobile planetary systems: 1 day - 3 months, 5 year life
Fixed planetary systems: 20+ years
Safety (TBD)
Quality Assurance CI'BD)
Transportability (TBD)
Health Monitoring CI'BD)
- architecture
- percent coverage
- detection
- isolation
B-81
Requirements List (continued)
Commonality CI'BD)
. interchangeability
. standardization
Environmental CrBD)
. Acceleration
The highest acceleration is expected to occur during the Earth to orbit (ETO) mission
segment or during aerobraking and re-entry. Shuttle launch produces up to 4 g of dynamic
acceleration.
. Vibration
The most severe vibration occurs during the ETO mission segment or during
aeromaneuvering.
- Shock
Shock eventsareassociatedwith thefollowingmissionevents:staging,docking,
maneuvers, landing,oremplacement.
. Electromagnetic CI'BD)
. Thermal
Based on information provided by the Lunar Transportation Facilities and Operations
Study Final Report by McDonnell Douglas, Lunar surface temperatures range from -153
°C at night to 108 °C in daylight. The average Earth's surface temperature is about 22 °C.
Equipment utilized on the moon will be exposed to a solar radiation heat load of up to 442
BTU/hr/ft 2.
Alternate information about thermal exposures for the Lunar orbits as well as Earth and
Mars orbit is provided by the Boeing r,_mrt:
Within planetary atmosphere - specify vehicle/system temperature
In orbit - specify heat flux/thermal radiation fxom sun and nearby planet
LEO = Low Earth Orbit
LLO ---Low Lunar Orbit
LMO = Low Mars Orbit
LEO: 200 W/m 2 in earth's shadow and 1600 Wire 2 when exposed to sunlight.
LLO: 15 W/m 2 in moon's shadow and 2800 W/m 2 when exposed to sunlight.
Venus fly-by: 2800 W/m 2
LMO: 110 W/m 2 in Mars' shadow
Mars surface: -95 ° C to 25 ° C
B-82
RequirementsList (continued)
- Contamination (Dust)
TheLunarTransportationFacilitiesand Operations Study identifies dust as a major design
consideration. The Lunar dust has low electrical conductivity which allows it to build up an
electrostatic charge. The charged dust particles are then likely to be attracted to and stick to
surfaces of bodies in their immediate proximity. The layered dust poses risk both as a
contaminant and as an insulating blanket which impedes heat dissipation from electronic
equipment.
- Meteorite
Code Z 1989 Exploration Study Requirements Document provides a requirement for
micrometeoroid protection for flight vehicles while on the Lunar surface. The
phenomenon has been quantified in the following equation:
Logl0Nsp = - 14.41-1.22 logl0m where,
Nsp = number of particles of mass m or greater per square meter per second
m = particle mass in grams
According to this equation for estimation, a vehicle on the Lunar surface with 250 m2 of
surface area will experience 750 strikes per year by a meteoroid of 10 -6 grams or more.
The vehicle must be provided with protection to assure a probability of 0.985 against
penetration over thirty years. Space Station Freedom currently has a protection prevision
requirement of 0.9995 probability of no micrometeoroid penetration per year.
- Radiation
The space radiation environment is composed of three main components: earth's trapped
radiation belts, galactic cosmic rays, and solar cosmic rays. On-board nuclear power
reactors are an additional potential source of radiation. Radiation effects can be transient
(single event upset) or permanent (total dose, displacement damage, latchup, burnout).
Techniques for hardening to long-term effects include: shielding, device selection, device
hardening, and electronics design margin (fault tolerant design for single event upset and
examination of effects on critical parameters of each device/module). /,bout 40 - 60 mils
of A1 is recommended for radiation shielding of electronic equipment (approximate from
Boeing chart).
Galactic cosmic ray exposure on the Lunar surface has been quantified in the following
ways:
1.3 x 108 to 7 x 107 proton_cm 2 with energy levels between 40 and 1013 MeV.
The equivalent average annual dose is 12 REM.
Solar proton events lead to radiation energy levels in the order of 3 to 300 MeV. It is likely
that solar storm shelters will be used on the Lunar surface to protect personnel and
equipment from the previously detected solar storms.
B-83
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Avionic Function Definitions*
Guidance and Navigation
Process for achieving the desired conditions at engine cut-off and determmg vehicle
position and velocity.
Flight Controi/Effectors
Process that commands vehicle actuators to achieve desired vehicle orientation, position,
velocity, and acceleration.
Propulsion/Fluids
Process of determining fuel quantities and controlling fuel mixture and tank pressures for
optimum vehicle performance.
Telemetry
Process for collecting sensor data from the vehicle and sending it via RF link to ground
processing equipment.
Communications
Process of transmitting and receiving data, voice, and video signals between and within
systems.
Power Management
Process of conditioning system power and muting it to subsystems in a controlled manner.
Data Acquisition
Process of sensing stimuli, converting to electrical signals, and providing signals to vehicle
subsystems
Data Management
Processing, filtering, compression, handling and storage of data.
Crew Support
Provision for human interfaces, life support, and training and simulation.
Range Safety
Disabling or destroying a vehicle in the event of a failure which could result in injury or
death.
Health Monitoring
Observation and recording of vehicle system status infmmafion and recommendation of
_mfigumion response.
Deorbit/Reeovery
Process of separating launch components for return to earth and control of attitude and
position as require&
Rendezvous/Docking
Bringing vehicles and/or platforms together and coupling
Payload Support
*Adapted from General Dynamics Space Avionics Requirements Study, Fmal Task Report,
10/30/90 and Multipath Redundant Avionics Suite Reference VehicleJRequirements,
Preliminary, 6/7/89.
B-90
J
Interface with payload for basic support (e.g. power, processing), calibration, checkout
and deployment.
Ground Support Equipment
Interface with ground equipment to provide rcsom'ces and support during vertical
integration, cargo and payload installation, and prelaunch phases of a mission.
Candidate Systems*
STS = Space Transportation System
STS-C = Space Transportation System - Cargo
HLLV = Heavy LiftLaunch Vehicle
NDV = NationalAerospacePlane(NASP) DerivedVehicle
LTV = Lunar TransferVehicle
MTV = Mars TransferVehicle
LEV = Lunar ExcursionVehicle
MEV = Mars ExcursionVehicle
PMU --PersonalManeuvering Unit
OMV = OrbitalManeuvering Vehicle
SSF = Space StationFreedom
MTrN = Man Tended TransportationNode
Probe = ExploratoryProbe
The followingsystemsareacknowledge,d,butnot considere,d tobc inthescope of this
study:
Pmssm-izeM Surface Rover
Unpressm'iz_ SurfaceRover
Robotic Surface Rover
Manned Soil Mover
Unmanned Soil Mover
PersonnelQuarters
Command and ControlC.cntcr
Power Plant
Soft Processing Facility
Mass Driver
Science Center
Spaceport
Environmental Operations Center
*Adapted from GeneralDynamics Space AvionicsRequirements Study,FinalTask Relxn't,
10/30/90and MultipathRedundant AvionicsSuiteReferenceVehicle/Requirements,
Preliminary,6/7/89.
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